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436
3DHS / Cashing in on Client #9
« on: March 17, 2008, 08:45:49 PM »
Cashing in on Client #9

You've got to love capitalism. No matter what happens, someone will use it as an opportunity to generate wealth. Virgin Mobile Canada makes the most of Client #9:


From the ad copy:

    At Virgin Mobile, you're more than just a number. When you call us we'll treat you like a person, not a client. Whether you're #9 or #900, you'll get hooked up with somebody who'll finally treat you just how you want to be treated.

But the services Eliot Spitzer required might run you a little extra.

via Moonbattery

437
3DHS / Wall Street fears for next Great Depression
« on: March 16, 2008, 11:14:38 PM »
Independent.co.uk
Wall Street fears for next Great Depression
By Margareta Pagano, Business Editor
Sunday, 16 March 2008

Wall Street is bracing itself for another week of roller-coaster trading after more than $300bn (?150bn) was wiped off the US equity markets on Friday following the emergency funding package put together by the Federal Reserve and JPMorgan Chase to rescue Bear Stearns.

One UK economist warned that the world is now close to a 1930s-like Great Depression, while New York traders said they had never experienced such fear. The Fed's emergency funding procedure was first used in the Depression and has rarely been used since.

A Goldman Sachs trader in New York said: "Everyone is in a total state of shock, aghast at what is happening. No one wants to talk, let alone deal; we're just standing by waiting. Everyone is nervous about what is going to emerge when trading starts tomorrow."

In the UK, Michael Taylor, a senior market strategist at Lombard, the economics consultancy, said on Friday night: "We have all been talking about a 1970s-style crisis but as each day goes by this looks more like the 1930s. No one has any clue as to where this is going to end; it's a self-feeding disaster." Mr Taylor, who had been relatively optimistic, has turned bearish: "It really does look as though the UK is now heading for a recession. The credit-crunch means that even if the Bank of England cuts rates again, the banks are in such a bad way they are unlikely to pass cuts on."

Mr Taylor added that he expects a sharp downturn in the real UK economy as the public and companies stop borrowing. "We have never seen anything like this before. This is new territory for us. Liquidity is being pumped into the system but the banks are not taking any notice. This is all about confidence. The more the central banks do, the more the banks seem to ignore what's going on."

Mr Taylor added that the problems unravelling at Bear Stearns are just the beginning: "There will be more banks and hedge funds heading for collapse."

One of the problems facing the markets is that, despite the Fed's move last week to feed them another $200bn, the banks are still not lending to each other.

"This crisis is one of faith. We are going to see even more problems in the hedge funds as they face margin calls," said Mark O'Sullivan, director of dealing at Currencies Direct in London. "What we are waiting for now is for the Fed to cut interest rates again this week. But that's already been discounted by the market and is unlikely to help restore confidence."

Mr O'Sullivan added that the dollar's free-fall is set to continue and may need cuts in European interest rates to trim the euro's recent strength against the dollar. "But the ECB doesn't like cutting rates," he said.

On Europe, Mr Taylor said that while the German economy remains strong, others such as Italy's and Spain's are weakening. "You could see a scenario where the eurozone breaks up if economies continue to be so worried about inflation."

European financial markets were relatively unscathed by Wall Street's crisis but traders expect there to be a backlash when stock markets open tomorrow.

The Fed's plan will give 28 days of secured funding to Bear Stearns, which saw its value slashed over the week by more than a half to $3.7bn. JP Morgan will provide the funding, but the Fed will bear the risk if the loan is not repaid. Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke, who pumped $200bn of loans to cash-strapped institutions last week, said more would be available to help others in distress.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/wall-street-fears-for-next-great-depression-796428.html

438
3DHS / J.P. Morgan Rescues Bear Stearns
« on: March 16, 2008, 10:59:59 PM »
J.P. Morgan Rescues Bear Stearns
U.S. Pushed Deal
To Avert Crisis;
A Fire-Sale Price
By DENNIS K. BERMAN, SUSANNE CRAIG and KATE KELLY
March 17, 2008
Bear Stearns Cos. reached an agreement to sell itself to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., as worries grew that failing to find a buyer for the beleaguered investment bank could cause the crisis of confidence gripping Wall Street to worsen.

The deal calls for J.P. Morgan to pay $2 a share in a stock-swap transaction, with J.P. Morgan Chase exchanging 0.05473 share of its common stock for each Bear Stearns share. Both companies' boards have approved the transaction, which values Bear Stearns at just $236 million based on the number of shares outstanding as of Feb. 16. At Friday's close, Bear Stearns's stock-market value was about $3.54 billion. It finished at $30 a share in 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite trading Friday.

Effective immediately, J.P. Morgan Chase is guaranteeing the trading obligations of Bear Stearns and its subsidiaries and is providing management oversight for its operations. The deal isn't subject to any conditions, except shareholder approval. It is expected to close before the end of the second quarter.

Government regulators, including the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, have given their blessing to the transaction

Many well-known investors, from billionaire Joe Lewis to Bruce Sherman, the head of Legg Mason Inc.'s Private Capital Management Inc. money-management firm, have seen the value of their stakes in Bear Stearns plummet. The pain could be most acute for Bear Stearns's employees, who are steeped in a culture of personal ownership -- and hold about a third of the firm's shares outstanding.

Through the weekend, Bear Stearns bankers were summoned to the company's headquarters on New York's Madison Avenue, where they were told to prepare lists of ongoing deals and business relationships. Representatives from prospective buyers circulated through conference rooms, with J.P. Morgan executives asking questions of Bear Stearns's senior management. A separate bidding group, including J.C. Flowers & Co. and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., also was in the mix, said a person familiar with the discussions.

Bear Stearns shares, which traded as high as $170 in January 2007, fell 47% on Friday after the firm was forced to seek emergency funding from the Federal Reserve and J.P. Morgan to stay afloat amid a severe cash crunch.

One stumbling point for a sale appeared to be the amount of risk that J.P. Morgan would absorb in any type of transaction. While J.P. Morgan was eager to snap up some of Bear Stearns assets -- such as its prime brokerage business that caters to hedge funds -- Chief Executive Officer James Dimon was reluctant to pursue the deal without certain assurances that would protect his firm's exposure, said people familiar with the matter. Spokesmen for Mr. Dimon couldn't be reached yesterday.

Despite the emergency funding from J.P. Morgan and the Federal Reserve that was announced Friday and gives Bear access to cash for an initial period of 28 days, the clock is ticking on the 85-year-old firm. Late Friday, credit-ratings firms downgraded Bear Stearns to two or three levels above junk status. The downgrades also had a big impact on Bear Stearns's viability, as they severely crimped the firm's number of potential trading partners.

Regulators, bankers and investors are concerned Bear Stearns's stock could plummet even further when the stock market opens today. A continued exodus by parties with which the investment bank trades could even cause it to collapse. Still, unwinding Bear Stearns could be a nightmare because of the plethora of Wall Street firms with which it has dealings.

Analysts and investors are bracing for more bad news as securities firms report earnings this week, though Bear Stearns's results are expected to surpass the average estimate from analysts surveyed by Thomson Financial, say people familiar with the matter. A Bear spokesman declined to comment.

Meanwhile, worries are deepening that other securities firms and commercial banks might be on shaky ground. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Chief Executive Richard Fuld, concerned about the markets and possible fallout from Bear Stearns's troubles, cut short a trip to India and returned home Sunday, ahead of schedule, according to people familiar with the matter. The decision came after a series of calls Saturday to both senior executives at the firm and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, these people say.

Investors' concerns that the flight of worried Bear Stearns customers last week might spread to other firms is likely to make for a tense opening today on Wall Street. Yesterday, Mr. Paulson said in a TV interview that the government "would do what it takes" to protect the integrity of the financial system.

On several occasions over the weekend, Mr. Paulson spoke about the Bear Stearns negotiations with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and New York Federal Reserve Bank President Timothy Geithner, according to people familiar with the matter.

The takeover agreement signals an abrupt and crushing end for Bear Stearns, one of Wall Street's best-known firms. Though it had survived many previous market swoons, it was savaged by the crisis in the nation's mortgage market, which began last August.

Over the weekend, some Bear Stearns employees were hoping a foreign bank would emerge as the winning suitor, since that might mean fewer job cuts than in a domestic acquisition. But those prospects dwindled, leaving J.P. Morgan in the prime position to acquire the firm.

For J.P. Morgan, a Bear Stearns deal essentially would be one of convenience. The big New York bank hadn't planned on buying a Wall Street firm. It was focusing instead on the prospect of buying a large regional bank. But people familiar with the matter said that the Bear acquisition doesn't preclude J.P. Morgan from pursuing that strategy.

One of Bear's biggest attractions for J.P. Morgan is its prime brokerage business which caters to hedge fund clients. J.P. Morgan doesn't have such a business and executives there have long said that they would like to add those operations to the bank's portfolio. J.P. Morgan has been one of the banks eyeing the prime brokerage business of Bank of America Corp. That business reportedly is on the auction block.

J.P. Morgan executives, however, are far less interested in the rest of Bear's operations, including its investment-banking unit. J.P. Morgan already has a substantial investment-banking operation with ties to many high-profile clients. Indeed, executives have scoffed at the idea that J.P. Morgan would buy a large Wall Street firm despite repeated speculation that the bank would ultimately buy a rival such as Morgan Stanley.

"Fill-ins, piecemeals, joint ventures, small purchases, where they're filling gaps, [we are] absolutely, always open, always interested. But on doing something major that would create a dramatically different landscape, not in my lifetime," Steve Black, co-head of J.P. Morgan's investment bank, said last year.

Over time, Bear Stearns's misfortune could bear fruit for J.P. Morgan. Bear Stearns's investment-banking unit, which underwrites stocks and bonds and advises on mergers, and its fixed-income and capital-markets trading businesses have been badly bruised by the credit crunch but still have some value.

Likely even more valuable are Bear Stearns's clearing unit, which settles trades and also services and lends to hedge funds, and an investment-advisory business catering to wealthy customers. Both of those operations have suffered from withdrawals in recent days.

The probable sale of Bear Stearns is the latest in the cascading mortgage-related blows that began last summer and have resulted in staggering losses and write-downs on Wall Street, the ouster of several high-profile CEOs and an epidemic of worry that the financial system faces even more turmoil.

On Friday, Bear Stearns sought and received emergency funding backed by the federal government. Both the Fed and J.P Morgan stepped in to keep Bear afloat as investors moved to pull assets out of the firm. In stepping in, the Fed was trying to move aggressively to prevent the firm's from spreading to the broader economy. The lifeline gave Bear access to cash for an initial period of 28 days -- but it was widely believed Bear would be sold within days to keep it from going under.

The Fed's unusual intervention was motivated by a concern that a rapid and disorderly failure of Bear Stearns would wreak havoc on the markets in which the firm is an intermediary, particularly the huge and important securities-repurchase, or "repo" market.

Bear Stearns risked defaulting on extensive "repo" loans, on which firms pledge securities as collateral for overnight loans from money-market funds. If that happened, other securities dealers would find their access to repo loans restricted. The pledged securities behind those loans could be dumped in a fire sale, deepening the plunge in securities prices.

As a result, one of regulators' priorities in any deal for Bear Stearns or its parts is to minimize the risk to the financial system. That suggests that they want those counterparties furthest removed from Bear Stearns itself to know immediately where they stand in any deal, and for a buyer to have sufficient financial strength to reassure those counterparties.

Bankruptcy experts said filing for bankruptcy protection wouldn't have been an attractive option for Bear Stearns, partly due to recent changes in the federal Bankruptcy Code relating to financial instruments like derivatives and repurchasing trades. Unlike most parties in bankruptcy, lenders in such transactions aren't stayed or prevented from acting to seize or control the assets involved in those deals.

"They can send you a letter saying the value of the assets is falling, so either pay us back or we will liquidate the asset," said Holly Etlin, a managing director at AlixPartners, a turnaround and business advisory firm.

Financial regulators, which had been monitoring the situation at Bear on a daily basis leading up to Friday, beefed up their presence inside the firm over the weekend. Staff from the Securities and Exchange Commission's examinations group and trading and markets division, which monitors capital levels for soundness, worked with representatives from Wall Street's self-regulator, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, and Federal Reserve.

The SEC and Finra staff inspected Bear's books to ensure that if customers began pulling their accounts that there was a process to unwind the positions fairly, so as to prevent additional losses.

The regulators also had staff at other firms to monitor the brokerage firm's capital level amid speculation it could face liquidity problems. A person familiar with regulators said their presence wasn't to suggest that any particular firm was in trouble, rather it was to examine whether there was enough cash on hand to deal with potential problems.

--Robin Sidel, Michael M. Phillips, Greg Ip, Gregory Zuckerman, Kara Scannell, Heidi N. Moore, Jenny Strasburg and Jeffrey McCracken contributed to this article.

Write to Kate Kelly at kate.kelly@wsj.com1

     URL for this article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120569598608739825.html

    Hyperlinks in this Article:
(1) mailto:kate.kelly@wsj.com


439
3DHS / He's got my vote!
« on: March 15, 2008, 10:32:21 PM »
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sm2weLS5gJ4[/youtube]

440
3DHS / Partisan Trends - Party ID: Dem 41.5% GOP 31.8%
« on: March 14, 2008, 12:05:07 AM »
Partisan Trends
Party ID: Dem 41.5% GOP 31.8%
Sunday, March 02, 2008

As the public image of the Democratic Party shifted from Congress to the Presidential campaign trail, the number of Democrats in the United States has soared. In fact, during the month of February, the Democrat?s numerical advantage over the Republican Party grew to the highest level ever measured by Rasmussen Reports.

In February, the number of Americans who consider themselves to be Democrats jumped to 41.5%, the highest total on record. Just 31.8% consider themselves to be Republicans. The partisan gap?a 9.7 percentage point advantage for the Democrats?is by far the largest it has ever been. The previous high was a 6.9 point edge for the Democrats in December 2006. Rasmussen Reports tracks this information based upon telephone interviews with approximately 15,000 adults per month and has been doing so since November 2002.

The 9.7 percentage point advantage for Democrats is up from a 5.6 point advantage a month ago and a 2.1 point advantage two months ago. The surge for the Democrats is especially notable because it reversed a modest trend in the GOP direction that unfolded over much of calendar year 2007 (see history from January 2004 to present).

The gains for the Democrats were especially strong among women. In February, 46% of women considered themselves to be Democrats, up from 40% in December. The number of women identifying themselves as Republicans fell from 33% to 29% during that same time frame.

Among men, 36% were Republicans in December and 35% said the same in February. The number of men who are Democrats increased from 33% in December to 36% in February.

Data for February shows that 40% of adults under 30 are Democrats while just 27% now identify with the GOP. Republicans trail among all age groups but do best among forty-somethings where the gap is just four percentage points (38% Democrat, 34% Republican).

Democrats have a huge advantage among those who earn less than $40,000 annually and a two-percentage point edge among those in the $40,000 to $75,000 range. In December, Republicans had a five-point advantage among that income bracket.

Democrats currently enjoy an eighteen-point advantage among retired Americans, a thirteen-point edge among those who work for the government, and a seven-point lead among those who work for someone in the private sector. Republicans retain a four-point lead among entrepreneurs?those who are self-employed or own their own business.

Thirty-nine percent (39%) of Investors are Republicans, 37% are Democrats. In December, those figures were 40% Republican, 32% Democrat.

These results are based upon tracking surveys of 15,000 adults per month. The margin of sampling error is less than one percentage point, with a 95% level of confidence. Please keep in mind that figures reported in this article are for all adults, not Likely Voters.

In 2004, the Democrats began the year with a 2.3 percentage point edge over the GOP. That grew to 4.0 points by March before moving in the Republican direction for the rest of the year. By Election Day in 2004, the edge for Democrats was a mere 1.6 percentage points.

In 2006, the Democrats began the year with just a 1.6 percentage point advantage. That grew to 6.1 percentage points by November.

The Rasmussen Reports daily Presidential Tracking Poll shows the race for the White House remains close. Democrats start the season with an advantage in the Electoral College.

Democrats continue to have a significant advantage on ten key issues tracked by Rasmussen Reports and lead on the Generic Congressional Ballot.

http://rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_america/party_affiliation/partisan_trends

441
3DHS / Plumbing the Depths
« on: March 12, 2008, 01:54:27 PM »


    Plumbing the Depths

    How the Gears Turn

 

    March 9, 2008

 

    Common delusions notwithstanding, the United States, I submit, is not a democracy?by which is meant a system in which the will of the people prevails. Rather it is a curious mechanism artfully designed to
    circumvent the will of the people while appearing to be democratic. Several mechanisms accomplish this.

    First, we have two identical parties which, when elected, do very much the same things. Thus the election determines not policy but only the division of spoils. Nothing really changes. The Democrats will never seriously reduce military spending, nor the Republicans, entitlements.

    Second, the two parties determine on which questions we are allowed to vote. They simply refuse to engage the questions that matter most to many people. If you are against affirmative action, for whom do you vote? If you regard the schools as abominations? If you want to end the president?s hobbyist wars?

    Third, there is the effect of large jurisdictions. Suppose that you lived in a very small (and independent) school district and didn?t like the curriculum. You could buttonhole the head of the school board, whom you would probably know, and say, ?Look, Jack, I really think?.? He would listen.

    But suppose that you live in a suburban jurisdiction of 300,000. You as an individual mean nothing. To affect policy, you would have to form an organization, canvass for votes, solicit contributions, and place ads in newspapers. This is a fulltime job, prohibitively burdensome.

    The larger the jurisdiction, the harder it is to exert influence. Much policy today is set at the state level. Now you need a statewide campaign to change the curriculum. Practically speaking, it isn?t practical.

    Fourth are impenetrable bureaucracies. A lot of policy is set by making regulations at some department or other, often federal. How do you call the Department of Education to protest a rule which is in fact a policy? The Department has thousands of telephones, few of them listed, all of which will brush you off. There is nothing the public can do to influence these goiterous, armored, unaccountable centers of power.

    Yes, you can write your senator, and get a letter written by computer, ?I thank you for your valuable insights, and assure you that I am doing all?.?

    Fifth is the invisible bureaucracy (which is also impenetrable). A few federal departments get at least a bit of attention from the press, chiefly State and Defense (sic). Most of the government gets no attention at all?HUD, for example. Nobody knows who the Secretary of HUD is, or what the department is doing. Similarly, the textbook publishers have some committee whose name I don?t remember (See? It works) that decides what words can be used in texts, how women and Indians must be portrayed, what can be said about them, and so on. Such a group amounts to an unelected ministry of propaganda and, almost certainly, you have never heard of it.

    Sixth, there is the illusion of journalism. The newspapers and networks encourage us to think of them as a vast web of hard-hitting, no-holds-barred, chips-where-they-may inquisitors of government: You can run, but you can?t hide. In fact federal malefactors don?t have to run or hide. The press isn?t really looking.

    Most of press coverage is only apparent. Television isn?t journalism, but a service that translates into video stories found in the Washington Post and New York Times (really). Few newspapers have bureaus in Washington; the rest follow the lead of a small number of major outlets. These don?t really cover things either.

    When I was reporting on the military, there were (if memory serves) many hundreds of reporters accredited to the Pentagon, or at least writing about the armed services. It sounds impressive: All those gimlet eyes.

    What invariably happened though was that some story would break?a toilet seat alleged to cost too much, or the failure of this or that. All the reporters would chase the toilet seat, fearful that their competitors might get some detail they didn?t. Thus you had one story covered six hundred times. In any event the stories were often dishonest and almost always ignorant because reporters, apparently bound by some natural law, are obligate technical illiterates. This includes the reporters for the Post and the Times.

    Seventh, and a bit more subtle, is the lack of centers of demographic power in competition with the official government. The Catholic Church, for example, once influentially represented a large part of the population. It has been brought to heel. We are left with government by lobby?the weapons industry, big pharma, AIPAC, the teachers unions?whose representatives pay Congress to do things against the public interest.

    Eighth, we are ruled not by a government but by a class. Here the media are crucial. Unless you spend time outside of America, you may not realize to what extent the press is controlled. The press is largely free, yes, but it is also largely owned by a small number of corporations which, in turn, are run by people from the same pool from which are drawn high-level pols and their advisers. They are rich people who know each other and have the same interests. It is very nearly correct to say that these people are the government of the United States, and that the federal apparatus merely a useful theatrical manifestation.

    Finally, though it may not be deliberate, the schools produce a pitiably ignorant population that can?t vote wisely. Just as trial lawyers don?t want intelligent jurors, as they are harder to manipulate, so political parties don?t want educated voters. The existence of a puzzled mass gawping at Oprah reduces elections to popularity contests modulated by the state of the economy. One party may win, yes, or the other. But a TV-besotted electorate doesn?t meddle in matters important to its rulers. It has never heard of them.

    To disguise all of this, elections provide the excitement and intellectual content of a football game, without the importance. They allow a sense of Participation. In bars across the land, in high-school gymns become forums, people become heated about what they imagine to be decisions of great import: This candidate or that? It keeps them from feeling left out while denying them power.

    It is fraud. In a sense, the candidates do not even exist. A presidential candidate consists of two speechwriters, a makeup man, a gestures coach, ad agency, two pollsters and an interpreter of focus groups. Depending on his numbers, the handlers may suggest a more fixed stare to crank up his decisiveness quotient for male or Republican voters, or dial in a bit of compassion for a Democratic or female audience. The newspapers will report this calculated transformation. Yet it works. You can fool enough of the people enough of the time.

    When people sense this and decline to vote, we cluck like disturbed hens and speak of apathy. Nope. Just common sense.

http://fredoneverything.net/TACDemocracy.shtml

442
3DHS / New York Times Credit Rating Approaching Junk Status
« on: March 04, 2008, 04:16:17 PM »
New York Times Credit Rating Approaching Junk Status

It looks like sacrificing even the semblance of professionalism for the sake of moonbat ideology hasn't been a winning strategy for the New York Times:

    The New York Times Co.'s continued struggles with declining advertising revenue prompted Standard & Poor's to caution Friday that it is inching closer to cutting the company's debt ratings.

    S&P said it placed all of the Times' ratings, including its key long-term corporate credit rating, on CreditWatch with negative implications. In plain English, that means the rating agency is leaning heavily toward a downgrade unless current financial trends at the company improve.

    S&P currently assigns the Times a long-term corporate credit rating of BBB. A one-notch downgrade would bring the rating down to BBB-. But in a research note Friday, S&P credit analyst Emile Courtney warned that a possible downgrade "may not be limited to one notch."

    That would drop the Times' long-term rating to BB+ or worse, which would leave it at sub-investment grade, or junk.


Junk status would bring the Times' credit rating in line with its journalistic standards under Publisher Pinch Sulzberger, the left-wing weenie who has been steering the formerly respected paper toward bankruptcy in the name of moonbattery.

You can see why moonbats want everything socialized. The free market is not kind to fools.

via Moonbattery

443
   
Weather Channel Founder Blasts Network; Claims It Is 'Telling Us What to Think'
TWC founder and global warming skeptic advocates suing Al Gore to expose 'the fraud of global warming.'

By Jeff Poor
Business & Media Institute
3/3/2008 6:11:04 PM

     The Weather Channel has lost its way, according to John Coleman, who founded the channel in 1982.

 

     Coleman told an audience at the 2008 International Conference on Climate Change on March 3 in New York that he is highly critical of global warming alarmism.

 

     ?The Weather Channel had great promise, and that?s all gone now because they?ve made every mistake in the book on what they?ve done and how they?ve done it and it?s very sad,? Coleman said. ?It?s now for sale and there?s a new owner of The Weather Channel will be announced ? several billion dollars having changed hands in the near future. Let?s hope the new owners can recapture the vision and stop reporting the traffic, telling us what to think and start giving us useful weather information.?

 

     The Weather Channel has been an outlet for global warming alarmism. In December 2006, The Weather Channel?s Heidi Cullen argued on her blog that weathercasters who had doubts about human influence on global warming should be punished with decertification by the American Meteorological Society.

 

     Coleman also told the audience his strategy for exposing what he called ?the fraud of global warming.? He advocated suing those who sell carbon credits, which would force global warming alarmists to give a more honest account of the policies they propose.

 

     ?I have a feeling this is the opening,? Coleman said. ?If the lawyers will take the case ? sue the people who sell carbon credits. That includes Al Gore. That lawsuit would get so much publicity, so much media attention. And as the experts went to the media stand to testify, I feel like that could become the vehicle to finally put some light on the fraud of global warming.?

 

     Earlier at the conference Lord Christopher Monckton, a policy adviser to former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, told an audience that the science will eventually prevail and the ?scare? of global warming will go away. He also said the courts were a good avenue to show the science.

 

 

Stuart James and Paul Detrick also contributed to this report.

 

 

Related Links:

 

A New Special Report from BMI: Global Warming Censored

 

BMI's Special Report "Fire & Ice: Journalists have warned of climate change for 100 years, but can't decide weather we face an ice or warming"

 

Climate of Bias: BMI's page devoted entirely to global warming and climate change in the media.

http://www.businessandmedia.org/printer/2008/20080303175301.aspx

444
3DHS / Grand Old Party
« on: March 04, 2008, 03:13:55 PM »
February 25, 2008 Issue
Copyright ? 2007 The American Conservative

Grand Old Party

High spirits and low expectations at CPAC

by Michael Brendan Dougherty

At last year?s Conservative Political Action Conference, a man in a dolphin suit stood outside the Omni Shoreham Hotel mocking Mitt Romney?s flip-flopping on abortion, the Reagan presidency, and other issues dear to conservative hearts. Attendees loved him. This year, Flipper stood by himself in a hallway, his dorsal fin drooping, his plush head hanging?a year?s worth of wear and tear. With John McCain on the verge of winning the Republican nomination, few of the conservatives at CPAC wanted to joke about Romney, in whom they had of late placed their hopes. And within a few hours of the start of the conference, both Romney and Flipper would need to find new lines of work.

The former Massachusetts governor was introduced by Laura Ingraham, who, clueless of the drama to come, waxed on about Romney as the ?conservative?s conservative? while enthusiastic supporters waved foam ?Mitts.? With trademark efficiency, he delivered a speech that served red meat with the regularity and forced sincerity of a Denny?s waitress. On welfare and regulation, Romney said, ?Dependency is culture killing.? On family, he declared that the development of a child is ?enhanced? by having a mother and father. ?I wonder how it is that unelected judges, like some in my state of Massachusetts, are so unaware of this reality,? he mused.

He compared his run against McCain to Reagan?s campaign against the moderate Ford, but then declared that one issue trumped everything, even his own presidential ambitions: ?There is an important difference from 1976. Today we are a nation at war.? He explained that by fighting on to the convention, he would ?forestall the launch of a national campaign and, frankly, I?d make it easier for Senator Clinton or Obama to win. ? I simply cannot let my campaign be a part of aiding a surrender to terror.? As disappointed fans filed out, organizers hauled out the campaign debris. Exit Romney faithful, enter McCainiacs. The transition took mere minutes.

Well aware that CPAC wasn?t a natural constituency, McCain?s campaign had loaded a double-barreled introduction: former Virginia senator George Allen, who but for three unfortunate syllables might have been in McCain?s place, and Tom Coburn, arguably the Senate?s most conservative member.

His credentials polished, McCain entered to orchestrated applause?the string of speakers preceding him had urged the crowd to mind its manners?and struck as conciliatory a tone as an old maverick can muster. ?Many of you have disagreed strongly with some positions I have taken in recent years,? he said. ?I understand that. ? And it is my sincere hope that even if you believe I have occasionally erred in my reasoning as a fellow conservative, you will still allow that I have, in many ways important to all of us, maintained the record of a conservative.?

The reaction was mixed. The author of last year?s wildly unpopular ?comprehensive immigration reform? was roundly booed when he broached the subject of America?s borders. But he knew how to win the audience back: ?Whomever the Democrats nominate, they would govern this country in a way that will, in my opinion, take this country backward to the days when government felt empowered to take from us our freedom to decide for ourselves the course and quality of our lives.? (Within the same paragraph, McCain inadvertently demonstrated the contradictions between the old Republican palaver about freedom and the demands of the war on terror saying, ?It is shameful and dangerous that Senate Democrats are blocking an extension of surveillance powers.? No line got louder applause.)

McCain may not have sealed the deal, but he got his foot in the door. Blogging for National Review, Stanley Kurtz wrote, ?I thought McCain did an excellent job ? he won over most of the crowd.?

While the establishment was upstairs coalescing around its unlikely champion, the full spectrum of the conservative grassroots was on display in the downstairs exhibition hall. Where else to buy an ?I?d rather be water-boarded than vote for McCain? t-shirt? Other conservative couture featured a picture of a bricklayer constructing a wall: ?If you build it, they won?t come.?(One wonders what the Hondurans who make these shirts think of the Americans who buy them.) A generation after the Berlin Wall fell, red-baiting is still in vogue: one activist sold t-shirts with the figure of Vladimir Lenin bestriding an American university; another offered bottles of Lenin-ade and ushankas with hammer and sickle insignia and Clinton or Obama?s name.

Wandering among the dealers, Max Blumenthal greeted me. Son of former Clinton aide Sidney Blumenthal, Max writes for The Nation and produces video expos?s of the Right. He looked over his shoulder at the young Republican women standing around and asked, ?Shouldn?t they be dressed more modestly?? I laughed and said that the conservative movement doesn?t come from Amish country. Max offered his opinion of the way liberal women dress (not all that great) and pressed on about the short skirts and plunging necklines around us. By then, I wanted to get away. ?I guess they are dressed for breeding,? I quipped?then immediately worried that he was videotaping me. That would never sound right. But Max had hit on something odd about CPAC.

Six feet from us hung a t-shirt that read ?I only sleep with Republicans,? and two booths away Young Americans for Freedom featured an airbrushed poster of Ann Coulter in her best come-hither pose. The Young Britons? Foundation didn?t have any Edmund Burke tracts, but they did have a poster of a sultry brunette, her lips parted slightly. The lascivious caption: ?Life is better under a conservative.? Not to be outdone, banners at the Clare Booth Luce Policy Institute?s booth encouraged each young woman walking by to become ?A Luce Lady.? CPAC?s many parties would provide ample opportunity.

The first night, a Washington Times editor rented a room and spread the word that he had $1,500 worth of booze. The party was loud, and just a few moments after former congressman Bob Barr, leader of the House?s effort to impeach Bill Clinton, posed for a picture with his arms draped over two young women, the hotel shut down the festivities. The consensus opinion of the party: ?Off the hook.?

The Maine College Republicans boasted on Facebook of their annual binge: ?In just five years Mainefest has grown from a small hotel gathering to become one of Washington?s most highly anticipated social events of the year.? It?s not quite the Gridiron Dinner, but the parties seem to please the attendees. Washington?s free-market think tanks and lobbying outfits suffer from a lack of females, and college Republican groups contain a surfeit of attractive women looking for America?s future lawyers. Besides, the men in college Republican groups are unavailable and undesirable?their romantic attention entirely fixed on Ayn Rand.

Not everyone came for the parties. Outside the main ballroom, angry CPACers waved ?Republicans Against McCain? protest signs. Another cluster held up a ?McCain = Amnesty? banner. Libertarian activists claimed that registrations at their booth spiked as soon as Romney announced the suspension of his campaign.

Ron Paul, under whose standard most dissenters rallied, gave one of the sharpest speeches of his campaign. The only featured speaker to attack John McCain, Paul asked the audience to consider that the presumptive nominee had allied with Tom Daschle on tax policy, with Russ Feingold on campaign finance, with Al Gore on global warming, and with Ted Kennedy on immigration. He did not shy away from his differences with the movement on the war on terror: ?Osama bin Laden loves our foreign policy.? Donald Devine, second vice chairman of The American Conservative Union, moved slowly to the back of the room, asking if the people there supported Paul. With a sigh, he admitted that he, too, would probably vote for him. It was a stunning admission from one of CPAC?s founders.

But the organizers know better than to let their conference devolve into dissent. Newt Gingrich was called in as the closer. His speech contained his familiar chorus of absurd statistics: ?85 percent of American people believe we have an obligation to protect America and her allies, 75 percent believe we have obligation to defeat our enemies.? Apparently Democrats believe that America?s enemies should pillage Kansas City next week.

At one moment Gingrich seemed to echo the dissident voices heard in break-away sessions: it is essential for ?the conservative movement ? to declare itself independent from the Republican Party.? But that doesn?t mean starting a new party or even sitting out an election. Gingrich continued, ?Any reasonable conservative will?in the end?find they have an absolute requirement to support the Republican nominee for president this fall.? Apparently political independence from Republicans still implies an absolute requirement to vote for them.

Gingrich was acting according to the logic of CPAC. Founded to pull the country and the Republican Party to the right, the conference is now so well established and so reliant on the appearance of big-name politicians for its success (measured in number of attendees and media buzz) that it has become the place where conservatives reconcile themselves to voting Republican no matter what. Tempted though they may be to punish the GOP for its transgressions, each year Raymond Aron?s dictum prevails: ?In politics, the choice is not between good and evil, but between the preferable and the detestable.? Of course this gives incredible license to ?the preferable? to act detestably. If a movement believes that its opponents are the communist caricatures depicted on CPAC t-shirts, it can convince itself to throw in with McCain. By the end of Gingrich?s speech, morale had been lifted and attendees had their bags stuffed with all the trinkets they could carry.

The bullying bumper stickers, the man in the dolphin outfit, and the bestsellers by radio personalities are all the result of conservatives turning toward movement politics. It is tempting to sniff at the CPAC crowd?many of whom claim to be conservatives but cannot tell the difference between Russell Kirk and Captain Kirk. But that would be wrong.

Moving from ideas to policy advocacy and finally to governance requires building an electoral coalition that will, by its very nature, simplify subtle reflections into campaign slogans. When William F. Buckley tied himself, and by extension National Review, to the cause of Joe McCarthy, the conservative intellectual movement was married to a populist base. In his 1992 Republican convention speech, Pat Buchanan spoke of a great class of voters: ?They don?t read Adam Smith or Edmund Burke, but they came from the same schoolyards and playgrounds and towns as we did. They share our beliefs and convictions, our hopes and our dreams. They are the conservatives of the heart.? Many of them are now at CPAC?and that?s part of the problem.

The conference flattens the political passions of these conservatives, channeling their energy into national politics and away from local concerns. Thus the range of activism narrows to immigration, foreign policy, and the solipsistic goal of sustaining the conservative movement itself. This is good for keeping Beltway institutions well funded but bad for the actual work of conservatism.

As the Omni Shoreham?s staff disassembled the exhibit hall, the young Republicans repaired to Capitol Hill for the last party of the weekend, Reaganpalooza, where organizers urged everyone to ?Drink one for the Gipper.? A handful of anti-McCainiacs ordered stiff shots and argued over whether they could vote Republican in the fall. ?It?s an anti-Obama vote, that?s all,? one offered. ?But on immigration, McCain is against us. And on the war he?s against public opinion,? said another. But soon enough they swallowed their doubts and began dancing to the music, determined to celebrate a president who left office before some of them were born. The band never stopped playing on the Titanic either. 

http://amconmag.com/2008/2008_02_25/article.html

445
3DHS / Make the World Safe for Hope
« on: March 04, 2008, 07:44:20 AM »
February 25, 2008 Issue
Copyright ? 2008 The American Conservative

Make the World Safe for Hope

Can Barack Obama, who campaigns as an icon of peace, actually be more bellicose than Bush? Yes, he can.

by Brendan O?Neill

Obama-mania is getting out of hand. Full-grown and well-educated men?from swooning Andrew Sullivan to the entire staff of GQ magazine?are developing ?man crushes? on Barack Obama, going weak in the knees for his immaculately pressed suits, oratorical skills, and shameless hope-mongering.

?I?ve never wanted anyone more than I want you,? warbles Obama Girl in a song called ?I Got a Crush on Obama,? which has been viewed over 6 million times on YouTube. Celebs are queuing up to fall at his feet. ?My heart belongs to Barack,? says Scarlett Johansson. There?s a palpable whiff of semi-religious hysteria at Obama rallies. As Joel Stein wrote in the Los Angeles Times, ?Obamaphilia has gotten creepy,? and its ?fanatical? adherents are starting to embarrass themselves.

Actually, it?s worse than that: they are deluding themselves. Many Democrats have become so goggle-eyed, so insanely convinced that Obama is the savior of American politics (potentially rescuing both the Democratic Party from political ruin and America herself from the decadence and violence of the Bush era), that they are beginning to suffer political hallucinations. They fantasize that he is pure and righteous, a miracle-worker who, in a pique of rage, will overturn the conventions of neocon-ruled America.

The blind hope in Obama-as-messiah is most clearly expressed in the widespread delusion that he would be a ?president of peace,? welcomed by a world eager to bury the warmongering ways of the office?s former occupant and renew its respect for America. Columnist Michael Kinsley praised Obama?s ?valuable experience ? as what you might call a ?world man??Kenyan father, American mother, four formative years living in Indonesia, more years in the ethnic stew of Hawaii, middle name of Hussein, and so on?in an increasingly globalized world.? But from my sedate Obamarama-free home in London, I?m not cheered by the prospect of this ?world man? in the White House. Rather, I see him for what he is?or for what he threatens to become. Having never been stirred by the sight of Obama giving an MLK-style speech on the need for change, I can only take the candidates at their words. And Obama?s words are ominous indeed.

President Obama would be a warmonger. He would be a wide-eyed, zealous interventionist who would not think twice about using America?s ?military muscle? (his words) to overthrow ?rogue states? and to suppress America?s enemies, real and imagined. He would go farther even than President Bush in transforming the globe into America?s backyard and staffing it with spies and soldiers. He would relish the ?American mission? to police the world and topple tyrannical regimes.

After eight years of Bush?s military meddling in the Middle East, if you want more war, vote Obama.

Two myths must be exploded: first, that Barack Obama was a principled and passionate opponent of the war in Iraq; second, that if he were installed in the White House he would resist the temptation to launch new wars and would instead usher in an era of peace.

Iraq is the Obamabots? favorite faultline in the clash of the two Democrat contenders: Clinton supported the invasion and Obama opposed it. An open-and-shut case of one candidate being ?for the war? and the other being ?against the war,? right? Not quite. Obama?s position over the past five years has been strikingly similar to Clinton?s. And that ought to be an issue of serious concern for Obama?s army of acolytes and the peace protesters who have latched on to his campaign because, as Jeff Taylor pointed out in Counterpunch, ?Clinton herself provides no substantive alternative to the neoconservative philosophy of the Bush administration.? Obama is little different from Clinton, and Clinton is little different from Bush.

Obama?s campaign frequently invokes his 2002 ?speech against the war,? but very rarely quotes directly from it. Why? Because this mysterious speech?which has become the stuff of legend in Obamaphilic circles, talked about but rarely read?is a pro-war tirade. Yes, Obama described the planned invasion of Iraq as ?dumb? and ?rash,? but his overriding concern?expressed repetitively throughout the speech?was that the Bush administration was damaging the legitimate case for American-made wars of intervention and potentially making it harder for future administrations (Democratic, for example) to send soldiers around the world to depose unfriendly regimes.

Obama gave the speech at an antiwar rally in Chicago in October 2002. Perhaps nervous about being seen at a gathering of critics of American military intervention, he straight away outlined his pro-war credentials: ?Let me begin by saying that although this has been billed as an anti-war rally, I stand before you as someone who is not opposed to war in all circumstances.? He reiterated his non-opposition to war another four times in the 921-word speech.

Then Obama went to Washington, where he obediently voted to fund the war in Iraq and opposed the withdrawal of American troops. In 2004, he even talked about sending more troops to Iraq to stabilize the country?he had the idea of a surge before the Bushies did. When he and Hillary Clinton had a chance to enact Sen. Russ Feingold?s measure ordering Bush to withdraw most U.S. troops from Iraq by July 1, 2007, both voted no. Both senators also voted against a June 2006 amendment proposed by John Kerry for the redeployment of U.S. troops out of Iraq. It wasn?t until May 2007 that Clinton and Obama voted to cut off funds.

It is a myth, pure bunkum, that Obama is a brave anti-warrior. He made a brief speech in 2002?peppered with reminders of his generally pro-war leanings?and then, like Clinton, used his muscle in the Senate to fund the war and extend its bloody duration. It is only during the past year, as he has thrown himself into the presidential race, that Obama has decided to pose as a long-standing, level-headed critic. As Taylor argues, ?An adept politician, Obama began emphasizing his ?anti-war? stance as the war became increasingly unpopular among Democrats across the country and he began gearing up for the 2008 presidential campaign.?

But there is more going on here than Iraq-related opportunism. If elected president, Obama would make it a priority to smash the argument for non-interventionism and to rehabilitate America?s imperial mission to right the wrongs of the world.

His main beef with the war in Iraq is not that it has failed in its stated objectives, fomented terror, and killed thousands, but rather that it has made the American people skeptical about military intervention. ?There is one ? place where our mistakes in Iraq have cost us dearly, and that is the loss of our government?s credibility with the American people,? he says. Citing a Pew Survey that found that 42 percent of Americans agree that the U.S. should ?mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own,? Obama retorted, ?We cannot afford to be a country of isolationists right now. ? We need to maintain a strong foreign policy, relentless in pursuing our enemies and hopeful in promoting our values around the world.?

Those foolishly cheering Obama?s promise to bring the war in Iraq to a ?responsible end? should recognize why he is planning this: not to liberate Iraq but rather to liberate the interventionist project from the ?Iraqi distraction? and rebuild America?s military sufficiently to send its forces to hotspots around the globe. In a long piece for Foreign Affairs in July/August 2007, he argued, ?After Iraq, we may be tempted to turn inward. That would be a mistake. The American moment is not over, but it must be seized anew. We must bring the war to a responsible end and then renew our leadership?military, diplomatic, moral?to confront new threats and capitalize on new opportunities.? He calls for adding 65,000 soldiers to the Army and 27,000 to the Marine Corps and vastly expanding their mission. ?[D]eposing a dictator and setting up a ballot box? is not enough: Obama wants $50 billion to promote ?sustainable democracy,? a gauzy scheme that aims to ?build healthy and educated communities, reduce poverty, develop markets, and generate wealth.?

Yet for all his focus on the ?politics of hope,? when it comes to outlining his program of international interventionism, Obama parrots precisely the Bush regime?s panic-packed arguments about the horrendous threats facing America. Paying tribute to earlier battles against fascism and Soviet communism, Obama said last year, ?This century?s threats are at least as dangerous and in some ways more complex than those we have confronted in the past. They come from weapons that can kill on a mass scale and from global terrorists who respond to alienation or perceived injustice with murderous nihilism. They come from rogue states allied to terrorists and from rising powers that could challenge both America and the international foundation of liberal democracy.? Here, Obama the celebrated new Democrat sounds startlingly like the clapped-out dinosaurs of the neocon project. Like them, he compares today?s shoddy and stateless terror networks to the powerful regimes of fascist Germany and Soviet Russia. And like them he suggests that America is threatened by ?weapons that can kill on a mass scale??a dark hint at the much feared ?dirty nuke,? the existence of which has never been established, either in al-Qaeda?s caves or in the nuclear facilities of Iran.

Besides plagiarizing the Bush regime?s book of fear-mongering, Obama embraces two other aspects of Bushite foreign policy: unilateralism and pre-emption. He argues, ?No president should ever hesitate to use force?unilaterally if necessary?to protect ourselves and our vital interests when we are attacked or imminently threatened.?

Those expecting the age of Obama to bring a repudiation of the Bush agenda hope in vain. In a speech to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs last April he said, ?We have heard much over the last six years about how America?s larger purpose in the world is to promote the spread of freedom.? The anticipated twist never came. ?I agree,? Obama told the crowd. Turns out we haven?t done enough to mold the world in America?s image: ?America must lead by reaching out to all those living disconnected lives of despair in the world?s forgotten corners.?

Making Bush?s foreign policy look nearly as ?humble? as initially promised, Obama declared that America?s security is ?inextricably linked to the security of all people,? opining that flu-stricken Indonesian chickens and Latin American corruption put Americans at risk. No, they don?t. Obama?s stress on how everything is interconnected not only sets up the United States to intervene everywhere, but it makes any coherent strategy impossible. If every problem is an American problem, how would Obama set priorities or address one crisis instead of another? It?s a question he hasn?t begun to answer.

Neoconservatives are only too happy to fill in the blank. In a Washington Post column entitled ?Obama the Interventionist,? Robert Kagan celebrated the repudiation of the realist consensus: ?Obama?s speech ? was pure John Kennedy, without a trace of John Mearsheimer.? In 1996, Kagan co-wrote with Bill Kristol a Foreign Affairs essay entitled ?Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,? which argued that U.S. foreign policy should seek to preserve ?American hegemony? so that we can continue to fulfill our ?responsibility to lead the world.? Obama has updated this outlook in PC, Democrat-friendly lingo: ?The mission of the U.S. is to provide global leadership grounded in the understanding that the world shares a common security and a common humanity.? Little wonder that Kagan sees in Obama a kindred spirit: ?Obama believes the world yearns to follow us,? he writes. ?Personally, I like it.?

If President Obama pursued a neocon foreign policy, only with a touch more East Coast-style diplomacy than was ever employed by the Stetson-wearing Bush, that would be bad enough. But he might actually be worse than the neocons.

Obama continually criticizes the Bush administration for pursuing its interests on the international stage instead of spreading ?values? and ?principles.? He says Iraq was a war based ?not on principle but on politics.? Yet if there could be anything worse than the Bush foreign policy, it would be Obama?s principled meddling. At least interventions driven by narrow interests and politics have some kind of endpoint: when the interest has been protected or the political goal realized, the intervention might come to an end. Obama, by contrast, inflamed by his self-defined ?values? and motivated by a vision of good versus evil in which it is America?s role to lead the world toward its ?common humanity,? would be more reckless and unwieldy than Bush ever was. There is nothing quite so dangerous as a well-armed leader convinced that he has an historic moral purpose on the world stage.

Barack Obama?s Inaugural Address wouldn?t require much work: George W. Bush delivered the first draft in 2005. 
_________________________________

Brendan O?Neill is editor of Spiked in London. (spiked-online.com)

http://amconmag.com/2008/2008_02_25/cover.html

446
3DHS / Trade Tirade
« on: February 29, 2008, 01:12:13 PM »

February 29, 2008
   
POTOMAC WATCH
By KIMBERLEY A. STRASSEL    

Trade Tirade
February 29, 2008; Page A16

At an event Monday at George Washington University, a moderator asked four House Democrats if any thought it "practical" or a "good idea" to reopen and renegotiate Nafta. The crew, led by Democratic Caucus head Rahm Emanuel, stared uneasily into the middle distance before submitting "no."

"We'll see if word gets to Ohio," joked the moderator.

It didn't, and that's got some grown-ups in the party nervous. Democrats have been flirting with outright protectionism for some time now -- taking a dip with the "fair trade" movement, cozying up to labor and environmental standards, and shunning trade deals in Congress. It's been a tease, though careful not to let things go too far.

Now they're cornered with the heavy-breathing Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, and some are worried about their reputation. The two presidential nominees, grasping for votes in economically depressed Ohio, are setting new protectionist lows, with calls for trade "time outs" and threats to overthrow Nafta. It's come at a crucial moment for the Democratic Party, which after years of trade wandering now has a shot at defining the issue from the White House.

"I think Lou Dobbs took the pulse of America and realized he could drive his ratings up by engaging in protectionist rhetoric and pandering. I think there are an increasing number of politicians who are also pandering to the less informed emotional impulses of a lot of U.S. voters," says Cal Dooley, a former Democratic congressman from California who helped lead the party to trade victories in the 1990s. "And the thing that is a little distressing to me is that our national leaders, in many respects, they know better."

Democrats do know better, and have for a long time. It was Cordell Hull, FDR's secretary of state, who picked up Hoover's pieces and rebuilt the world trade system in the 1930s. Graduates of the party's old free-trade school know America has a responsibility to lead an open, global market. They know the nation's economic prosperity depends on it. They know isolationism doesn't sell well in elections. And they know the bipartisan trade successes of the Clinton years were a boon for both sides.

That common sense hasn't matched the temptation to win points with Big Labor or to ride a populist anti-trade wave. Threats to hold trade deals hostage to labor and environmental rules; vows to review existing deals; the bashing of Mexican truck drivers; the mauling of the Chinese currency; complaints about trade enforcement -- all of these are today standard Democratic (and increasingly Republican) talking points. The Clinton-Obama threats are a logical conclusion of this, not some surprising beginning.

And yet free-trade Democrats point out that the stakes are arguably higher now than they've ever been, not just for the nation, but for their own party's long-term electoral prospects. Mr. Dooley notes that trade is inextricably tied up with national security, and so it matters more in today's complex world. He points to the Colombia trade pact, currently spinning in Congress, as an example of an agreement that is crucial to keeping a democratic neighbor strong. "If you look at that deal, it is, in most respects, more of a security issue for the United States and Colombia -- one that has some economic benefits as well," he says.

If Democrats wanted be trusted on national security, they've got to underpin their promises with a commitment to trade. "Once you are president of the United States you have to first and foremost protect the security of the United States, and one of the tools that you have to protecting that security is in building strong relationships that are going to be founded on an economic partnership," he says. An "optimist," he's hopeful that the eventual nominee will be able to "walk back" from some of the recent positions by stressing exactly that security point.

Other Democrats are likewise worried this bout of anti-trade fervor risks undercutting the party's key foreign policy plank: that it will do more on the diplomatic front. When asked about the wisdom of reopening Nafta at the university event, Rep. Artur Davis (an Alabama Democrat who happened to be the first congressman outside of Illinois to endorse Mr. Obama) replied: "I'm not a fan for reopening agreements we have negotiated because the rest of the world thinks that we don't keep our word enough as it is."

In other words, it's hard to make nicey-nice with the global community when you are stiffing it on trade. Ask Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty, who clearly tuned into the Ohio Democratic debate long enough to catch Mr. Obama and Mrs. Clinton threatening to withdraw from Nafta unless his country rolled over for their new demands. "[They] should recognize that Nafta benefits the U.S. tremendously. Those who speak of it as helpful to [just the] Canadian and Mexican economies are missing the point," he responded, and not lovingly.

There is, too, the question of Democratic economic leadership. Texas Democrat Henry Cuellar recently hosted Mrs. Clinton on the streets of Laredo. He said he explained to her the city was the largest inland port in the South. Trade has transformed his district's border communities -- dropping double-digit employment and curbing rampant poverty. "My philosophy is simple: trade between the United States and other countries is good. You export, you create jobs, you build relationships," says Mr. Cuellar, who was the first Democrat to endorse the Central American Free Trade Agreement, and one of just 15 to vote for it.

Mr. Cuellar, who is a Mrs. Clinton supporter, says he remains comfortable with what she's asking for in a renegotiated Nafta. (If she'd said "six months after becoming president, I'm just going to opt out, then that would worry me," he explains.) He, too, remains hopeful that the national debate will cool once the primary is over. He warns that while it might be tempting to "demagogue" trade in the short term, Democrats will have to perform on the economy if they want a lasting run in office. Remaining strong on trade is "about both the prosperity of the nation, and the prosperity of the Democratic Party," he says.

Write to kim@wsj.com1

See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal2.

And add your comments to the Opinion Journal forum3.
     URL for this article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120424592454501493.html

 

447
3DHS / Flashback....
« on: February 28, 2008, 07:35:03 PM »
Publisher?s Statement
Standing athwart history, yelling Stop.

By William F. Buckley Jr.

EDITOR'S NOTE: This appeared in the first issue of National Review, on November 19, 1955.

There is, we like to think, solid reason for rejoicing. Prodigious efforts, by many people, are responsible for NATIONAL REVIEW. But since it will be the policy of this magazine to reject the hypodermic approach to world affairs, we may as well start out at once, and admit that the joy is not unconfined.

Let's face it: Unlike Vienna, it seems altogether possible that did NATIONAL REVIEW not exist, no one would have invented it. The launching of a conservative weekly journal of opinion in a country widely assumed to be a bastion of conservatism at first glance looks like a work of supererogation, rather like publishing a royalist weekly within the walls of Buckingham Palace. It is not that, of course; if NATIONAL REVIEW is superfluous, it is so for very different reasons: It stands athwart history, yelling Stop, at a time when no one is inclined to do so, or to have much patience with those who so urge it.

NATIONAL REVIEW is out of place, in the sense that the United Nations and the League of Women Voters and the New York Times and Henry Steele Commager are in place. It is out of place because, in its maturity, literate America rejected conservatism in favor of radical social experimentation. Instead of covetously consolidating its premises, the United States seems tormented by its tradition of fixed postulates having to do with the meaning of existence, with the relationship of the state to the individual, of the individual to his neighbor, so clearly enunciated in the enabling documents of our Republic.

"I happen to prefer champagne to ditchwater," said the benign old wrecker of the ordered society, Oliver Wendell Holmes, "but there is no reason to suppose that the cosmos does." We have come around to Mr. Holmes' view, so much that we feel gentlemanly doubts when asserting the superiority of capitalism to socialism, of republicanism to centralism, of champagne to ditchwater ? of anything to anything. (How curious that one of the doubts one is not permitted is whether, at the margin, Mr. Holmes was a useful citizen!) The inroads that relativism has made on the American soul are not so easily evident. One must recently have lived on or close to a college campus to have a vivid intimation of what has happened. It is there that we see how a number of energetic social innovators, plugging their grand designs, succeeded over the years in capturing the liberal intellectual imagination. And since ideas rule the world, the ideologues, having won over the intellectual class, simply walked in and started to run things.

Run just about everything. There never was an age of conformity quite like this one, or a camaraderie quite like the Liberals'. Drop a little itching powder in Jimmy Wechsler's bath and before he has scratched himself for the third time, Arthur Schlesinger will have denounced you in a dozen books and speeches, Archibald MacLeish will have written ten heroic cantos about our age of terror, Harper's will have published them, and everyone in sight will have been nominated for a Freedom Award. Conservatives in this country ? at least those who have not made their peace with the New Deal, and there is a serious question of whether there are others ? are non-licensed nonconformists; and this is a dangerous business in a Liberal world, as every editor of this magazine can readily show by pointing to his scars. Radical conservatives in this country have an interesting time of it, for when they are not being suppressed or mutilated by Liberals, they are being ignored or humiliated by a great many of those of the well-fed Right, whose ignorance and amorality of never been exaggerated for the same reason that one cannot exaggerate infinity.

There are, thank Heaven, the exceptions. There are those of generous impulse and a sincere desire to encourage a responsible dissent from the Liberal orthodoxy. And there are those who recognize that when all is said and done, the market place depends for a license to operate freely on the men who issue licenses ? on the politicians. They recognize, therefore, that efficient getting and spending is itself impossible except in an atmosphere that encourages efficient getting and spending. And back of all political institutions there are moral and philosophical concepts, implicit or defined. Our political economy and our high-energy industry run on large, general principles, on ideas ? not by day-to-day guess work, expedients and improvisations. Ideas have to go into exchange to become or remain operative; and the medium of such exchange is the printed word. A vigorous and incorruptible journal of conservative opinion is ? dare we say it? ? as necessary to better living as Chemistry.

We begin publishing, then, with a considerable stock of experience with the irresponsible Right, and a despair of the intransigence of the Liberals, who run this country; and all this in a world dominated by the jubilant single-mindedness of the practicing Communist, with his inside track to History. All this would not appear to augur well for NATIONAL REVIEW. Yet we start with a considerable ? and considered ? optimism.

After all, we crashed through. More than one hundred and twenty investors made this magazine possible, and over fifty men and women of small means invested less than one thousand dollars apiece in it. Two men and one woman, all three with overwhelming personal and public commitments, worked round the clock to make publication possible. A score of professional writers pledged their devoted attention to its needs, and hundreds of thoughtful men and women gave evidence that the appearance of such a journal as we have in mind would profoundly affect their lives.

Our own views, as expressed in a memorandum drafted a year ago, and directed to our investors, are set forth in an adjacent column. We have nothing to offer but the best that is in us. That, a thousand Liberals who read this sentiment will say with relief, is clearly not enough! It isn't enough. But it is at this point that we steal the march. For we offer, besides ourselves, a position that has not grown old under the weight of a gigantic, parasitic bureaucracy, a position untempered by the doctoral dissertations of a generation of Ph.D's in social architecture, unattenuated by a thousand vulgar promises to a thousand different pressure groups, uncorroded by a cynical contempt for human freedom. And that, ladies and gentlemen, leaves us just about the hottest thing in town.

WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR.
   
     
http://www.nationalreview.com/flashback/buckley200406290949.asp

448
3DHS / Why I became a conservative
« on: February 17, 2008, 11:20:33 PM »
 Why I became a conservative
by Roger Scruton
 
I was brought up at a time when half the English people voted Conservative at national elections and almost all English intellectuals regarded the term ?conservative? as a term of abuse. To be a conservative, I was told, was to be on the side of age against youth, the past against the future, authority against innovation, the ?structures? against spontaneity and life. It was enough to understand this, to recognize that one had no choice, as a free-thinking intellectual, save to reject conservatism. The choice remaining was between reform and revolution. Do we improve society bit by bit, or do we rub it out and start again? On the whole my contemporaries favored the second option, and it was when witnessing what this meant, in May 1968 in Paris, that I discovered my vocation.

In the narrow street below my window the students were shouting and smashing. The plate-glass windows of the shops appeared to step back, shudder for a second, and then give up the ghost, as the reflections suddenly left them and they slid in jagged fragments to the ground. Cars rose into the air and landed on their sides, their juices flowing from unseen wounds. The air was filled with triumphant shouts, as one by one lamp-posts and bollards were uprooted and piled on the tarmac, to form a barricade against the next van-load of policemen.

The van?known then as a panier de salade on account of the wire mesh that covered its windows?came cautiously round the corner from the Rue Descartes, jerked to a halt, and disgorged a score of frightened policemen. They were greeted by flying cobble-stones and several of them fell. One rolled over on the ground clutching his face, from which the blood streamed through tightly clenched fingers. There was an exultant shout, the injured policeman was helped into the van, and the students ran off down a side-street, sneering at the cochons and throwing Parthian cobbles as they went.

That evening a friend came round: she had been all day on the barricades with a troupe of theater people, under the captainship of Armand Gatti. She was very excited by the events, which Gatti, a follower of Antonin Artaud, had taught her to regard as the high point of situationist theater?the artistic transfiguration of an absurdity which is the day-to-day meaning of bourgeois life. Great victories had been scored: policemen injured, cars set alight, slogans chanted, graffiti daubed. The bourgeoisie were on the run and soon the Old Fascist and his r?gime would be begging for mercy.

The Old Fascist was de Gaulle, whose M?moires de guerre I had been reading that day. The M?moires begin with a striking sentence??Toute ma vie, je me suis fait une certaine id?e de la France??a sentence so alike in its rhythm and so contrary in its direction to that equally striking sentence which begins A la recherche du temps perdu: ?Longtemps, je me suis couch? de bonne heure.? How amazing it had been, to discover a politician who begins his self-vindication by suggesting something?and something so deeply hidden behind the bold mask of his words! I had been equally struck by the description of the state funeral for Val?ry?de Gaulle?s first public gesture on liberating Paris?since it too suggested priorities unimaginable in an English politician. The image of the cort?ge, as it took its way to the cathedral of Notre Dame, the proud general first among the mourners, and here and there a German sniper still looking down from the rooftops, had made a vivid impression on me. I irresistibly compared the two bird?s-eye views of Paris, that of the sniper, and my own on to the riots in the quartier latin. They were related as yes and no, the affirmation and denial of a national idea. According to the Gaullist vision, a nation is defined not by institutions or borders but by language, religion, and high culture; in times of turmoil and conquest it is those spiritual things that must be protected and reaffirmed. The funeral for Val?ry followed naturally from this way of seeing things. And I associated the France of de Gaulle with Val?ry?s Cimeti?re marin?that haunting invocation of the dead which conveyed to me, much more profoundly than any politician?s words or gestures, the true meaning of a national idea.

Of course I was na?ve?as na?ve as my friend. But the ensuing argument is one to which I have often returned in my thoughts. What, I asked, do you propose to put in the place of this ?bourgeoisie? whom you so despise, and to whom you owe the freedom and prosperity that enable you to play on your toy barricades? What vision of France and its culture compels you? And are you prepared to die for your beliefs, or merely to put others at risk in order to display them? I was obnoxiously pompous: but for the first time in my life I had felt a surge of political anger, finding myself on the other side of the barricades from all the people I knew.

She replied with a book: Foucault?s Les mots et les choses, the bible of the soixante-huitards, the text which seemed to justify every form of transgression, by showing that obedience is merely defeat. It is an artful book, composed with a satanic mendacity, selectively appropriating facts in order to show that culture and knowledge are nothing but the ?discourses? of power. The book is not a work of philosophy but an exercise in rhetoric. Its goal is subversion, not truth, and it is careful to argue?by the old nominalist sleight of hand that was surely invented by the Father of Lies?that ?truth? requires inverted commas, that it changes from epoch to epoch, and is tied to the form of consciousness, the ?episteme,? imposed by the class which profits from its propagation. The revolutionary spirit, which searches the world for things to hate, has found in Foucault a new literary formula. Look everywhere for power, he tells his readers, and you will find it. Where there is power there is oppression. And where there is oppression there is the right to destroy. In the street below my window was the translation of that message into deeds.

My friend is now a good bourgeoise like the rest of them. Armand Gatti is forgotten; and the works of Antonin Artaud have a quaint and d?pass? air. The French intellectuals have turned their backs on ?68, and the late Louis Pauwels, the greatest of their post-war novelists, has, in Les Orphelins, written the damning obituary of their adolescent rage. And Foucault? He is dead from AIDS, the result of sprees in the bath-houses of San Francisco, visited during well-funded tours as an intellectual celebrity. But his books are on university reading lists all over Europe and America. His vision of European culture as the institutionalized form of oppressive power is taught everywhere as gospel, to students who have neither the culture nor the religion to resist it. Only in France is he widely regarded as a fraud.

By 1971, when I moved from Cambridge to a permanent lectureship at Birkbeck College, London, I had become a conservative. So far as I could discover there was only one other conservative at Birkbeck, and that was Nunzia?Maria Annunziata?the Neapolitan lady who served meals in the Senior Common Room and who cocked a snook at the lecturers by plastering her counter with kitschy photos of the Pope.

One of those lecturers, towards whom Nunzia conceived a particular antipathy, was Eric Hobsbawm, the lionized historian of the Industrial Revolution, whose Marxist vision of our country is now the orthodoxy taught in British schools. Hobsbawm came as a refugee to Britain, bringing with him the Marxist commitment and Communist Party membership that he retained until he could retain it no longer?the Party, to his chagrin, having dissolved itself in embarrassment at the lies that could no longer be repeated. No doubt in recognition of this heroic career, Hobsbawm was rewarded, at Mr. Blair?s behest, with the second highest award that the Queen can bestow?that of ?Companion of Honour.? This little story is of enormous significance to a British conservative. For it is a symptom and a symbol of what has happened to our intellectual life since the Sixties. We should ponder the extraordinary fact that Oxford University, which granted an honorary degree to Bill Clinton on the grounds that he had once hung around its precincts, refused the same honor to Margaret Thatcher, its most distinguished post-war graduate and Britain?s first woman Prime Minister. We should ponder some of the other recipients of honorary degrees from British academic institutions?Robert Mugabe, for example, or the late Mrs. Ceausescu?or count (on the fingers of one hand) the number of conservatives who are elected to the British Academy.

Suffice it to say that I found myself, on arrival in Birkbeck College, at the heart of the left establishment which governed British scholarship. Birkbeck College had grown from the Mechanics Institution founded by George Birkbeck in 1823 and was devoted to the education of people in full-time employment. It was connected to the socialist idealists of the Workers? Education Association, and had links of a tenacious but undiscoverable kind to the Labour Party. My failure to conceal my conservative beliefs was both noticed and disapproved of, and I began to think that I should look for another career.

Because of Birkbeck?s mission as a center of adult education, lectures began at 6 P.M. and the days were nominally free. I used my mornings to study for the Bar: my intention was to embark on a career which gave no advantage to utopians and malcontents. In fact I never practiced at the Bar and received from my studies only an intellectual benefit?though a benefit for which I have always been profoundly grateful. Law is constrained at every point by reality, and utopian visions have no place in it. Moreover the common law of England is proof that there is a real distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power, that power can exist without oppression, and that authority is a living force in human conduct. English law, I discovered, is the answer to Foucault.

Inspired by my new studies I began to search for a conservative philosophy. In America this search could be conducted in a university. American departments of political science encourage their students to read Montesquieu, Burke, Tocqueville, and the Founding Fathers. Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and others have grafted the metaphysical conservatism of Central Europe on to American roots, forming effective and durable schools of political thought. American intellectual life benefits from American patriotism, which has made it possible to defend American customs and institutions without fear of being laughed to scorn. It has benefited too from the Cold War, which sharpened native wits against the Marxist enemy, in a way that they were never sharpened in Europe: the conversion of important parts of the social democratic Jewish intelligentsia of New York to the cause of neo-conservatism is a case in point. In 1970s Britain, conservative philosophy was the preoccupation of a few half-mad recluses. Searching the library of my college, I found Marx, Lenin, and Mao, but no Strauss, Voegelin, Hayek, or Friedman. I found every variety of socialist monthly, weekly, or quarterly, but not a single journal that confessed to being conservative.

The view has for a long time prevailed in England that conservatism is simply no longer available?even if it ever has been really available to an intelligent person?as a social and political creed. Maybe, if you are an aristocrat or a child of wealthy and settled parents, you might inherit conservative beliefs, in the way that you might inherit a speech impediment or a Habsburg jaw. But you couldn?t possibly acquire them?certainly not by any process of rational enquiry or serious thought. And yet there I was, in the early 1970s, fresh from the shock of 1968, and from the countervailing shock of legal studies, with a fully articulate set of conservative beliefs. Where could I look for the people who shared them, for the thinkers who had spelled them out at proper length, for the social, economic, and political theory that would give them force and authority sufficient to argue them in the forum of academic opinion?

To my rescue came Burke. Although not widely read at the time in our universities, he had not been dismissed as stupid, reactionary, or absurd. He was simply irrelevant, of interest largely because he got everything wrong about the French Revolution and therefore could be studied as illustrating an episode in intellectual pathology. Students were still permitted to read him, usually in conjunction with the immeasurably less interesting Tom Paine, and from time to time you heard tell of a ?Burkean? philosophy, which was one strand within nineteenth-century British conservatism.

Burke was of additional interest to me on account of the intellectual path that he had trod. His first work, like mine, was in aesthetics. And although I didn?t find much of philosophical significance in his Essay on the Sublime and the Beautiful, I could see that, in the right cultural climate, it would convey a powerful sense of the meaning of aesthetic judgment and of its indispensable place in our lives. I suppose that, in so far as I had received any intimations of my future career as an intellectual pariah, it was through my early reactions to modern architecture, and to the desecration of my childhood landscape by the faceless boxes of suburbia. I learned as a teenager that aesthetic judgment matters, that it is not merely a subjective opinion, unargued because unarguable, and of no significance to anyone besides oneself. I saw?though I did not have the philosophy to justify this?that aesthetic judgment lays a claim upon the world, that it issues from a deep social imperative, and that it matters to us in just the way that other people matter to us, when we strive to live with them in a community. And, so it seemed to me, the aesthetics of modernism, with its denial of the past, its vandalization of the landscape and townscape, and its attempt to purge the world of history, was also a denial of community, home, and settlement. Modernism in architecture was an attempt to remake the world as though it contained nothing save atomic individuals, disinfected of the past, and living like ants within their metallic and functional shells.

Like Burke, therefore, I made the passage from aesthetics to conservative politics with no sense of intellectual incongruity, believing that, in each case, I was in search of a lost experience of home. And I suppose that, underlying that sense of loss is the permanent belief that what has been lost can also be recaptured?not necessarily as it was when it first slipped from our grasp, but as it will be when consciously regained and remodelled, to reward us for all the toil of separation through which we are condemned by our original transgression. That belief is the romantic core of conservatism, as you find it?very differently expressed?in Burke and Hegel, and also in T. S. Eliot, whose poetry was the greatest influence on me during my teenage years.

When I first read Burke?s account of the French Revolution I was inclined to accept, since I knew no other, the liberal humanist view of the Revolution as a triumph of freedom over oppression, a liberation of a people from the yoke of absolute power. Although there were excesses?and no honest historian had ever denied this?the official humanist view was that they should be seen in retrospect as the birth-pangs of a new order, which would offer a model of popular sovereignty to the world. I therefore assumed that Burke?s early doubts?expressed, remember, when the Revolution was in its very first infancy, and the King had not yet been executed nor the Terror begun?were simply alarmist reactions to an ill-understood event. What interested me in the Reflections was the positive political philosophy, distinguished from all the leftist literature that was currently ? la mode, by its absolute concretion, and its close reading of the human psyche in its ordinary and unexalted forms. Burke was not writing about socialism, but about revolution. Nevertheless he persuaded me that the utopian promises of socialism go hand in hand with a wholly abstract vision of the human mind?a geometrical version of our mental processes which has only the vaguest relation to the thoughts and feelings by which real human beings live. He persuaded me that societies are not and cannot be organized according to a plan or a goal, that there is no direction to history, and no such thing as moral or spiritual progress.

Most of all he emphasized that the new forms of politics, which hope to organize society around the rational pursuit of liberty, equality, fraternity, or their modernist equivalents, are actually forms of militant irrationality. There is no way in which people can collectively pursue liberty, equality, and fraternity, not only because those things are lamentably underdescribed and merely abstractly defined, but also because collective reason doesn?t work that way. People reason collectively towards a common goal only in times of emergency?when there is a threat to be vanquished, or a conquest to be achieved. Even then, they need organization, hierarchy, and a structure of command if they are to pursue their goal effectively. Nevertheless, a form of collective rationality does emerge in these cases, and its popular name is war.

Moreover?and here is the corollary that came home to me with a shock of recognition?any attempt to organize society according to this kind of rationality would involve exactly the same conditions: the declaration of war against some real or imagined enemy. Hence the strident and militant language of the socialist literature?the hate-filled, purpose-filled, bourgeois-baiting prose, one example of which had been offered to me in 1968, as the final vindication of the violence beneath my attic window, but other examples of which, starting with the Communist Manifesto, were the basic diet of political studies in my university. The literature of left-wing political science is a literature of conflict, in which the main variables are those identified by Lenin: ?Kto? Kogo????Who? Whom?? The opening sentence of de Gaulle?s memoirs is framed in the language of love, about an object of love?and I had spontaneously resonated to this in the years of the student ?struggle.? De Gaulle?s allusion to Proust is to a masterly evocation of maternal love, and to a dim premonition of its loss.

Three other arguments of Burke?s made a comparable impression. The first was the defense of authority and obedience. Far from being the evil and obnoxious thing that my contemporaries held it to be, authority was, for Burke, the root of political order. Society, he argued, is not held together by the abstract rights of the citizen, as the French Revolutionaries supposed. It is held together by authority?by which is meant the right to obedience, rather than the mere power to compel it. And obedience, in its turn, is the prime virtue of political beings, the disposition which makes it possible to govern them, and without which societies crumble into ?the dust and powder of individuality.? Those thoughts seemed as obvious to me as they were shocking to my contemporaries. In effect Burke was upholding the old view of man in society, as subject of a sovereign, against the new view of him, as citizen of a state. And what struck me vividly was that, in defending this old view, Burke demonstrated that it was a far more effective guarantee of the liberties of the individual than the new idea, which was founded in the promise of those very liberties, only abstractly, universally, and therefore unreally defined. Real freedom, concrete freedom, the freedom that can actually be defined, claimed, and granted, was not the opposite of obedience but its other side. The abstract, unreal freedom of the liberal intellect was really nothing more than childish disobedience, amplified into anarchy. Those ideas exhilarated me, since they made sense of what I had seen in 1968. But when I expressed them, in a book published in 1979 as The Meaning of Conservatism, I blighted what remained of my academic career.

The second argument of Burke?s that impressed me was the subtle defense of tradition, prejudice, and custom, against the enlightened plans of the reformers. This defense engaged, once again, with my study of aesthetics. Already as a schoolboy I had encountered the elaborate defense of artistic and literary tradition given by Eliot and F. R. Leavis. I had been struck by Eliot?s essay entitled ?Tradition and the Individual Talent,? in which tradition is represented as a constantly evolving, yet continuous thing, which is remade with every addition to it, and which adapts the past to the present and the present to the past. This conception, which seemed to make sense of Eliot?s kind of modernism (a modernism that is the polar opposite of that which has prevailed in architecture), also rescued the study of the past, and made my own love of the classics in art, literature, and music into a valid part of my psyche as a modern human being.

Burke?s defense of tradition seemed to translate this very concept into the world of politics, and to make respect for custom, establishment, and settled communal ways, into a political virtue, rather than a sign, as my contemporaries mostly believed, of complacency. And Burke?s provocative defense, in this connection, of ?prejudice? ?by which he meant the set of beliefs and ideas that arise instinctively in social beings, and which reflect the root experiences of social life?was a revelation of something that until then I had entirely overlooked. Burke brought home to me that our most necessary beliefs may be both unjustified and unjustifiable from our own perspective, and that the attempt to justify them will lead merely to their loss. Replacing them with the abstract rational systems of the philosophers, we may think ourselves more rational and better equipped for life in the modern world. But in fact we are less well equipped, and our new beliefs are far less justified, for the very reason that they are justified by ourselves. The real justification for a prejudice is the one which justifies it as a prejudice, rather than as a rational conclusion of an argument. In other words it is a justification that cannot be conducted from our own perspective, but only from outside, as it were, as an anthropologist might justify the customs and rituals of an alien tribe.

An example will illustrate the point: the prejudices surrounding sexual relations. These vary from society to society; but until recently they have had a common feature, which is that people distinguish seemly from unseemly conduct, abhor explicit sexual display, and require modesty in women and chivalry in men in the negotiations that precede sexual union. There are very good anthropological reasons for this, in terms of the long-term stability of sexual relations, and the commitment that is necessary if children are to be inducted into society. But these are not the reasons that motivate the traditional conduct of men and women. This conduct is guided by deep and immovable prejudice, in which outrage, shame, and honor are the ultimate grounds. The sexual liberator has no difficulty in showing that those motives are irrational, in the sense of being founded on no reasoned justification available to the person whose motives they are. And he may propose sexual liberation as a rational alternative, a code of conduct that is rational from the first-person viewpoint, since it derives a complete code of practice from a transparently reasonable aim, which is sexual pleasure.

This substitution of reason for prejudice has indeed occurred. And the result is exactly as Burke would have anticipated. Not merely a breakdown in trust between the sexes, but a faltering in the reproductive process?a failing and enfeebled commitment of parents, not merely to each other, but also to their offspring. At the same time, individual feelings, which were shored up and fulfilled by the traditional prejudices, are left exposed and unprotected by the skeletal structures of rationality. Hence the extraordinary situation in America, where lawsuits have replaced common courtesy, where post-coital accusations of ?date-rape? take the place of pre-coital modesty, and where advances made by the unattractive are routinely penalized as ?sexual harrassment.? This is an example of what happens, when prejudice is wiped away in the name of reason, without regard for the real social function that prejudice alone can fulfill. And indeed, it was partly by reflecting on the disaster of sexual liberation, and the joyless world that it has produced around us, that I came to see the truth of Burke?s otherwise somewhat paradoxical defense of prejudice.

The final argument that impressed me was Burke?s response to the theory of the social contract. Although society can be seen as a contract, he argued, we must recognize that most parties to the contract are either dead or not yet born. The effect of the contemporary Rousseauist ideas of social contract was to place the present members of society in a position of dictatorial dominance over those who went before and those who came after them. Hence these ideas led directly to the massive squandering of inherited resources at the Revolution, and to the cultural and ecological vandalism that Burke was perhaps the first to recognize as the principal danger of modern politics. In Burke?s eyes the self-righteous contempt for ancestors which characterized the Revolutionaries was also a disinheriting of the unborn. Rightly understood, he argued, society is a partnership among the dead, the living, and the unborn, and without what he called the ?hereditary principle,? according to which rights could be inherited as well as acquired, both the dead and the unborn would be disenfranchized. Indeed, respect for the dead was, in Burke?s view, the only real safeguard that the unborn could obtain, in a world that gave all its privileges to the living. His preferred vision of society was not as a contract, in fact, but as a trust, with the living members as trustees of an inheritance that they must strive to enhance and pass on.

I was more exhilarated by those ideas than by anything else in Burke, since they seemed to explain with the utmost clarity the dim intuitions that I had had in 1968, as I watched the riots from my window and thought of Val?ry?s Cimeti?re marin. In those deft, cool thoughts, Burke summarized all my instinctive doubts about the cry for liberation, all my hesitations about progress and about the unscrupulous belief in the future that has dominated and perverted modern politics. In effect, Burke was joining in the old Platonic cry, for a form of politics that would also be a form of care??care of the soul,? as Plato put it, which would also be a care for absent generations. The graffiti paradoxes of the soixante-huitards were the very opposite of this: a kind of adolescent insouciance, a throwing away of all customs, institutions, and achievements, for the sake of a momentary exultation which could have no lasting sense save anarchy.

It was not until much later, after my first visit to communist Europe, that I came to understand and sympathize with the negative energy in Burke. I had grasped the positive thesis?the defense of prejudice, tradition, and heredity, and of a politics of trusteeship in which the past and the future had equal weight to the present?but I had not grasped the deep negative thesis, the glimpse into Hell, contained in his vision of the Revolution. As I said, I shared the liberal humanist view of the French Revolution, and knew nothing of the facts that decisively refuted that view and which vindicated the argument of Burke?s astonishingly prescient essay. My encounter with Communism entirely rectified this.

Perhaps the most fascinating and terrifying aspect of Communism was its ability to banish truth from human affairs, and to force whole populations to ?live within the lie,? as President Havel put it. George Orwell wrote a prophetic and penetrating novel about this; but few Western readers of that novel knew the extent to which its prophecies had come true in Central Europe. To me it was the greatest revelation, when first I travelled to Czechoslovakia in 1979, to come face to face with a situation in which people could, at any moment, be removed from the book of history, in which truth could not be uttered, and in which the Party could decide from day to day not only what would happen tomorrow, but also what had happened today, what had happened yesterday, and what had happened before its leaders had been born. This, I realized, was the situation that Burke was describing, to a largely incredulous readership, in 1790. And two hundred years later the situation still existed, and the incredulity along with it.

Until 1979 my knowledge of Communism had been entirely theoretical. I did not like what I had read, of course, and was hostile in any case to the socialist ideas of equality and state control, of which I had already seen enough in France and Britain. But I knew nothing of what it is like to live under Communism?nothing of the day-to-day humiliation of being a non-person, to whom all avenues of self-expression are closed. As for Czechoslovakia, as it then was, I knew only what I had gleaned from its music?the music of Smetana, ~DVORAK, and ~jan in particular, to all three of whom I owe the greatest of debts for the happiness they have brought me. Of course, I had read Kafka and Ha~s\ek?but they belonged to another world, the world of a dying empire, and it was only subsequently that I was able to see that they too were prophets, and that they were describing not the present but the future of their city.

I had been asked to give a talk to a private seminar in Prague. This seminar was organized by Julius Tomin, a Prague philosopher, who had taken advantage of the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which supposedly obliged the Czechoslovak government to uphold freedom of information and the basic rights defined by the U.N. Charter. The Helsinki Accords were a farce, used by the Communists to identify potential trouble-makers, while presenting a face of civilized government to gullible intellectuals in the West. Nevertheless, I was told that Dr. Tomin?s seminar met on a regular basis, that I would be welcome to attend it, and that they were indeed expecting me.

I arrived at the house, after walking through those silent and deserted streets, in which the few who stood seemed occupied by some dark official business, and in which Party slogans and symbols disfigured every building. The staircase of the apartment building was also deserted. Everywhere the same expectant silence hung in the air, as when an air-raid has been announced, and the town hides from its imminent destruction. Outside the apartment, however, I encountered two policemen, who seized me as I rang the bell and demanded my papers. Dr. Tomin came out, and an altercation ensued, during which I was thrown down the stairs. But the argument continued and I was able to push my way past the guard and enter the apartment. I found a room full of people, and the same expectant silence. I realized that there really was going to be an air-raid, and that the air-raid was me.

In that room was a battered remnant of Prague?s intelligentsia?old professors in their shabby waistcoats; long-haired poets; fresh-faced students who had been denied admission to university for their parents? political ?crimes?; priests and religious in plain clothes; novelists and theologians; a would-be rabbi; and even a psychoanalyst. And in all of them I saw the same marks of suffering, tempered by hope; and the same eager desire for the sign that someone cared enough to help them. They all belonged, I discovered, to the same profession: that of the stoker. Some stoked boilers in hospitals; others in apartment blocks; one stoked at a railway station, another in a school. Some stoked where there were no boilers to stoke, and these imaginary boilers came to be, for me, a fitting symbol of the communist economy.

This was my first encounter with ?dissidents?: the people who, to my astonishment, would be the first democratically elected leaders of post-war Czechoslovakia. And I felt towards these people an immediate affinity. Nothing was of such importance for them as the survival of their national culture. Deprived of material and professional advancement, their days were filled with a forced meditation on their country and its past, and on the great Question of Czech History which has preoccupied the Czechs since Palack~y\?s day. They were forbidden to publish; the authorities had concealed their existence from the world and had resolved to remove their traces from the book of history. Hence the dissidents were acutely conscious of the value of memory. Their lives were an exercise in what Plato calls anamnesis: the bringing to consciousness of forgotten things. Something in me responded to this poignant ambition, and I was at once eager to join with them and make their situation known to the world.

Briefly, I spent the next ten years in daily meditation on Communism, on the myths of equality and fraternity that underlay its oppressive routines, just as they had underlain the routines of the French Revolution. And I came to see that Burke?s account of the Revolution was not merely a piece of contemporary history. It was like Milton?s account of Paradise Lost?an exploration of a region of the human psyche: a region that lies always ready to be visited, but from which return is by way of a miracle, to a world whose beauty is thereafter tainted by the memories of Hell. To put it very simply, I had been granted a vision of Satan and his work?the very same vision that had shaken Burke to the depths of his being. And I at last recognized the positive aspect of Burke?s philosophy as a response to that vision, as a description of the best that human beings can hope for, and as the sole and sufficient vindication of our life on earth.

Henceforth I understood conservatism not as a political credo only, but as a lasting vision of human society, one whose truth would always be hard to perceive, harder still to communicate, and hardest of all to act upon. And especially hard is it now, when religious sentiments follow the whims of fashion, when the global economy throws our local loyalties into disarray, and when materialism and luxury deflect the spirit from the proper business of living. But I do not despair, since experience has taught me that men and women can flee from the truth only for so long, that they will always, in the end, be reminded of the permanent values, and that the dreams of liberty, equality, and fraternity will excite them only in the short-term.

As to the task of transcribing, into the practice and process of modern politics, the philosophy that Burke made plain to the world, this is perhaps the greatest task that we now confront. I do not despair of it; but the task cannot be described or embraced by a slogan. It requires not a collective change of mind but a collective change of heart.
From The New Criterion Vol. 21, No. 6, February 2003
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3DHS / The Great Betrayal
« on: February 16, 2008, 03:45:11 PM »
February 11, 2008 Issue
Copyright ? 2008 The American Conservative

The Great Betrayal

by Patrick J. Buchanan

Offering more ?straight talk? on the Sunday before the Florida primary, John McCain made an arresting prediction: ?It?s a tough war we?re in. It?s not going to be over right away. There?s going to be other wars. I?m sorry to tell you, there?s going to be other wars. We will never surrender but there will be other wars.?

Ike promised to ?go to Korea? and ended that war. Nixon pledged to end Vietnam with honor. McCain says we may be in Iraq a hundred years and warns, ?there?s going to be other wars.? Take the man at his word.

Mimicking the Beach Boys? ?Barbara Ann,? McCain has joked about ?Bomb, bomb, bomb?bomb, bomb Iran? and urged the expulsion of Russia from the G-8. He wants to expand NATO to bring in Georgia and the Ukraine. This could mean confrontation between Russia and the United States over whether South Ossetia and Abkhazia should be free of Georgia or ruled by Tbilisi, a matter of zero vital interest to this country.

We are forewarned. John McCain intends to be a war president.

Where Bush has lately cleansed his administration of neocons, McCain offers the last best hope for a neocon return and restoration and more wars in the Middle East. And if, as seems probable, Bibi Netanyahu again becomes prime minister of Israel, he and a President McCain will find a pretext for war on Iran.

Year 2008 may prove a defining one for conservatives. For on many of the great issues, McCain has sided as often with the Left and the Big Media as he has with the Right.

Where Bush has been at his best, cutting taxes and nominating conservative judges, McCain has been his nemesis. Not only did he vote twice against the Bush tax cuts, McCain colluded to sell out the most conservative of Bush?s judges

In 1993, McCain voted to confirm the pro-abortion liberal Ruth Bader Ginsburg. But when Bush set out to restore constitutionalism, McCain formed the Gang of 14, seven senators from each party. All agreed to vote to block the GOP Senate from invoking the ?nuclear option??i.e., empowering the GOP to break a filibuster of judicial nominees by majority vote?unless the seven Democrats agreed.

With this record of voting for Clinton justices and joining with Democrats anxious to kill the most conservative Bush?s nominees, what guarantee is there a President McCain would nominate and fight for the fifth jurist who would vote to overturn Roe v Wade?

McCain also colluded with liberals to pass McCain-Feingold, a law that denies to Second Amendment folks and right-to-lifers their First Amendment right to identify friends and foes in TV ads before national elections.

On ANWAR, too, McCain votes with the liberals, and on global warming he has moved toward Gore.

After five record trade deficits have denuded the nation of thousands of factories and 3 million manufacturing jobs, McCain is still babbling on about Smoot-Hawley. ?When you study history,? he told a Detroit newspaper, ?every time we?ve adopted protectionism, we?ve paid a very heavy price.?

But what history was McCain talking about? From Lincoln through Calvin Coolidge, the GOP was the Party of Protection that put 12 presidents in the White House to two for the Democrats, and the U.S. became the most awesome industrial power and self-reliant nation in the history of mankind, producing 42 percent of the world?s manufactured goods. Even Hillary, whose husband passed NAFTA with McCain?s support, has begun to question the free-trade paradigm and the disastrous results it has produced.

On controlling America?s borders and halting the invasion through Mexico, McCain collaborated with Senate liberals in the McCain-Kennedy amnesty, which was rejected only after a national uprising.

When 190,000 Arizonans petitioned in 2004 to put Prop 200 on the ballot, requiring proof of citizenship before an individual could vote or receive welfare benefits, John McCain led the GOP congressional delegation in opposing it unanimously. Prop 200 passed with the support of 56 percent of all Arizona voters and 46 percent of Hispanics.

Unsurprisingly, Juan Hernandez, the open-borders chatterbox and former adviser to Vicente Fox, has turned up in McCain?s campaign.

On the two issues where Bush has been at his best, taxes and judges, McCain has sided against him. On the three issues that have ravaged the Bush presidency?the misbegotten war in Iraq, the failure to secure America?s borders, and the trade policy that has destroyed the dollar, de-industrialized the country, and left foreigners with $5 trillion to buy up America?McCain has sided with Bush.

Now McCain is running on a platform that says your jobs are not coming back, the illegals are not going home, but we are going to have more wars. If you don?t like it, vote for Hillary.

And this was to be the Year of Change.   

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3DHS / Value Voters
« on: February 16, 2008, 03:43:53 PM »
February 11, 2008 Issue
Copyright ? 2007 The American Conservative

Value Voters

The best indicator of whether a state will swing Red or Blue? The cost of buying a home and raising a family.

by Steve Sailer

No matter who wins the 2008 presidential election, pundits will afterwards hypothesize feverishly about why the country is so divided into vast inland expanses of Red (Republican) regions versus thin coastal strips of Blue (Democratic) metropolises. Yet looking at 2000 and 2004, few will stumble upon the engine driving this partisan pattern, even though the statistical correlations are among the highest in the history of the social sciences.

The Republicans lost the popular vote in 2000 while advocating a ?humble? foreign policy and won in 2004 while defending a foreign policy that Napoleon might have found bombastic. But all that happened from 2000 to 2004 was that virtually every part of the country moved a few points toward the Republicans. The relative stability of this Red-Blue geographic split suggests that more fundamental forces are at work than just the transient issues of the day.

Neither Jane Austen nor Benjamin Franklin, however, would have found the question of what drives the Red-Blue divide so baffling. Unlike today?s intellectuals, they both thought intensely about the web linking wealth, property, marriage, and children. They would not have been surprised that a state?s voting proclivities are now dominated by the relative presence or absence of affordable family formation.

First-time readers of Pride and Prejudice frequently remark that Austen?s romance novels are, by American standards, not terribly romantic. She possessed a hard-headed understanding of how in traditional English society, wedlock was a luxury that some would never be able to afford, an assumption that often shocks us in our more sentimental 21st century.

Economic historian Gregory Clark?s recent book, A Farewell to Alms, quantified the Malthusian reality under the social structure acerbically depicted in Austen?s books. The English in the 1200-1800 era imposed upon themselves the sexual self-restraint that pioneering economist Thomas Malthus famously (but belatedly) suggested they follow in 1798. By practicing population control, the English largely avoided the cycles of rapid growth followed by cataclysmic famines that plagued China, where women married universally and young. The English postponed marriage and children until a man and woman could afford the accouterments suitable for a respectable married couple of their class.

In the six centuries up through Austen?s lifetime, Clark found, English women didn?t marry on average until age 24 to 26, with poor women often having to wait until their 30s to wed. And 10 to 20 percent never married. Judging from the high fertility of married couples, contraceptive practices appear to have been almost unknown in England in this time, but merely three or four percent of all births were illegitimate, demonstrating that rigid premarital self-discipline was the norm.

Remarkably, a half-century before Malthus?s gloomy and Austen?s witty reflections on life and love in crowded England, Ben Franklin had pointed out that in his lightly populated America, the human condition was more relaxed and happy. In his insightful 1751 essay, ?Observations concerning The Increase of Mankind,? Franklin spelled out, with an 18th-century surfeit of capitalization, the first, nonpartisan half of the theory of affordable family formation: ?For People increase in Proportion to the Number of Marriages, and that is greater in Proportion to the Ease and Convenience of supporting a Family. When Families can be easily supported, more Persons marry, and earlier in Life.?

He outlined the virtuous cycle con-necting the colonies? limited population, low land prices, high wages, early marriage, and abundant children: ?Europe is generally full settled with Husbandmen, Manufacturers, &c. and therefore cannot now much increase in People. ? Land being thus plenty in America, and so cheap as that a labouring Man, that understands Husbandry, can in a short Time save Money enough to purchase a Piece of new Land sufficient for a Plantation, whereon he may subsist a Family; such are not afraid to marry?? Franklin concluded, ?Hence Marriages in America are more general, and more generally early, than in Europe.?

The Industrial Revolution broke the tyranny of the Malthusian Trap over food, but the supply of and demand for land never ceased to influence decisions to marry and have children. As America?s coastal regions filled up, affordability of family formation began to differ sharply from state to state (disparities partially masked over the last few years by subprime mortgages and other financial gambits). CNN reported in 2006: ?More than 90 percent of homes in [Indianapolis] were affordable to families earning the median income for the area of about $65,100. In Los Angeles, the least affordable big metro area, only 1.9 percent of the homes sold were within the reach of families earning a median income for the city of $56,200.?

When I lived in the Midwest, from age 24 to 34, I attended numerous weddings, but as my social circle matured, the invitations naturally dried up. Yet when I moved back to my native, but now much more expensive, Los Angeles in 2000, I suddenly started being invited to weddings again. Like male characters in a Jane Austen novel, four of my seven closest friends from my high-school class of 1976 got married and bought houses for the first time in their early forties.

Similarly, the cost of childrearing varies more across the country than ever before. A study of census data by the New York Times found that ?Manhattan?s 35,000 or so white non-Hispanic toddlers are being raised by parents whose median income was $284,208 a year in 2005.? Second was San Francisco, where the 50th percentile of income for white parents of small children fell at $150,763. That explains a lot about why the city by the bay is last in the country in percentage of residents under 18, below even retirement havens such as Palm Beach.

The culture wars between Red and Blue States are driven in large part by these objective differences in how family-friendly they are, financially speaking. For example, according to ACCRA, a nonprofit organization that measures the cost of living so corporations can adjust the salaries of employees they relocate, the liberal San Francisco-Oakland area is twice as expensive as the conservative Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex. The BestPlaces.net calculator reports, ?To maintain the same standard of living, your salary of $100,000 in San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, California could decrease to $49,708 in Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, Texas.?

Not surprisingly, the San Francisco area is popular with people who don?t need a big backyard for their kids, such as homosexuals and childless couples, while North Texas attracts families from across America. San Francisco is very Democratic, while the Metroplex is quite Republican.

Why? The simplest explanation is that GOP ?family values? resound more in states where people can more afford to have families. In parts of the country where ?Families can be easily supported, more Persons marry, and earlier in Life.? And where it is economical to buy a house with a yard in a neighborhood with a decent public school, you will generally find more conservatives. It?s a stereotype that marriage, mortgage, and kids make people more conservative, but, like most stereotypes, it?s reasonably true. You?ll find fewer Republicans in places where family formation is expensive. Where fewer people can form families, Republican candidates making speeches about family values just sound irrelevant or irritating.

The arrow of causality points in both directions. Some family-oriented people move to more affordable states in order to marry and have children, while people uninterested in marriage and children move in the opposite direction to enjoy adult lifestyles. This population swapping just makes the electorate more divided by geography rather than tipping the national balance toward one party.

Still, for the many Americans whose innate inclinations fall somewhere in the middle, the cost of forming a family in their current state affects how likely they are to start down the path toward married-with-children conservatism and therefore, cumulatively, which party will eventually prevail nationally.

Imagine a young couple considering marriage who live in the San Francisco Bay Area. He makes $60,000 and she makes $40,000 annually. If he could find a job that pays $50,000 in northern Texas, where costs are only half as high, she could stay home and raise the children. But if they can?t bear to leave California, with its inspiring scenery and lovely weather, she will have to keep working. And if she has to work, are children really such a good idea? And if they aren?t going to have children, why get married at all? And if they aren?t married, are they going to appreciate the nagging of socially conservative politicians?

Four interlocking reasons explain why the affordability of family formation paints the electoral map red or blue.

First is the Dirt Gap: Republican regions simply have more acres of land per person. Even excluding Alaska, counties that voted for Bush are only one-fourth as densely populated on average as Kerry?s counties. Blue State metropolises, such as Boston, Seattle, and Chicago, are mostly located on oceans or Great Lakes, so their suburban expansion is permanently limited to their landward sides. (That?s why Chicago has a West Side but not an East Side.) In contrast, Red State metropolises (such as Atlanta, Phoenix, and San Antonio) are mostly inland. They tend to be surrounded by dirt, not water, allowing their suburbs to spread out over virtually 360 degrees. The supply of suburban land available for development is larger in Red State cities, so the price is lower.

To demonstrate this, consider the 53 percent of the nation?s population who live in the 50 largest metropolitan areas. Among these folks, 73 percent of the Blue Staters live in metropolises bounded by deep water, compared to only 19 percent of the Red Staters.

The second major factor in the Red-Blue divide is the Mortgage Gap. As the law of supply and demand dictates, the limited availability of suburban dirt in most Blue States means housing generally costs more.

This has a striking political corollary. According to ACCRA, Bush carried the 20 states that have the cheapest housing costs, while Kerry won the nine states that are most expensive. The states with the lowest-cost housing are Mississippi (where Bush won an extraordinary 85 percent of the white vote), Arkansas (home state of Bill Clinton but now solidly Republican) and the GOP?s anchor state of Texas.

In recent years, the most expensive state for housing has been California. Although GOP presidential candidates carried California nine out of ten times from 1952 to 1988, they have not come close in the four elections since. Next most expensive are Hawaii and the District of Columbia (where Bush won only 9 percent).

Of course, Blue State cities are also more likely to use environmental and zoning restrictions to limit housing supply artificially. Portland, Oregon, for instance, is an inland city that pretends to be a coastal city by outlawing development of most adjoining land, thereby inflating home costs. This has helped turn Portland, once a blue-collar burgh, into one of America?s most fashionable cities. Indeed, so many young whites have moved to Portland that some are now gentrifying stretches of the inner city?s Martin Luther King Boulevard. (A cynic might suggest that the fact that Portland?s leftist land-use regulations tend to drive out poor blacks and slow the influx of Hispanic illegal immigrants is not an accidental bug but a planned feature.) These development restrictions make children more expensive, as the title of a 2005 New York Times article focusing on Portland made clear: ?Vibrant Cities Find One Thing Missing: Children.?

Moreover, the Mortgage Gap has been growing. Bush was victorious in the 26 states with the least home-price inflation since 1980, while Kerry triumphed in the 14 states with the most. Home prices rose fastest in Kerry?s Massachusetts (515 percent) and second slowest in Bush?s Texas (89 percent), trailing only nearby Oklahoma. The correlation between low housing inflation and Bush?s share of the vote was strong, with a correlation coefficient, or ?r,? of 0.72.

A rule of thumb in the social sciences is that correlation coefficients of 0.2 are low, 0.4 moderate, and 0.6 high. Thus 0.72 is quite high, especially given the complexity of voting patterns.

To put the influence of housing inflation in perspective, compare its correlation with voting to a more obvious factor influencing who a state votes for: the minority proportion of the state?s electorate. Nationally, Bush carried 58 percent of the white vote compared to only 23 percent of the minority vote. Yet the percentage of minority voters in a state correlated with Bush?s share of the vote only at the moderate 0.37 level.

To further help explain the importance of a correlation coefficient, you should multiply the number by itself. Squaring 0.72 reveals that the amount of variation accounted for by the relationship between housing inflation and 2004 voting was 52 percent of the total. In contrast, squaring the 0.37 correlation for minority share shows it can only account for 13 percent of the variance, just one quarter as much as housing inflation can.

Despite the explanatory power of the Dirt Gap and the Mortgage Gap, these concepts have not been widely discussed. Perhaps they are too objective, too emotionally neutral. What people want to hear instead are justifications for why they are ethically and culturally superior to their enemies.

The Mortgage Gap leads, in turn, to a third factor: the Marriage Gap. Sophisticated voting analysts have long noted that the celebrated ?gender gap? is dwarfed by the obscure ?marriage gap.? Democratic pollster Stanley Greenberg?s multiple regression analysis of the 2004 exit polls revealed:

    The marriage gap is one of the most important cleavages in electoral politics. This is true even when controlling for other demographic and behavioral factors such as gender, age, race, gun ownership, union household membership, party identification, education, income, and church attendance. Controlling for all these other variables, the odds of voting for Kerry were 1.56 times greater if the voter was unmarried than if the voter was married. In contrast, once other demographic and behavioral factors were controlled for, a voter?s gender had no significant effect on their likelihood to vote for the Democrat. [Italics mine]

Bush carried 61 percent of married non-Hispanic white women but merely 44 percent of single white females?a 17-point difference. Among white men, Bush won 53 percent of the single and 66 percent of the married guys?a 13-point difference.

Why do I, like Greenberg, concentrate more on analyzing non-Hispanic white voting? First, this allows an apples-to-apples comparison between states. Second, the white vote is the decisive swing vote. Although the media drones on about supposedly decisive minority ?swing voters? such as the small Hispanic bloc (only 6.0 percent of all voters in 2004, according to the census), the white bloc was dominant, casting 79 percent of the vote.

And whites are highly diverse politically. Bush?s performance among white voters ranged from only 40 percent in Massachusetts and Vermont to 85 percent in Mississippi?a 45-point spread. In contrast, Bush?s percentage of blacks varied only from 3 percent in D.C. to 28 percent in Oklahoma?a 25-point range.

Third, each state?s overall voting behavior is driven primarily by the divergences in marriage and baby-making among whites. Whites appear more sensitive to cost-of-living calculations about marriage and babies. While white parents of small children in Manhattan have a median income of $284,208, the NYT reports, ?In comparison, the median income of other Manhattan households with toddlers was $66,213 for Asians, $31,171 for blacks and $25,467 for Hispanic families.? Similarly, demographer Hans Johnson of the Public Policy Institute of California finds that American-born white women in costly California are having babies at a rate of only 1.6 per lifetime, while immigrant Latinas are having 3.7.

The impact of marriage on the Red-Blue divide among states was long difficult to quantify graphically because the government only provides data on ?getting married,? yet it?s ?being married? that drives voters toward the GOP. Many white people get married in Nevada, for example, but the state is only purplish-red because they also get divorced frequently. Next door Utah, however, is the most rock-ribbed Red State (Bush won 72 percent) because the locals get married and stay married.

Consequently, I devised a measure called ?Years Married? (modeled on Total Fertility) that estimated how many years a woman could expect to be married during her childbearing years of 18-44.

For example, white women in Utah lead the nation by being married an average of 17.0 years during those 27 years from age 18 through 44. In contrast, in liberal Washington D.C., the average white woman is married only 7.4 years. In Massachusetts, where Bush won merely 37 percent, years married average just 12.2.

Applied to white women, this new measure proved to be the single-best predictor imaginable of Bush?s share of the vote by state in the last two elections. Bush carried the top 25 states, while Kerry won 16 of the lowest 19.

The 2004 correlation coefficient was a stratospheric 0.91, accounting for an astonishing r-squared equal to 83 percent of total variation in voting by state. This has to be one of the highest correlations for an unexpected factor ever seen in political science.

Although there are profound cultural differences among states, the Marriage Gap among whites appears to be pushed to a sizable extent by the Mortgage Gap. The cost-of-housing index correlates with ?years married? with an r-squared equal to 53 percent. Similarly, the housing inflation rate since 1980 and ?years married? correlate at an r-squared equal to 48 percent.

While young couples during the postwar Baby Boom rushed into marriage at very early ages, assuming that with wages high and housing costs low, they could somehow make things work, modern Americans have developed an attitude similar in some ways to Jane Austen?s characters: money should precede marriage. Miss Austen, though, would never have approved of the corollary: that sex, and even children, can precede money.

Sociologists Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas conducted a five-year study of 162 low-income white, black, and Hispanic single mothers in Philadelphia. They found that ?Marriage, we heard time and again, ought to be reserved for those couples who?ve acquired the symbols of working-class respectability: a mortgage on a modest rowhouse, a reliable car, a savings account and enough money left over to host a ?decent? wedding.?

Little media attention has been paid to the relentless surge in illegitimacy. From 2005 to 2006, the number of babies born to married white women declined 0.4 percent, while the number born to unmarried Hispanic women rose an astonishing 9.6 percent. Across all races, the illegitimacy rate in 2006 was 39 percent, up from 28 percent in 1990. For blacks, it was 71 percent, for Hispanics 50 percent, and for whites 27 percent.

Women in higher social classes are more likely to avoid the troubles of giving birth out of wedlock. But they often postpone marriage and children until they can afford the down payment on a house in a neighborhood with good public schools.

That leads to the fourth and final factor: the Baby Gap. Bush carried 25 of the top 26 states in the ?total fertility rate? (expected number of babies per woman per lifetime) among whites, while Kerry was victorious in the bottom 16. In Utah, for instance, white women in 2002 were having babies at a pace equivalent to 2.45 per lifetime. In the District of Columbia, white women average only 1.11 babies.

The correlation between white total fertility and Bush?s performance produced an impressive r-squared of 74 percent. In a 2006 paper entitled ?The ?Second Demographic Transition? in the US,? demographers Ron J. Lesthaeghe and Lisa Neidert of the University of Michigan confirmed the findings that I first published in my ?Baby Gap? article in The American Conservative in 2004: the white total fertility rate correlates extraordinarily well with whether a state voted for Bush or Kerry. They note that this provides ?to our knowledge one of the highest spatial correlations between demographic and voting behavior on record.?

Yet the Baby Gap appears to be somewhat less important than the Marriage Gap. Nevertheless, together they proved extraordinarily powerful in explaining Bush?s performance. Their combined r-squared: 88 percent.

Affordable family formation won?t predict who will win this November. But it offers profound implications for long-range political strategies. For example, the late housing bubble, over which Republicans George W. Bush and Alan Greenspan complacently presided, reduced the affordability of family formation, which should help the Democrats in the long run.

This theory suggests that, in order to encourage marriage and children among voters, Republicans should pursue policies that raise wages, lower demand for houses, and keep the public schools from eroding further. The most obvious way to move the country toward a more Republican future is to restrict immigration. This revamped GOP could then position itself as the party of more weddings and more babies, while describing the Democrats, with some accuracy, as the party of dying alone. 
_____________________________________

Steve Sailer is TAC?s film critic and a columnist for VDARE.com. His blog is iSteve.Blogspot.com.

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