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16
Matters of Faith / Hans Küng on Evolution
« on: August 01, 2008, 04:02:51 PM »
Let's Not Preach to the Scientists, Catholic Theologian Küng Says

God is not a category for science, but there's room for faith in divine creation, says theologian Hans Küng.

Interview by Tom Heneghan Link

Paris – In the debate over evolution and intelligent design, conservative voices have dominated among those who defend the idea that God played a role in the development of species. Now one of Catholicism’s leading liberals, theologian Hans Küng, has come out with a book that accepts evolution as scientists generally describe it but still maintains a role for God. He sees God's activity not in designing complex forms of life, as ID supporters argue, but in in founding the laws of nature by which life evolved and in facilitating the 13.7-billion-year adventure of creation. Küng has little patience either for scientists who do not see beyond the limits of their discipline or for believers who try to tell the experts how things must have been.

The Swiss-born priest, now 77, was stripped of his license to teach Catholic theology in 1979 because he challenged the doctrine of papal infallibility. A prolific author, he was out of favor for decades in Rome. But when Joseph Ratzinger, Küng's former colleague from the Tübingen University theology faculty in Germany, was elected Pope Benedict XVI last April, the mood changed. Even though the pope is unmistakably conservative, he invited his rebellious old colleague to a friendly dinner. Among the topics they discussed was Küng’s new book on evolution, Der Anfang aller Dinge ("The Beginning of All Things").

Küng spoke to Beliefnet by telephone from his office at Tübingen University. The following is an English translation of his remarks in German.

Where do you stand in the current evolution debate?

I understand the views of the agnostics and atheists. But I also see the questions that agnosticism can't and doesn't want to answer. I can fully understand those who want to have a basis in faith but think that a fundamentalism that takes the Bible literally does justice neither to the Bible nor to today's people. We can reach what I would call a reasonable middle position.

What did the pope have to say when you met him last August?

We agreed that the reason of natural science can enter into a discussion with faith. The pope does not represent an irrational faith. Faith, as Pascal said, has its reasons that reason doesn't know. A dialogue is possible.

What does the pope think of your approach?

He said all specialists in fundamental theology should [dialogue with scientists] but you [Küng] are the one who can talk to them as an equal. That means I don't have to become a physicist or a biologist, but I must know the most important results of astrophysics or microbiology and recognize them. There's no use casting doubt on their conclusions because there are some small difficulties with them, as the Intelligent Design people or the creationists sometimes do. I think what is there is there. A theologian should not cast doubt on a scientific consensus, but should see how he can deal with it.

Did God intervene in evolution?

The word "intervene" is not very good because it means come in between. An intervention is usually something violent or aggressive. What I would reject is the idea that God could intervene against the laws of nature. I would even go further and say that for science, God is not a category because God by definition is a reality beyond time and space, and therefore does not belong in the world of our scientific experience. But there are questions that science cannot answer. The fundamental question of philosophy, according to Leibnitz, is "why is there anything at all and not simply nothing?" Science can't answer that.

In your book, you say religion can interpret evolution as creation.

Creation is a concept that explains the beginning of things but is also the continuing process of life. So we can interpret evolution as creation, but I do that as a believer, not as a scientist.

Where did the laws of nature come from?

I prefer to speak about the constants in nature. Take the speed of light. Why has it been there from the start? You have to ask: where did it come from? How did matter develop and not just stay as gas? Astrophysicists can only go back to just after the Big Bang. I have to go beyond time and space, and there we can say, “I don't know.” We should not speak too quickly of God in an anthropomorphic sense.

So you want to get away from the personal image of God?

I don't want to get away from it. But if I ask the question scientifically, I can't ask about God the Father. In scientific terms, that is absurd. The symbol of the father certainly has a function and when I read the Bible, I have no problems with that. The fundamental cause of the world is God. But I can also say Our Father.

Did matter need some prior intelligence to get organized?

Matter needs constants in the beginning. It needs some mass and an initial energy. Where does it get that from? This initial energy works according to certain cosmic natural constants and they are givens. They were not newly invented or introduced at any time. No biologist would say there is a need of an intervention or organizer so that life emerges from non-life. But what holds it all together and makes it work? Where does it all come from? Why doesn't it all fall apart? Those are the big questions that a scientist can't answer. As soon as one tries to intellectually force scientists to recognize God, one is on the wrong track.

Pope Benedict and Cardinal Schönborn have entered the evolution debate to counter what they see as the growing influence of materialist thinking. Did this influence you?

I agree that materialism is a primitive world view, even if it is presented in a sophisticated way. But it’s not good to try to prove religion to scientists. That’s not my intention. It is a gigantic achievement of humanity that, at the end of a process of 13.7 billion years, there are small beings who are the first, as far as we know, who try to understand all this. That is an amazing achievement. If I am a believer, science can explain the process of creation in a completely different and magnificent way than the view that it all happened in six days. And yet the scientist can get a different picture of reality when he admits, "There is more between heaven and earth than is dreamt of in your philosophy," as Shakespeare put it. You can't reduce music just to physics and mathematics.

Why do you say in your book that man is not the crown of creation?

"Crown" sounds too much like self-coronation, as if we were the final product. What will we be in a few billion years? It’s enough to say we are the preliminary final product.

Is man only a by-product?

No, I wouldn't say that. That is the big question of the anthropic principle. The latest research shows, as far as we can see, there is no life elsewhere in the universe. We are probably alone. How curious that we are on a completely secondary star of a Milky Way that is one of hundred thousand galaxies! A religious person can say that creation obviously has a goal. But that is a religious statement. We shouldn’t talk of intelligent design. That we have emerged is a product of necessity and chance.

Why is evolution so controversial in the United States and not in Europe?

There is an interest here [in Europe] too, but there is a big difference. There are fewer fundamentalists here. Religion classes in our schools are much more sophisticated. Biology classes are also better here. Many Americans have never had serious biology classes. Another thing we don’t have in Europe is, as in America, teachers who are afraid to teach these biological facts because some parents could make a big fuss. It is so politicized in America. These court cases over evolution are counterproductive. They damage religion and don't help at all.

17
Matters of Faith / For Those Who Will Be Left Behind
« on: July 20, 2008, 11:49:10 PM »
Maybe we'll get an email that says, "I told you so!"

You've Been Left Behind promises to send out emails to those of us who Tim LeHaye , Jerry Jenkins and millions of American Fundamentalist Protestants believe will be "left behind." The custoimer may save emails to be sent to a maximum of sixty-three email addresses six days after Christ has come and removed their righteous souls from the Earth, leaving what the website's owner calls "your lost family and friends."


18
Culture Vultures / Persepolis
« on: July 20, 2008, 09:09:03 PM »
I watched this movie today.

I highly recommend it. It gets a bit slow towards the middle, but all in all it was a very good movie. It is animated (taken from the graphic novel) and tells the story of a girl who grows up in Iran during the 1979 Revolution, then the subsequent Iraq-Iran War. Very poignant, but with dark comedy mixed in as well.

19
Culture Vultures / The Great Silence
« on: July 19, 2008, 12:45:59 AM »
Well, that was one of the most dispiriting finishes I've seen in a while. Good film from the heyday of the Spaghetti Western.

20
3DHS / US housing slump creating 'ghost towns'
« on: July 05, 2008, 05:01:57 AM »
US housing slump creating 'ghost towns'

By Catherine Elsworth in the Inland Empire


Welcome to the new "ghost towns" - brand new, immaculately tended communities with not a tumbleweed in sight.

Financial analysts in California have identified the latest symptom of the devastating housing down-turn plaguing the US - tracts of freshly built, well-appointed homes where no-one apparently wants, or can afford, to live.

Aaron Deer, an analyst with Sandler O'Neill & Partners, toured housing developments in California's Inland Empire, a formerly booming property market 40 miles east of Los Angeles, for a report on the health of the building industry.

On his visit to developments in Ontario and Corona, which he pointed out are "actually healthier markets" compared to areas further inland, he found "a significant number of fully built homes sitting vacant along with a large number of additional homes still under construction".

And, "at one master plan community, the entire development appeared to be vacant. With the exception of crews working on new construction, it was a ghost town. The homes all appeared to be empty and there was no prospective buyers anywhere to be found."

"What I found so amazing was that this is actually a beautiful complex, with lush green lawns and high-end appliances that would suggest a prestige property," Mr Deer said.

"It's impeccably cared for because they are trying to sell the homes. But they were all empty. It was bizarre. There were no cars in the streets, no children's toys anywhere. Literally there was no-one but construction workers. It really did have a ghost town feel."

He noted in his report: "Perhaps the most interesting aspect to the development was what it revealed about the nature of the housing boom: that at the peak even the most undesirable and remote locations were worthy of expensive, high-end homes."

At one development he visited, "the New Model Colony at Edenglen", in Ontario, homes start at just over 200,000 dollars.

The estate is dotted with colourful flags and signs that read "welcome home, we've been expecting you". But despite a map in the sales office dotted with "sold" stickers, there appeared few signs of life other than construction workers and gardeners tending pristine shrubbery in the baking 97 degree heat.

The only sounds were the hum of air conditioning units cooling immaculately-furnished show homes where flat screen televisions played to vacant rooms and piped music emanating eerily from empty balconies.

Mr Deer said similar developments could be seen across the region, marked by flags and balloons and for sale signs. And it was a trend echoed nationwide in places such as Nevada, Arizona and Florida, "where most of the aggressive development was done in recent years".

"For example, condominium projects in Miami are having a very difficult time selling," he said. "In a lot of cases, developers thought they had pre-sold properties. But the buyers they thought they had are walking away from deposits because since the time they signed those agreements, the properties have come down so much in value it doesn't make sense for them to follow through with their purchase agreements."

Mr Deer said many of the banks with "construction exposure" he represented were steeling themselves for potential losses on developments they had financed.

He said Edenglen was "indicative of the trends that are being seen in this market", but added: "It's not to say that properties haven't been sold, I just didn't see any signs of community or life that would suggest that they have."

Calls to Brookfield Homes, developers of the community, were not returned.

In Corona and Ontario, home prices have dropped by over 30 percent over the past year, according to surveys. And prices in Edenglen have fallen by up to 200,000 dollars since the first phase went on the market in 2007, the Inland Valley Daily Bulletin reported in May. Adiran Foley, Brookfield president, however, told the paper the new pricing was working and they had sold "52 homes in 16 weeks, so we're very happy with the sales rate".

Experts predict the new homes will sell in time but prices are unlikely to increase in such "overbuilt areas" for years. The New Model Colony will eventually comprise 30,000 new properties over the next 20 years.

Sales of new homes fell by 40 percent in the year to May, according to government figures, with purchases reaching a rate not seen since 1991.

Confidence among American home developers has also equalled a record low, the National Association of Home Builders/Wells Fargo said last month. The number of construction jobs has fallen by 528,000 since its peak in September 2006.

Property developers are meanwhile resorting to incentive schemes to shift existing inventory such as giving away free flat-screen televisions or even a two-houses-for-the-price-of-one offer from a company in California.

Falling home values, rising mortgage rates as well as stricter borrowing rules and a sweeping credit crunch have all contributed to the drop-off in sales, factors expected to prevent many potential buyers from entering the market this year.

"I don't think we have ever seen anything of the magnitude we have had this time," Mr Deer said. "I don't like the expression the perfect storm but there's been a confluence of factors that played into this housing cycle."

Peter Dennehy, a specialist with Sullivan Group Real Estate Advisors who advised Mr Deer about "distressed" areas before he carried out his report, said recent construction booms had partly been "fuelled by cheap money and relatively inexpensive gas prices, and that dynamic has really changed."

Home-buyers would now be far more cautious about buying a home that would mean a lengthy, increasingly expensive commute.

"It's really tough (for builders)", he said. "Home prices have come down pretty dramatically and people are wary."

In Southern California, there were around 2,000 active housing projects still under construction, he said, although no new ones had started in the past year. The Inland Empire had the most - 686 developments still underway at the end of March.

He added California along with "sunbelt states" such as Nevada, Arizona and Florida - "everywhere where the market was really hot" - were "where the downturn is the worst".

Story from Telegraph News:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/2248674/US-housing-slump-creating-%27ghost-towns%27.html

21
Matters of Faith / Christ and Culture
« on: July 03, 2008, 07:59:53 PM »
Protestant theologian Richard Niebuhr wrote of five possible relationships that man identified Jesus as having with culture. In this case the word culture is used to include both "high" culture such as potry, art, philosophy, etc and "popular" culture such as politics and the social life of the common man. The book, worthy of a look, is Christ and Culture printed in 1951. In a very real sense these views also relate to Jesus' dual, but singular nature as both man and God. In another way, Niebuhr really identified, though he did not do so intentionally, different types of Christian worldviews.

1. Christ Against Culture: Tertullian (see Apology) is the earliest proponent of this view of Christ's relationship with culture. The Biblical context is especially found in the First Letter of John. This view is extremely cautionary. The world is an evil place, filled with lies, hatred, murder, and lust. It is a dying world which is destined to fall away. Christian faith should never be compromised to the kingdoms of man, nor to his culture.

2. The Christ of Culture: Walter Rauschenbusch is a good example of a religious leader who espoused this view. This is the polar opposite of the above. Christ came not to pronounce judgment on the world, but to bless it and teach man the depth of God's love. Every culture and every age is represented by Christ as He preached a message for all cultures because He was of this world and united with it. Sin is overcome through Christian education, which will produce real justice and real peace.

3. Christ Above Culture: Clement of Alexandria and Thomas Aquinas were the principle proponents of this view. This view is also known as the synthesist approach as it basically finds the middle ground of the above two positions. Christ is at the same time above culture and of culture due to His two natures. This is a view that considers the first two to be extremes and extrapolates a middle position. Yes, the world does have the presence of evil - but that does not mean that the Christian should withdraw from it. On the other hand, Christians cannot simply overcome sin through education - Jesus' Kingdom is not of this world (John 18:36).

4. Christ and Culture in Paradox: This view is also known as the dualist view. The Apostle Paul and Martin Luther are the two most famous adherents. The best Biblical text to frame this view is 2 Corinthians 5:1-2. Luther basically rephrases that text and gives a longer essay on the matter. I'll try and summarize (it is a paradox, so stay with me :) ).

There are two kingdoms, God's kingdom of grace and mercy and the worldly kingdom (on which we know reside) of wrath and severity. We cannot confuse the two, lest we place wrath and severity into the Kingdom of God or mercy and grace into the Kingdom of Man. On the other hand, the two are closely related through creation. We must therefore affirm both in a single act of obedience to the one God. He is after all, the God of both mercy and wrath, the old and the new covenant. We cannot have a dual allegiance (first commandment).

This is not as illogical as it may sound - we know that life can be both tragic and joyful. One could celebrate a wedding and have a loved one pass on the same day. This is a dualist position because it basically combines #1 and #2, whereas the Christ Above Culture position took #1 and #2 as two extremes and found a middle ground instead.

5. Christ the Transformer of Culture: Augustine and Calvin are two examples of this view. History is the interaction between God and man. The Kingdom of God is being built as we speak. As opposed to the Paulist view of #4, this is considered to be a more Johannine view. God did not send the Son into the world to condemn the world, but in order that the world might be saved through Him. Christ transforms culture. Christ has come to heal and renew what sin has tarnished. God's sovereignty can be made manifest in the entire network of human relationships.


The Pros and Cons

1. Christ Against Culture: The witness of these Christians is generally very strong in both word and deed. The problem is that they condemn in action exactly what they affirm in words. Tertullian, for example, was very much a Roman and whether he liked it or not, he contributed to culture.

2. The Christ of Culture: These Christians have done a great deal of good work to help spread the Gospel (as well as basic necessities) to those who would otherwise never have them. Yet, they tread on dangerous waters by coming so close to denying the divinity of Jesus (indeed some have, just as some in the category above have denied His humanity). On the other hand, they have demonstrated God's love and that does a great deal to attract others to follow.

3. Christ Above Culture: In many ways this view mollifies basic human psychology. Let's face it, we love a good compromise. We had Arianism on one side and Monophysiticism (work that into a casual conversation) on the other side - so we said, "hold on now, we can work this out with a nice compromise." Well, it wasn't quite that easy...but most Christians follow the middle position. On the other hand, has it really worked so well? Some have argued that it created an idealized Eurocentric Christian Civilization which helped justify all sorts of nasty ideas regarding race, expansion, conquering, and yes - genocide. Was the safe path the best path?

4. Christ and Culture in Paradox: This view has a definite downside, though it is also very popular for it has a strong theological basis. Just like above the proponents were some incredibly intelligent folks. Yet, when taken as a whole the dualist view shows sin to be ever-present in individuals, communities, institutions, and laws. This has led many Christians to hold these things in complete disdain. Therefore they rest content in their political, economic, and social life - knowing that it is all transitory anyway. All of our temporal work is basically spitting into the ocean.

5. Christ the Transformer of Culture: The positives here can be the greatest of the five. Christ has called us to help Him re-create and renew his creation. Both Augustine and Calvin saw this as a positive role for political and social institutions. On the other hand the negatives of this view are perhaps the worst of all the five. Calvin's Geneva was never known as a utopia to anyone except perhaps Calvin himself.



22
Remembering the Poor: An Interview with Gustavo Guti?rrez
By Daniel Hartnett, S.J., is a professor of philosophy at Loyola University Chicago.
America: The National Catholic Weekly

Each year the prestigious American Academy of Arts and Sciences announces the incorporation of new members. This year?s list of honorary fellows includes the world-renowned Peruvian theologian Gustavo Guti?rrez, O.P., who is best known for his book A Theology of Liberation (Span. 1971, Eng. 1973).

Father Guti?rrez has written over a dozen books and hundreds of articles concerning the church?s role in creating social structures of solidarity. Perhaps more than anyone else, he has been instrumental in helping the Christian community to read and live the Gospel from the perspective of the poor.

The following interview took place at the University of Notre Dame, where Father Guti?rrez has held the John Cardinal O?Hara chair in theology since 2001. The interviewer is Daniel Hartnett, S.J., a professor of philosophy at Loyola University Chicago.

You have received numerous awards and dozens of honorary doctorates in the course of your fruitful ministry as theologian and priest. What is the significance to you of this particular award from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences?

To tell you the truth, the news of this award took me totally by surprise. I was not even aware that my name was being considered. It is certainly an honor for me to be included in such a group of distinguished scholars, scientists and public leaders. I am very grateful for being named to this academy and for the opportunity to bring the Gospel into a fuller and more fruitful dialogue with a broader range of disciplines and with civil society.

Speaking of incorporations, you have been a member of the Dominican Order for only about five years. Tell us about your decision to enter.

My relationship with the Order of Preachers goes back to my studies in France, where I had personal contact with the scholarly work of Fathers Congar, Chenu and Schillebeeckx, all Dominican theologians. I was attracted to their profound understanding of the intimate relationship that should exist between theology, spirituality and the actual preaching of the Gospel. Liberation theology shares that same conviction. My subsequent research into the life of Bartolom? de Las Casas and his ardent defense of the poor of his time (the indigenous people and black slaves) also played an important role in my decision. My long friendship with many Dominicans, as well as other circumstances, finally brought me to this step. I am grateful for the warm welcome that the Dominican family gave me.

You have always placed the concerns of the poor in the forefront of your theological reflection. Must every theologian come to grips with the reality of social suffering in the world, or is this only incumbent, say, on those who work directly within a context of poverty?

I am firmly convinced that poverty?this sub-human condition in which the majority of humanity lives today?is more than a social issue. Poverty poses a major challenge to every Christian conscience and therefore to theology as well.

People today often talk about contextual theologies but, in point of fact, theology has always been contextual. Some theologies, it is true, may be more conscious of and explicit about their contextuality, but all theological investigation is necessarily carried out within a specific historical context. When Augustine wrote The City of God, he was reflecting on what it meant for him and for his contemporaries to live the Gospel within a specific context of serious historical transformations.

Our context today is characterized by a glaring disparity between the rich and the poor. No serious Christian can quietly ignore this situation. It is no longer possible for someone to say, ?Well, I didn?t know? about the suffering of the poor. Poverty has a visibility today that it did not have in the past. The faces of the poor must now be confronted. And we also understand the causes of poverty and the conditions that perpetuate it. There was a time when poverty was considered to be an unavoidable fate, but such a view is no longer possible or responsible. Now we know that poverty is not simply a misfortune; it is an injustice.

Of course, there always remains the practical question: what must we do in order to abolish poverty? Theology does not pretend to have all the technical solutions to poverty, but it reminds us never to forget the poor and also that God is at stake in our response to poverty. An active concern for the poor is not only an obligation for those who feel a political vocation; all Christians must take the Gospel message of justice and equality seriously. Christians cannot forgo their responsibility to say a prophetic word about unjust economic conditions. Pope John Paul II?s approach to the phenomenon of globalization is a good example. He constantly asks: ?How is this going to affect the poor? Does it promote justice??

Do you think the ?preferential option for the poor? has become an integral part of the Catholic Church?s social teaching? And where did that term come from?

Yes, I do believe that the option for the poor has become part of the Catholic social teaching. The phrase comes from the experience of the Latin American church. The precise term was born sometime between the Latin American bishops? conferences in Medell?n (1968) and in Puebla (1979). In Medell?n, the three words (option, preference, poor) are all present, but it was only in the years immediately following Medell?n that we brought these words into a complete phrase. It would be accurate to say that the term ?preferential option for the poor? comes from the Latin American church, but the content, the underlying intuition, is entirely biblical. Liberation theology tries to deepen our understanding of this core biblical conviction.

The preferential option for the poor has gradually become a central tenet of the church?s teaching. Perhaps we can briefly explain the meaning of each term:

? The term poverty refers to the real poor. This is not a preferential option for the spiritually poor. After all, such an option would be very easy, if for no other reason that there are so few of them! The spiritually poor are the saints! The poverty to which the option refers is material poverty. Material poverty means premature and unjust death. The poor person is someone who is treated as a non-person, someone who is considered insignificant from an economic, political and cultural point of view. The poor count as statistics; they are the nameless. But even though the poor remain insignificant within society, they are never insignificant before God.

? Some people feel, wrongly I believe, that the word preferential waters down or softens the option for the poor, but this is not true. God?s love has two dimensions, the universal and the particular; and while there is a tension between the two, there is no contradiction. God?s love excludes no one. Nevertheless, God demonstrates a special predilection toward those who have been excluded from the banquet of life. The word preference recalls the other dimension of the gratuitous love of God?the universality.

? In some ways, option is perhaps the weakest word in the sentence. In English, the word merely connotes a choice between two things. In Spanish, however, it evokes the sense of commitment. The option for the poor is not optional, but is incumbent upon every Christian. It is not something that a Christian can either take or leave. As understood by Medell?n, the option for the poor is twofold: it involves standing in solidarity with the poor, but it also entails a stance against inhumane poverty.

The preferential option for the poor is ultimately a question of friendship. Without friendship, an option for the poor can easily become commitment to an abstraction (to a social class, a race, a culture, an idea). Aristotle emphasized the important place of friendship for the moral life, but we also find this clearly stated in John?s Gospel. Christ says, ?I do not call you servants, but friends.? As Christians, we are called to reproduce this quality of friendship in our relationships with others. When we become friends with the poor, their presence leaves an indelible imprint on our lives, and we are much more likely to remain committed.

Some people say that liberation theology made an important contribution, but that it is now in decline. Do you agree? What is your prognosis for the future of liberation theology?

Any new insight within a particular field of knowledge initially receives a lot of attention, but then it slowly gets incorporated or assimilated into the normal ways of doing things. This principle applies to many of the key insights found in liberation theology.

Like any other way of doing theology, liberation theology is linked to a particular historical moment. Now we can ask ourselves: have the historical circumstances changed? Certainly, it is true that many important events have taken place over the past decades and that the political climate is very different from that of the 60?s and 70?s. But the situation of the poor has not changed fundamentally. As long as there is a group of Christians trying to be faithful in these circumstances, a group trying to follow Christ among the poor, we will find something like liberation theology.

Even though it is common to refer to liberation theology in the singular, we are witnessing several new expressions of this theology in different contexts and continents?North America, Central and South America, Africa and Asia. Each of these theologies has a particular point of view, but they also have much in common, particularly a concern for the poor and excluded. Liberation theology revolves around this attention to the plight of the poor.

What would a liberation theology in the United States look like? What do we most need to be liberated from? Consumerism, ethnocentrism? And if you were to work in this country, how would you do theology?

We have known for a long time the many ways that poverty can destroy or debilitate persons and nations, but perhaps we need to think more about the ways that riches or abundance can weaken our commitment to Christ. Each country or context has its temptations and its opportunities for spreading the good news. In poor nations, one is continuously reminded of the problem of poverty; in a rich and powerful nation, the challenge is to remember the poor and not succumb to ethnocentrism. Witnessing to a culture will sometimes involve prophetic critique; at other times it will mean drawing out from that culture its noblest qualities.

The Catholic Church has had a long history in the United States of being close to the struggling poor. Catholics have built up networks of primary and high schools, hospitals and colleges for first-generation immigrants. As Catholics moved up the social ladder, however, they began to adapt more and more to the prevailing culture of consumerism. But Pope John Paul II constantly reminds us to remember the poor. I should mention that there are significant groups of theologians in this country trying to develop a contextual theology, one that is attuned to the social and cultural challenges of living the faith in this milieu. A good contextual theology, though, will also deal with global issues, because Christian responsibility does not stop at the border. The ministry of solidarity has international dimensions.

How do you sustain the virtues of joy and hope during difficult times or in the midst of criticism?

Christian joy is not tied to a particular object, but to the experience of God?s unconditional love for us. Christian joy comes from knowing God and from trying to follow God?s will. Joy means rejoicing in God. But we can see from the Magnificat that, when Mary rejoices in God, she is also celebrating the liberating action of God in history. Mary rejoices in a God who is faithful to the poor. Our service of others must be wrapped in this joy. Only work embraced with joy truly transforms.

And we must also engage in our work hopefully. Hope is not the same thing as optimism. Optimism merely reflects the desire that external circumstances may one day improve. There is nothing wrong with optimism, but we may not always have reasons for it. The theological virtue of hope is much more than optimism. Hope is based on the conviction that God is at work in our lives and in the world. Hope is ultimately a gift from God given to sustain us during difficult times. Charles P?guy described hope as the ?little sister? that walks between the ?taller sisters? of faith and charity; when the taller sisters grow tired, the little one instills new life and energy into the other two. Hope never allows our faith to grow weak or our love to falter.

I learned a lot about hope and joy when I was young. From the age of 12 to 18 I had osteomyelitis and was confined to bed. There certainly were reasons for discouragement, but also very present was the gift of hope that came to me through prayer, reading, family and friends. Later my parishioners in Lima would also teach me volumes about hope in the midst of suffering, and this is when I decided to write a book about Job. Hope is precisely for the difficult moments.

23
3DHS / The Problem of Conservatism in America
« on: June 18, 2008, 11:39:17 AM »
  At the end of that year, when the radical conservatives in the Gingrich Congress shut down the federal government, they learned that the American public was genuinely attached to the modern state. "An anti-government philosophy turned out to be politically unpopular and fundamentally un-American," Brooks said. "People want something melioristic, they want government to do things."

    Instead of governing, the Republican majority in Congress - along with right-wing authors, journalists, talk-radio personalities, think tanks, and foundations - surrendered to the negative strain of modern conservatism. As political strategy, this strain went back to the Nixon era, but its philosophical roots were older and deeper. It extended back to William F. Buckley, Jr.,'s mission statement, in the inaugural issue of National Review, in 1955, that the new magazine "stands athwart history, yelling Stop"; and to Goldwater's seminal 1960 book, "The Conscience of a Conservative," in which he wrote, "I have little interest in streamlining government or in making it more efficient, for I mean to reduce its size. I do not undertake to promote welfare, for I propose to extend freedom. My aim is not to pass laws, but to repeal them. It is not to inaugurate new programs, but to cancel old ones." By the end of the century, a movement inspired by sophisticated works such as Russell Kirk's 1953 "The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot" churned out degenerate descendants with titles like "How to Talk to a Liberal (If You Must)." Shortly after engineering President Bill Clinton's impeachment on a narrow party-line basis, Gingrich was gone.

    Though conservatives were not much interested in governing, they understood the art of politics. They hadn't made much of a dent in the bureaucracy, and they had done nothing to provide universal health-care coverage or arrest growing economic inequality, but they had created a political culture that was inhospitable to welfare, to an indulgent view of criminals, to high rates of taxation. They had controlled the language and moved the political parameters to the right. Back in November, 1967, Buckley wrote in an essay on Ronald Reagan, "They say that his accomplishments are few, that it is only the rhetoric that is conservative. But the rhetoric is the principal thing. It precedes all action. All thoughtful action."

    In 2000, George W. Bush presented himself as Reagan's heir, but he didn't come into office with Reagan's ideological commitments or his public-policy goals. According to Frum, who worked as a White House speechwriter during Bush's first two years, Bush couldn't have won if he'd run as a real conservative, because the country was already moving in a new direction. Bush's goals, like Nixon's, were political. Nixon had set out to expand the Republican vote; Bush wanted to keep it from contracting. At his first meeting with Frum and other speechwriters, Bush declared, "I want to change the Party" - to soften its hard edge, and make the Party more hospitable to Hispanics. "It was all about positioning," Frum said, "not about confronting a new generation of problems." Frum wasn't happy; although he suspected that Bush might be right, he wanted him to govern along hard-line conservative principles.

    The phrase that signalled Bush's approach was "compassionate conservatism," but it never amounted to a policy program. Within hours of the Supreme Court decision that ended the disputed Florida recount, Dick Cheney met with a group of moderate Republican senators, including Lincoln Chafee, of Rhode Island. According to Chafee's new book, "Against the Tide: How a Compliant Congress Empowered a Reckless President" (Thomas Dunne), the Vice-President-elect gave the new order of battle: "We would seek confrontation on every front... . The new Administration would divide Americans into red and blue, and divide nations into those who stand with us or against us." Cheney's combative instincts and belief in an unfettered and secretive executive proved far more influential at the White House than Bush's campaign promise to be "a uniter, not a divider." Cheney behaved as if, notwithstanding the loss of the popular vote, conservative Republican domination could continue by sheer force of will. On domestic policy, the Administration made tax cuts and privatization its highest priority; and its conduct of the war on terror broke with sixty years of relatively bipartisan and multilateralist foreign policy.

    The Administration's political operatives were moving in the same direction. The Republican strategist Matthew Dowd studied the 2000 results and concluded that the proportion of swing voters in America had declined from twenty-two to seven per cent over the previous two decades, which meant that mobilizing the Party's base would be more important in 2004 than attracting independents. The strategist Karl Rove's polarizing political tactics (which brought a new level of demographic sophistication to the old formula) buried any hope of a centrist Presidency before Bush's first term was half finished.

    Ed Rollins said, "Rove knew his voters, he stuck to the message with consistency, he drove that base hard - and there's nothing left of it. Today, if you're not rich or Southern or born again, the chances of your being a Republican are not great." As long as Bush and his party kept winning elections, however slim the margins, Rove's declared ambition to create a "permanent majority" seemed like the vision of a tactical genius. But it was built on two illusions: that the conservative era would stretch on indefinitely, and that politics matters more than governing. The first illusion defied history; the second was blown up in Iraq and drowned in New Orleans. David Brooks argues that these disasters discredited both neo- and compassionate conservatism in the eyes of many Republicans. "You've got to learn from the failures," Brooks told me. "But Republicans have rejected the entire attempt. For example, after Katrina, House Republicans wanted nothing to do with New Orleans. They were, like, 'We don't care about those people.' "

    In its final year, the Bush Administration is seen by many conservatives (along with seventy per cent of Americans) to be a failure. Among true believers, there are two explanations of why this happened and what it portends. One is the purist version: Bush expanded the size of government and created huge deficits; allowed Republicans in Congress to fatten lobbyists and stuff budgets full of earmarks; tried to foist democracy on a Muslim country; failed to secure the border; and thus won the justified wrath of the American people. This account - shared by Pat Buchanan, the columnist George F. Will, and many Republicans in Congress - has the appeal of asking relatively little of conservatives. They need only to repent of their sins, rid themselves of the neoconservatives who had agitated for the Iraq invasion, and return to first principles. Buchanan said, "The conservatives need to, in Maoist terms, go back to Yenan."

    The second version - call it reformist - is more painful, because it's based on the recognition that, though Bush's fatal incompetence and Rove's shortsighted tactics hastened the conservative movement's demise, they didn't cause it. In this view, conservatism has a more serious problem than self-betrayal: a doctrinaire failure to adapt to new circumstances, new problems. Instead of heading back to Yenan to regroup, conservatives will have to spend some years or even decades wandering across a bleak political landscape of losing campaigns and rebranding efforts and earnest policy retreats, much as liberals did after 1968, before they can hope to re?stablish dominance.

    Recently, I spoke with a number of conservatives about their movement. The younger ones - say, those under fifty - uniformly subscribe to the reformist version. They are in a state of glowing revulsion at the condition of their political party. Most of them predicted that Republicans will lose the Presidency this year and suffer a rout in Congress. They seemed to feel that these losses would be deserved, and suggested that, if the party wins, it will be - in the words of Rich Lowry, the thirty-nine-year-old editor of National Review - "by default."

    On April 4th, a rainy day in New York, I attended Buckley's memorial Mass at St. Patrick's Cathedral with some two thousand people, an unusually large number of them women in hats and men in bow ties. George W. Rutler, the presiding priest, declared that Buckley's words helped "crack the walls of an evil empire." Secular humanism, he said, "builds little hells for man on earth... . Communism was worse than a social tyranny because it was a theological heresy." The service reminded me of the movement's philosophical origins, in the forties and fifties, in a Catholic sense of alarm at the relativism that was rampant in American life, and an insistence on human frailty. The conservative movement began as a true counterculture; how unlikely that its gloomy creed took hold in America, the optimistic capital of modernity.

    Later that day, the Manhattan Institute and National Review Institute held a forum on Buckley's legacy, at the Princeton Club. The panelists - mostly members of the Old Guard - remembered Buckley, traded Latin phrases, and exuded self-satisfaction. Roger Kimball, the co-editor of the dour cultural review The New Criterion, declared that conservatism imposes a philosophical duty on its adherents to enjoy life - to which George Will, not ebullient by disposition, later added, "Politics is fun, because politics involves inherently the celebration of America's first principles... . Politics is an inherently cheerful undertaking, so be of good cheer. That is what Bill left us with." Kimball continued to roll up the score in favor of conservatives. Their reputation for being "un-fun," he said, stems partly from the fact that they are "realists" who are "a wet blanket on people who talk about things like 'The Audacity of Hope' and 'It Takes a Village,' just to pick two terms arbitrarily." The country, he said, "is still suffering from that post-Romantic assault on humanity that is summarized by the term 'the sixties.' This, too, shall pass."

    Once the principled levity had died down and it came time for questions, I asked whether the conservative movement was dead. "It would be a sign of maturity if conservatives would stop using the phrase 'conservative movement,' " Will said. "This is now a center-right country, and conservatism is the default position for, I think, a stable Presidential majority." Jay Nordlinger, an editor at National Review, added, "If it's no longer a movement, and really is mainstream, we owe a lot to Bill Buckley and Reagan." But Buckley himself had been more realistic than his eulogists. Sam Tanenhaus, the editor of the Times Book Review and the Week in Review section, who is working on a biography of Buckley, said that in his final years Buckley understood that his movement was cracking up. "He told me, 'The conservative movement lost its raison d'?tre with the end of Communism and never got it back.' "

    Between the Mass and the forum, I had lunch with David Frum. His mood was elegiac and chastened. He now realized that, in 2001, Bush had been right and he had been wrong at their first meeting: the Party did need to change, but not in the way Bush went on to change it. "It wasn't a successful Presidency, and that's a painful thing," Frum said. "And I was a very small, unimportant part of it, but I was a part of it, and that implies responsibility." Frum has made his peace with the fact that smaller government is no longer a basis for conservative dominance. The thesis of his new book, "Comeback: Conservatism That Can Win Again" (Doubleday), whose message Frum has been taking to Republican groups around the country, is that the Party has lost the middle class by ignoring its sense of economic insecurity and continuing to wage campaigns as if the year were 1980, or 1968.

    "If Republican politicians quote Reagan, their political operatives study Nixon," Frum writes. "Republicans have been reprising Nixon's 1972 campaign against McGovern for a third of a century. As the excesses of the 1960s have dwindled into history, however, the 1972 campaign has worked less and less well." He adds, "How many more elections can conservatives win by campaigning against Abbie Hoffman and Bobby Seale? Voters want solutions to the problems of today." Polls reveal that Americans favor the Democratic side on nearly every domestic issue, from Social Security and health care to education and the environment. The all-purpose Republican solution of cutting taxes has run its course. Frum writes, "There are things only government can do, and if we conservatives wish to be entrusted with the management of government, we must prove that we care enough about government to manage it well."

    This is a candid change of heart from a writer who, in "Dead Right," called Republican efforts to compete with Clinton's universal-health-coverage plan "cowardly." In the new book, Frum asks, "Who agreed that conservatives should defend the dysfunctional American health system from all criticism?" Well - he did! Frum now identifies health care as the chief anxiety of the middle class. But governing well, in conservative terms, doesn't mean spending more money. It means doing what neither Reagan nor Bush did: mastering details, knowing the options, using caution - that is, taking government seriously. The policy ideas in "Comeback" rely on the market more than on the state and are relatively small-bore, such as a government campaign to raise awareness about the dangers of obesity. As with most such books, the diagnosis is more convincing than the cure.

    Frum believes that the Republicans need their own equivalent of the centrist Democratic Leadership Council, to make it safe for Republican candidates to tell their interest groups, such as evangelical Christians, what they don't want to hear: that they need to mute their demands if the Party is to regain a majority. At lunch, he said, "The thing I worry about most is if the Republicans lose this election - and if you're a betting man you have to believe they will - there will be a fundamentalist reaction. Not religious - but the beaten party believes it just has to say it louder. Like the Democrats after 1968." He added, "A lot of the problems in the Republican Party will not be fixed."

    I asked Frum if the movement still existed. "We'll have people formed by the conservative movement making decisions for the next thirty to forty years," he said. "But will they belong to a self-conscious and cohesive conservative movement? I don't think so. Because their movement did its work. The core task was to stop and reverse, to some degree, the drift of democratic countries after the Second World War toward social democracy. And that was done."

    As we started to leave, Frum smiled. "One of Buckley's great gifts was the gift of timing," he said. "To be twenty-five at the beginning and eighty-two at the end! But I'm forty-seven at the end."

    When I met David Brooks in Washington, he was even more scathing than Frum. Brooks had moved through every important conservative publication - National Review, the Wall Street Journal editorial page, the Washington Times, the Weekly Standard - "and now I feel estranged," he said. "I just don't feel it's exciting, I don't feel it's true, fundamentally true." In the eighties, when he was a young movement journalist, the attacks on regulation and the Soviet Union seemed "true." Now most conservatives seem incapable of even acknowledging the central issues of our moment: wage stagnation, inequality, health care, global warming. They are stuck in the past, in the dogma of limited government. Perhaps for that reason, Brooks left movement journalism and, in 2003, became a moderately conservative columnist for the Times. "American conservatives had one defeat, in 2006, but it wasn't a big one," he said. "The big defeat is probably coming, and then the thinking will happen. I have not yet seen the major think tanks reorient themselves, and I don't know if they can." He added, "You go to Capitol Hill - Republican senators know they're fucked. They have that sense. But they don't know what to do. There's a hunger for new policy ideas."

    The Heritage Foundation Web site currently links to video presentations by Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham, "challenging Americans to consider, What Would Reagan Do?" Brooks called the conservative think tanks "sclerotic," but much conservative journalism has become just as calcified and ingrown. Last year, writing in The New Republic, Sam Tanenhaus revealed a 1997 memo in which Buckley - who had originally hired Brooks at National Review on the strength of a brilliant undergraduate parody that he had written of Buckley - refused to anoint him as his heir because Brooks, a Jew, is not a "believing Christian." At Commentary, the neoconservative counterpart to National Review, the editorship was bequeathed by Norman Podhoretz, its longtime editor, to his son John, whose crude op-eds for the New York Post didn't measure up to Commentary's intellectual past. A conservative journalist familiar with both publications said that what mattered most at the Christian National Review was doctrinal purity, whereas at the Jewish Commentary it was blood relations: "It's a question of who can you trust, and it comes down to religious fundamentals."

    The orthodoxy that accompanies this kind of insularity has had serious consequences: for years, neither National Review nor Commentary was able to admit that the Iraq war was being lost. Lowry, who received the editorship from Buckley before he turned thirty, told me that he particularly regretted a 2005 cover story he'd written with the headline "WE'RE WINNING." He said, "Most of the right was in lockstep with Donald Rumsfeld. We didn't want to admit we were losing and said anyone who said otherwise was a defeatist. One thing I've loved about conservatism is its keen sense of reality, and that was totally lost in 2006." Last year, National Review ran a cover article on global warming, which Lowry, like Brooks, Frum, and other conservatives, listed among the major issues of our time, along with wage stagnation and the breakdown of the family. Although the article, by Jim Manzi, proposed market solutions, the response among some readers, Lowry said, was " 'How dare you?' A bunch of people out there don't want to hear it - they believe it's a hoax. That's the head-in-the-sand response."

    A similar battle looms between traditional supply-side tax cutters and younger writers like National Review's Ramesh Ponnuru, who has proposed greatly expanding the child tax credit - using tax policy not to reduce the tax burden across the board, in accord with conservative orthodoxy, but to help families. These challenges to dogma, however tentative, are being led by Republican constituencies that have begun to embrace formerly "Democratic issues." Evangelical churches are concerned about the environment; businesses worry about health care; white working-class voters are angry about income inequality. But nothing focusses the mind like the prospect of electoral disaster: last November, Lowry and Ponnuru co-wrote a cover story with the headline "THE COMING CATACLYSM."

    It's probably not an accident that the most compelling account of the crisis was written by two conservatives who are still in their twenties and have made their careers outside movement institutions. Ross Douthat and Reihan Salam, editors at the Atlantic Monthly, are eager to cut loose the dead weight of the Gingrich and Bush years. In their forthcoming book, "Grand New Party: How Republicans Can Win the Working Class and Save the American Dream" (Doubleday), Douthat and Salam are writing about, if not for, what they call "Sam's Club Republicans" - members of the white working class, who are the descendants of Nixon's "northern ethnics and southern Protestants" and the Reagan Democrats of the eighties. In their analysis, America is divided between the working class (defined as those without a college education) and a "mass upper class" of the college educated, who are culturally liberal and increasingly Democratic. The New Deal, the authors acknowledge, provided a sense of security to working-class families; the upheavals of the sixties and afterward broke it down. Their emphasis is on the disintegration of working-class cohesion, which they blame on "crime, contraception, and growing economic inequality." Douthat and Salam are cultural conservatives - Douthat became a Pentecostal and then a Catholic in his teens - but they readily acknowledge the economic forces that contribute to the breakdown of families lacking the "social capital" of a college degree. Their policy proposals are an unorthodox mixture of government interventions (wage subsidies for lower-income workers) and tax reforms (Ponnuru's increased child-credit idea, along with a revision of the tax code in favor of lower-income families). Their ultimate purpose is political: to turn as much of the working class into Sam's Club Republicans as possible. They don't acknowledge the corporate interests that are at least as Republican as Sam's Club shoppers, and that will put up a fight on many counts, potentially tearing the Party apart. Nor are they prepared to accept as large a role for government as required by the deep structural problems they identify. Douthat and Salam are as personally remote from working-class America as any ?lite liberal; Douthat described their work to me as "a data-driven attempt at political imagination." Still, any Republican politician worried about his party's eroding base and grim prospects should make a careful study of this book.

    Frum's call for national-unity conservatism and Douthat and Salam's program for "Sam's Club Republicans" are efforts to shorten the lean years for conservatives, but political ideas don't materialize on command to solve the electoral problems of one party or another. They are generated over time by huge social transformations, on the scale of what took place in the sixties and seventies. "They're not real, they're ideological constructs," Buchanan said, "and you can write columns and things like that, but they don't engage the heart. The heart was engaged by law and order. You reached into people - there was feeling."

    Sam Tanenhaus summed up the 2008 race with a simple formula: Goldwater was to Reagan as McGovern is to Obama. From the ruins of Goldwater's landslide defeat in 1964, conservatives began the march that brought them fully to power sixteen years later. If Obama wins in November, it will have taken liberals thirty-six years. Tanenhaus pointed out how much of Obama's rhetoric about a "new politics" is reminiscent of McGovern's campaign, which was also directed against a bloated, corrupt establishment. In "The Making of the President 1972," Theodore White quotes McGovern saying, "I can present liberal values in a conservative, restrained way... . I see myself as a politician of reconciliation." That was in 1970, before McGovern was defined as the candidate of "amnesty, abortion, and acid," and he defined himself as a rigid moralist more interested in hectoring middle Americans than in inspiring them.

    Obama, of course, is an entirely different personality in a different time, but the interminable primary campaign has shown his coalition to look very much like McGovern's: educated, upper-income liberal voters; blacks; and the young. Nixon beat McGovern among the latter even after the Twenty-sixth Amendment lowered the voting age to eighteen; but times have changed so drastically that, according to Pew Research Center surveys, almost sixty per cent of voters under thirty now identify more strongly with the Democrats, doubling the Party's advantage among the young over Republicans since 2004. And the demographic work of John Judis and Ruy Teixeira in their 2002 book, "The Emerging Democratic Majority," showed that the McGovern share of the electorate - minorities and educated professionals working in post-industrial jobs - is expanding far faster than the white working class. This was the original vision of a McGovern adviser named Fred Dutton, whose 1971 book, "Changing Sources of Power: American Politics in the 1970s," cited by Perlstein, foresaw a rising "coalition of conscience and decency" among baby boomers. The new politics was an electoral disaster in 1972, but it may finally triumph in 2008.

    If not, it will be because Democrats still can't win the Presidency without the working-class Americans who remain the swing vote and, this year, are up for grabs more than ever. Hillary Clinton has denied Obama a lock on the nomination by securing large majorities of swing voters, beginning in New Hampshire and culminating last week in West Virginia. It took the Obama campaign months to realize that a 2008 version of the McGovern coalition will barely be sufficient to win the nomination, let alone the general election. The question is how Obama can do better with the crucial slice of the electorate that he hasn't been able to capture. Recently, he has gone from bowling in Pennsylvania and drinking Bud in Indiana to talking about his single mother, his wife's working-class roots, and his ardent patriotism on the night of his victory in North Carolina. But the problem can't be solved by symbols or rhetoric: for a forty-six-year-old black man in an expensive suit, with a Harvard law degree and a strange name, to walk into V.F.W. halls and retirement homes and say, "I'm one of you," seems both improbable and disingenuous.

    The other extreme - to muse aloud among wealthy contributors, like a political anthropologist, about the values and behavior of the economically squeezed small-town voter - is even more self-defeating. Perhaps Obama's best hope is to play to his strength, which is a cool and eloquent candor, and address the question of liberal ?litism as frontally as he spoke about race in Philadelphia two months ago. He would need to say, in effect, "I know I'm not exactly one of you," and then explain why this shouldn't matter - why he would be just as effective a leader for the working and middle class as his predecessors Presidents Roosevelt and Kennedy, who were ?lites of a different kind. Above all, Obama should absorb what the most thoughtful conservatives already know: that these voters see the economic condition of the country as inextricable from its moral condition.

    Last month, I saw John McCain speak in a tiny town, nestled among the Appalachian coal hills of eastern Kentucky, called Inez. He was in the middle of his Time for Action Tour of America's "forgotten places" (including Selma, Alabama; Youngstown, Ohio; and the Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans). It was a transparent effort to stay in the media eye and also to say, as his speechwriter Mark Salter later told me, "I'm not going to run an election like the last couple have been run, trying to grind out a narrow win by increasing the turnout of the base. I don't want to run a campaign like that because I don't want to be a President like that. I want to be your President even if you don't vote for me." As every new conservative book points out, the Bush-Rove realignment strategy would fail miserably this year, anyway.

    Inez is the place where Lyndon Johnson came to declare war on poverty, in 1964. He sat on the porch of a ramshackle, tin-roof house, which still stands (just barely) on a hillside above Route 3, looking a little like a museum of rural poverty in a county that has recently prospered because of coal. McCain was to appear in the county courthouse, on the short main street of Inez, and the middle-aged men I sat with in the second-floor courtroom all remembered Johnson's visit and had nothing but good things to say about his anti-poverty programs. Kennis Maynard, the county prosecutor, a cheerful, thickset man in a blue suit, had saved enough money for law school from a job in the mines that he got with the help of a federal work program. His family was so poor that they were happy to accept government handouts of pork, canned beans, and cheese. The courthouse in which we were sitting was a New Deal project, circa 1938. Maynard, like the other men, like most of nearly all-white Martin County, is Republican - mainly, he said, because of cultural issues like abortion. But Maynard and the others said that McCain had better talk about jobs and gas prices if he wanted to keep his audience.

    John Preston, who is the county's circuit-court judge and also its amateur historian, Harvard-educated, with a flag pin on his lapel, said, "Obama is considered an ?litist." He added, "There's a racial component, obviously, to it. Thousands of people won't publicly say it, but they won't vote for a black man - on both sides, Democrat and Republican. It won't show up in the polls, because they won't admit it. The elephant's in the room, but nobody will say it. Sad to say it, but it's true." Later, I spoke with half a dozen men eating lunch at the Pigeon Roost Dairy Bar outside town, and none of them had any trouble saying it. They announced their refusal to vote for a black man, without hesitation or apology. "He's a Muslim, isn't he?" an aging mine electrician asked. "I won't vote for a colored man. He'll put too many coloreds in jobs. Colored are O.K. - they've done well, good for them, look where they came from. But radical coloreds, no - like that Farrakhan, or that senator from New York, Rangel. There'd be riots in the streets, like the sixties." No speech, on race or ?litism or anything else, would move them. Here was one part of the white working class - maybe not representative, but at least significant - and in an Obama-McCain race they would never be the swing vote. It is a brutal fact, and Obama probably shouldn't even mention it.

    McCain appeared to a warm reception. I had seen him in New Hampshire, where he gave off-the-cuff remarks with vigor; when he is stuck with a script, however, he is a terrible campaigner. Looking pallid, he sounded flat, and stumbled over his lines - and yet they were effective lines, ones that Obama would do well to study. "I can't claim we come from the same background," McCain began. "I'm not the son of a coal miner. I wasn't raised by a family that made its living from the land or toiled in a mill or worked in the local schools or health clinic. I was raised in the United States Navy, and, after my own naval career, I became a politician. My work isn't as hard as yours - it isn't nearly as hard as yours. I had an easier start." He paused and went on, "But you are my compatriots, my fellow-Americans, and that kinship means more to me than almost any other association."

    McCain mentioned Johnson's visit and the war on poverty, expressing admiration for its good intentions but rebuking its reliance on government to create jobs - rebuking it gently, without the contempt that Reagan would have used. He called for job-training partnerships between business and community colleges, tax deductions for companies bringing telecommunications to rural areas. It was a moderate, reform-minded Republicanism. He didn't use any of the red-meat language that made two generations of white voters switch parties.

    "McCain is not a theme guy," David Brooks said. "He reacts - he has moral instinct, which I think is quite a good one." Other conservatives complained to me that he has no ideology at all. "Let's face it," Brooks said. "What McCain's going to do is say, 'I'm not George Bush. I'm not like the Republican Party you knew.' " Most Presidential candidates move to the center once they've locked up the nomination; McCain, however, still has to try to win over the suspicious Republican right, and he recently vowed to appoint only judges who "strictly interpret" the Constitution to the bench. But pledges of fealty to his party's ideological interest groups diminish what's appealing about McCain. "Feeling fraudulent is very debilitating to him," Mark Salter said.

    When McCain opened the floor for questions, a woman asked about border security. He replied, to general laughter, "This meeting is adjourned." Another woman asked him to discuss his religious faith, and McCain told a story from his imprisonment, about a generous gesture by a North Vietnamese guard one Christmas Day. I'd heard him tell the same story in New Hampshire; it seemed to be his stock answer, and he hurried through it. Other questions came, about gas prices and jobs going overseas and foreclosures and education costs, and McCain's answers - a summer federal-gas-tax holiday, a cut in the capital-gains tax, charter schools, federal home loans, job-training programs - didn't seem to move either him or his audience very much.

    Members of the audience began to appeal to McCain with the old polarizing language, but he refused to take the bait. A state senator asked what he thought about Obama's recent comments on rural voters, religion, and guns. McCain turned the question around. "Let me ask you: Do you think those remarks reflect the views of constituents?"

    "I think they reflect the views of someone who doesn't understand this neck of the woods," the state senator replied, to the biggest ovation of the day.

    "Yes, those were ?litist remarks, to say the least," McCain said quickly, walking away.

    Judge Preston had a question. McCain had mentioned Clinton's vote for a million-dollar earmark for a museum in Woodstock, New York. Had he attended the concert? It was an obvious setup for a standard McCain joke, and he seemed positively embarrassed by it. "I'll give my not-so-respectful answer," he said. "I was tied up at the time."

    It was a remarkably subdued performance. McCain doesn't try to stir a crowd's darker passions or its higher aspirations. He doesn't present himself as a conservative leader; he is simply a leader. His favorite book, according to Salter, is "For Whom the Bell Tolls," because it's the story of a man who struggles nobly even though he knows the effort is doomed. McCain says to audiences, Here I am, a man in full, take me or leave me. This might be the only kind of Republican who could win in 2008.


The entire article may be found here

24
3DHS / Who Spoke These Words?
« on: June 17, 2008, 02:25:32 PM »
Tonight I want to have an unpleasant talk with you about a problem unprecedented in our history. With the exception of preventing war, this is the greatest challenge our country will face during our lifetimes. The energy crisis has not yet overwhelmed us, but it will if we do not act quickly.

It is a problem we will not solve in the next few years, and it is likely to get progressively worse through the rest of this century.

We must not be selfish or timid if we hope to have a decent world for our children and grandchildren.

We simply must balance our demand for energy with our rapidly shrinking resources. By acting now, we can control our future instead of letting the future control us.

Two days from now, I will present my energy proposals to the Congress. Its members will be my partners and they have already given me a great deal of valuable advice. Many of these proposals will be unpopular. Some will cause you to put up with inconveniences and to make sacrifices.

The most important thing about these proposals is that the alternative may be a national catastrophe. Further delay can affect our strength and our power as a nation.

Our decision about energy will test the character of the American people and the ability of the President and the Congress to govern. This difficult effort will be the "moral equivalent of war" -- except that we will be uniting our efforts to build and not destroy.

I know that some of you may doubt that we face real energy shortages. The 1973 gasoline lines are gone, and our homes are warm again. But our energy problem is worse tonight than it was in 1973 or a few weeks ago in the dead of winter. It is worse because more waste has occurred, and more time has passed by without our planning for the future. And it will get worse every day until we act.

The oil and natural gas we rely on for 75 percent of our energy are running out. In spite of increased effort, domestic production has been dropping steadily at about six percent a year. Imports have doubled in the last five years. Our nation's independence of economic and political action is becoming increasingly constrained. Unless profound changes are made to lower oil consumption, we now believe that the world will be demanding more oil that it can produce.

The world now uses about 60 million barrels of oil a day and demand increases each year about 5 percent. This means that just to stay even we need the production of a new Texas every year, an Alaskan North Slope every nine months, or a new Saudi Arabia every three years. Obviously, this cannot continue.

We must look back in history to understand our energy problem. Twice in the last several hundred years there has been a transition in the way people use energy.

The first was about 200 years ago, away from wood -- which had provided about 90 percent of all fuel -- to coal, which was more efficient. This change became the basis of the Industrial Revolution.

The second change took place in this century, with the growing use of oil and natural gas. They were more convenient and cheaper than coal, and the supply seemed to be almost without limit. They made possible the age of automobile and airplane travel. Nearly everyone who is alive today grew up during this age and we have never known anything different.

Because we are now running out of gas and oil, we must prepare quickly for a third change, to strict conservation and to the use of coal and permanent renewable energy sources, like solar power.

The world has not prepared for the future. During the 1950s, people used twice as much oil as during the 1940s. During the 1960s, we used twice as much as during the 1950s. And in each of those decades, more oil was consumed than in all of mankind's previous history.

World consumption of oil is still going up. If it were possible to keep it rising during the 1970s and 1980s by 5 percent a year as it has in the past, we could use up all the proven reserves of oil in the entire world by the end of the next decade.

I know that many of you have suspected that some supplies of oil and gas are being withheld. You may be right, but suspicions about oil companies cannot change the fact that we are running out of petroleum.

All of us have heard about the large oil fields on Alaska's North Slope. In a few years when the North Slope is producing fully, its total output will be just about equal to two years' increase in our nation's energy demand.

Each new inventory of world oil reserves has been more disturbing than the last. World oil production can probably keep going up for another six or eight years. But eventually it cannot go up much more. Demand will overtake production. We have no choice about that.

But we do have a choice about how we will spend the next few years. Each American uses the energy equivalent of 60 barrels of oil per person each year. Ours is the most wasteful nation on earth. We waste more energy than we import. With about the same standard of living, we use twice as much energy per person as do other countries like Germany, Japan and Sweden.

One choice is to continue doing what we have been doing before. We can drift along for a few more years.

Our consumption of oil would keep going up every year. Our cars would continue to be too large and inefficient. Three-quarters of them would continue to carry only one person -- the driver -- while our public transportation system continues to decline. We can delay insulating our houses, and they will continue to lose about 50 percent of their heat in waste.

We can continue using scarce oil and natural to generate electricity, and continue wasting two-thirds of their fuel value in the process.

We can't substantially increase our domestic production, so we would need to import twice as much oil as we do now. Supplies will be uncertain. The cost will keep going up. Six years ago, we paid $3.7 billion for imported oil. Last year we spent $37 billion -- nearly ten times as much -- and this year we may spend over $45 billion.

Unless we act, we will spend more than $550 billion for imported oil -- more than $2,500 a year for every man, woman, and child in America. Along with that money we will continue losing American jobs and becoming increasingly vulnerable to supply interruptions.

Now we have a choice. But if we wait, we will live in fear of embargoes. We could endanger our freedom as a sovereign nation to act in foreign affairs. Within ten years we would not be able to import enough oil -- from any country, at any acceptable price.

If we wait, and do not act, then our factories will not be able to keep our people on the job with reduced supplies of fuel. Too few of our utilities will have switched to coal, our most abundant energy source.

We will not be ready to keep our transportation system running with smaller, more efficient cars and a better network of buses, trains and public transportation.

We will feel mounting pressure to plunder the environment. We will have a crash program to build more nuclear plants, strip-mine and burn more coal, and drill more offshore wells than we will need if we begin to conserve now. Inflation will soar, production will go down, people will lose their jobs. Intense competition will build up among nations and among the different regions within our own country.

If we fail to act soon, we will face an economic, social and political crisis that will threaten our free institutions.

But we still have another choice. We can begin to prepare right now. We can decide to act while there is time.

That is the concept of the energy policy we will present on Wednesday. Our national energy plan is based on ten fundamental principles.

The first principle is that we can have an effective and comprehensive energy policy only if the government takes responsibility for it and if the people understand the seriousness of the challenge and are willing to make sacrifices.

The second principle is that healthy economic growth must continue. Only by saving energy can we maintain our standard of living and keep our people at work. An effective conservation program will create hundreds of thousands of new jobs.

The third principle is that we must protect the environment. Our energy problems have the same cause as our environmental problems -- wasteful use of resources. Conservation helps us solve both at once.

The fourth principle is that we must reduce our vulnerability to potentially devastating embargoes. We can protect ourselves from uncertain supplies by reducing our demand for oil, making the most of our abundant resources such as coal, and developing a strategic petroleum reserve.

The fifth principle is that we must be fair. Our solutions must ask equal sacrifices from every region, every class of people, every interest group. Industry will have to do its part to conserve, just as the consumers will. The energy producers deserve fair treatment, but we will not let the oil companies profiteer.

The sixth principle, and the cornerstone of our policy, is to reduce the demand through conservation. Our emphasis on conservation is a clear difference between this plan and others which merely encouraged crash production efforts. Conservation is the quickest, cheapest, most practical source of energy. Conservation is the only way we can buy a barrel of oil for a few dollars. It costs about $13 to waste it.

The seventh principle is that prices should generally reflect the true replacement costs of energy. We are only cheating ourselves if we make energy artificially cheap and use more than we can really afford.

The eighth principle is that government policies must be predictable and certain. Both consumers and producers need policies they can count on so they can plan ahead. This is one reason I am working with the Congress to create a new Department of Energy, to replace more than 50 different agencies that now have some control over energy.

The ninth principle is that we must conserve the fuels that are scarcest and make the most of those that are more plentiful. We can't continue to use oil and gas for 75 percent of our consumption when they make up seven percent of our domestic reserves. We need to shift to plentiful coal while taking care to protect the environment, and to apply stricter safety standards to nuclear energy.

The tenth principle is that we must start now to develop the new, unconventional sources of energy we will rely on in the next century.

These ten principles have guided the development of the policy I would describe to you and the Congress on Wednesday.


Speech given when oil was $13 a barrel and gas was 62 cents per gallon.

click here to see who made this speech and when



25
3DHS / It takes a long time for freedom to return
« on: May 18, 2008, 07:15:03 PM »
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/16/usa1

Communist party membership no longer a fireable offence in California

May 16 2008.

The California Senate yesterday passed legislation that would delete membership in the Communist party as a reason for firing a public employee, a Cold War-era prohibition intended to root out communists.

Democratic Senator Alan Lowenthal called communism a "failed system," and said his bill - Senate Bill 1322 - was intended to protect "the constitutional freedoms that we have fought so valiantly for," including freedom of political affiliation.

California is the only state that allows public employees to be dismissed for membership in a political party.

In addition, current law requires that any organisation that applies to use a public school facility can be asked to sign a statement that "the applicant is not a communist action organisation or a communist front".

"SB 1322 seeks to protect the rights of free speech and political affiliation by repealing the no-longer necessary statute from the books," Lowenthal said.

The bill, he said, would "still allow employees to be fired for any activity to overthrow the state or federal government".

The legislation, which will now be considered by the assembly, was approved on a 24-15 vote, with Democrats in support and Republicans opposed.

Republican senator Jeff Denham warned: "the Communist party is not a dead organisation ... and [is] actively repressing human beings in Cuba and China in brutal ways.

"The state has every right to hold school employees accountable for their political standing, especially if that employee belongs to an organisation that favours the violent overthrow of the government," Denham said during the debate on the bill.

Denham said that it's also "reasonable that use of public school property should be limited to groups who support our democracy and do not advocate the overthrow of government by force, violence or other possible means."

But Lowenthal argued, "the communist party does not advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government.

"This is a very conservative bill," he said. "[It] says we must uphold the constitution."

The legislature cannot repeal California's loyalty oath, which was added to the state constitution by voters in 1952, but its current use was debated yesterday.

The oath requires public employees in California to swear to "defend" the US and California constitutions "against all enemies, foreign and domestic".

The law is sporadically enforced, but since the end of the Cold War some potential employees - including Quakers and Jehovah's Witnesses - have declined to sign the pledge over religious or political issues.

In a recent high-profile case, California State University, Fullerton, canceled the appointment of an American Studies lecturer after she declined to sign the oath.


    * guardian.co.uk ? Guardian News and Media Limited 2008

26
3DHS / The LRA
« on: May 15, 2008, 07:01:01 PM »
Note the bit of honor for the president as well... ;)

Africa?s Most Wanted

By Matthew Green

Published: February 8 2008 21:59 | Last updated: February 8 2008 21:59

FT

Matthew Green?s book, The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for Africa?s Most Wanted, recounts the author?s quest to meet Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord?s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels.

For 20 years, Kony?s followers have waged a campaign of terror by abducting thousands of children in his native northern Uganda. But beyond Kony?s pledges to rule according to the Ten Commandments, nobody seems to know why he is fighting.

Tracking Kony through the badlands of Uganda and Sudan, Green uncovers a hidden history of oppression and betrayal stretching back from the earliest Victorian explorers to the modern-day ?war on terror?. By the time Kony emerges from his jungle hideout, it is clear there is far more to the war than one man?s madness.

Kony?s appearance 18 months ago marked the start of talks that have led to one of Uganda?s most prolonged periods of peace in living memory. Hundreds of thousands of people have returned home after surviving for years in squalid ?protected camps?. But confirmation in January that the LRA had executed Kony?s deputy, Vincent Otti, has renewed concerns over dangerous divisions in the rebel ranks. Until Kony himself gives up, few in northern Uganda will believe their ordeal is over.

First came the bodyguards, teenage boys rustling through the long grass in oversized wellingtons. Some wore dreadlocks, others rosaries. All carried guns.

We watched as they formed a circle round the clearing, staring at us with eyes both sullen and alert. Their leader had to be close now, perhaps just around the bend in the trail.

Then we saw him. Gaunt, somehow managing to look immaculate in sharply creased short-sleeved shirt and trousers, the leader of the LRA strode out of the forest wearing a look of utter bewilderment.

One of the rebels produced a plastic chair. Lowering himself into his makeshift throne, he dabbed sweat from his brow with a flannel. His nerves could be forgiven. After two decades of fighting, he was about to hold his first news conference.

?I am a man,? he began, voice quavering. ?I am a human being. I am Joseph Kony.?

Until he emerged from his hideout in the north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in mid-2006, Joseph Kony was the most mysterious rebel leader in Africa, perhaps the world. For almost 20 years, his LRA rebels had terrorised his native northern Uganda, abducting thousands of children for use as soldiers, porters and wives. His fighters were renowned for chopping off people?s noses, padlocking their lips, or hacking them to death with machetes. Chief among their victims were Kony?s own Acholi community. At its peak, in 2002 and 2003, the war forced two million people from their homes, creating one of the worst humanitarian crises on the planet. For all the mayhem, Kony was an enigma. ?Ugandan newspapers described him as a self-styled prophet who wanted to rule according to the Ten Commandments. Possessing few pictures, they instead recycled a snap of him as a much younger man, wearing a T-shirt with the slogan ?Born to be Wild?. Nobody seemed to know why he was fighting.

Six months before Kony appeared in the clearing, I had set out to find him. I had been working as a reporter for the Reuters news agency in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, covering east Africa. I had filed endless reports about Kony?s atrocities, but had no real idea what the war was about. My question was simple: how could one man, kidnapping thousands of children, hold half a country hostage for 20 years?

My timing could have been better. The International Criminal Court in The Hague had just issued its first arrest warrants to try suspected war criminals. It named Kony and four of his top commanders. Facing 33 counts, Kony was now officially Africa?s most wanted man. Scared of being arrested, he seemed even less likely to be willing to receive visitors.

I took a bus north from Uganda?s capital Kampala, hurtling through schools and plantations until the land cracked in half. White water surged over rocks, soldiers guarded a bridge. This was the Karuma Falls on the river Nile, the dividing line between the peaceful south of Uganda, and the land of the LRA in the north. A sign by the road said ?Safe journey?.

I headed for Kony?s home village, Odek. As the bus drove past abandoned fields and the remains of farmsteads, I began to wonder where all the people had gone.

Then we passed the first ?protected camp? ? huts crammed together into a giant slum. Men, women and children wandered the lanes, too scared of the rebels or the soldiers sent to guard them to go out and farm. The government created the camps in 1996 to separate Kony from his Acholi people. A decade later, they had become huge prisons.

Kony?s village looked much the same as the other camps. The men gave sheepish grins when I asked about Kony, as if I had mentioned a relative nobody liked to talk about. Finally, they directed me to a hut belonging to a maths teacher named Lakoch p?Oyoo.

Mr p?Oyoo smiled as he reminisced about the childhood he had shared with Kony, describing a mild-mannered boy who hated violence. Older kids would insult his mother, but Kony ignored them. ?People said he was a coward,? p?Oyoo told me. ?He just said ?I can?t see the use of fighting.? ?

He smiled again. ?Kony was really a jolly man,? he said. ?What he liked best was conversation and laughing.? Then he frowned. ?He told me he never wanted to be a witch doctor, but he was forced to by the spirits,? p?Oyoo said. ?He could even have died if he had refused, so he accepted that he had to become a witch doctor and healed so many people.?

Among the Acholi ? where disease was often blamed on spirits called jogi ? becoming a healer was not such an unusual career. Kony might still be treating the sick, had his people not suffered a calamity that would, at first, turn him into a hero.

In January 1986, a dashing young guerrilla leader named Yoweri Museveni seized Kampala and toppled a ruling junta of Acholi generals. Five years of civil war that had raged in the south were over. Crowds thronged the capital to celebrate as Museveni was sworn in as president.

But for the Acholi, Museveni?s victory was a disaster. The Acholi people had formed the core of Uganda?s army ever since Britain began recruiting them into the King?s African Rifles before independence in 1962. They had been at the centre of Uganda?s power struggles ever since ? massacred by the dictator Idi Amin in the 1970s, then fighting Museveni on behalf of former president Milton Obote in the early 1980s.

Acholi officers feared Museveni wanted to take revenge for massacres their soldiers had committed. When his followers marched north, burning granaries and executing civilians, many Acholi believed he planned to wipe them out. Acholi rebel movements emerged, with Kony just one of several mystics who joined the fray.

Rival groups were soon defeated. But within a few years Kony had become more powerful than anyone could have believed.

In Gulu, the main town in the north of Uganda, I met Moses, a young man who knew the secrets of Kony?s success. Rarely seen without a file of notes from his peace studies course under his arm, Moses was fond of salmon-pink shirts and a matching tie. It was hard to imagine him as one of Kony?s most trusted commanders.

His rebel career had begun 10 years earlier, when Kony?s men stormed his dormitory at Sir Samuel Baker School (named after the Victorian explorer who crossed northern Uganda in search of the source of the White Nile). Kony?s men roped 39 boys together and marched them towards his camps in southern Sudan.

The Sudanese government in Khartoum had adopted Kony in the mid-1990s, using his fighters as a proxy to attack their own southern rebels. Lavished with guns, Kony sent his followers back into Uganda to abduct enough ?recruits? to swell his ranks into the thousands.

Moses, then 16, was dragged into an upside-down-version of the life he left behind. Kony became the teacher, his sermons the lessons. Years later, Moses still remembered his speeches: ?Kony is a messenger from God! We follow the commands of the Holy Spirit!?, Moses said, bulging his eyes like his old master. ?Our people are suffering while Museveni?s tribe is enjoying life. But by next year, Kony is going to overthrow the government. Kony is going to be president!?

Isolated in Sudan, Kony felt betrayed by the Acholi when they failed to rise up and support his rebellion. Twisting the logic of the Old Testament, he ordered punishments for people suspected of helping the army. Moses resumed his impression: ?If someone has done something bad to you, you have to kill them!? he said. ?Go and read in Matthew, chapter what and what, it is stated that if your right hand causes trouble, cut if off! It is there in the Bible!?

I met one of the victims of this policy in Gulu, a teenager called Geoffrey. The rebels had sliced off his lips, ears, fingers and thumbs. Then they had stuffed a letter in his pocket warning that anyone who tried to join the army would suffer a similar fate. He clasped my hand between his fingerless palms, managing to say he had forgiven the people who had done this ? hate would not bring back his hands.

Kony?s men were also famous for snatching young girls, who they called ting ting. Strict rules governed the women; rebels could be shot for touching a girl before she was handed out as a wife to a commander. Kony himself accumulated a harem of more than 80 wives. He began to father a master race of ?New Acholi?.

After suffering many wounds in countless battles with the army, Moses decided he might as well die trying to escape. He slipped away and handed in his gun after eight years in the rebel ranks. And yet, rather than laying all the blame on Kony for his suffering, he reserved most of his contempt for Museveni, the president. ?The government says these rebels are only terrorists, that we are thieves,? he said. ?But Kony has objectives: he wants to overthrow the government; he wants to restore Acholi culture.? Moses shook his head. ?We northerners, we are not given any respect, we are just like slaves.?

Leaving northern Uganda, I travelled to Juba, the capital of southern Sudan, hoping to find out more about where Kony might be hiding. I arrived just in time to learn that he had been captured ? on tape.

Leaders from south Sudan?s government had met Kony in the bush, persuading him to open talks with Museveni. They shot a video of him saying: ?I am not a terrorist, I want peace.? Riek Machar, south Sudan?s vice-president, handed him $20,000 in a brown envelope to buy food for his followers. Kony flashed the faintest of smiles.

In fact, he was boxed into a corner. Kony?s old backers in Khartoum had reduced their support after the US added Kony to a ?terrorist exclusion list? shortly after 9/11. Sudan?s government, listed by Washington as a ?state sponsor of terror?, was anxious to show it was on America?s side.

Kony?s options narrowed further in 2005 when Khartoum signed a peace deal with the southern rebels to end their long civil war. Both sides agreed foreign forces ? inc?luding the LRA ? must leave. Kony fled across the border into Congo?s Garamba National Park. Rebels began dining on elephant.

Riek then made one of the most dramatic gestures in the history of African peace-making. He flew or trucked more than 200 people ? Ugandan elders, rebels? relatives, even three of Kony?s wives ? hundreds of miles to the clearing on Sudan?s border with Congo to try to persuade the commanders to come home. I hitched a ride.

?I love him so,? one of Kony?s wives told me. ?He taught us how to pray.? The convoy also brought three of Kony?s children, including a toddler he had named George Bush. Riek guessed the LRA leader could not fail to be moved.

Days passed until, finally, Kony stepped into the clearing. At first he strode past the small group of reporters, ducking into a tent to meet the elders. When the time for the press conference came, a Sudanese journalist asked about abducted children.

Kony said simply: ?I did not abduct ?anybody which was in the bush.? The presence of his young bodyguards suggested otherwise.

Another Sudanese journalist asked why the war had lasted so long.

?I don?t know,? Kony snapped.

A young British woman asked Kony if he would face the International Criminal Court.

?Me?? he asked.

A Ugandan reporter repeated the ?question, and Kony seemed to come to his senses.

?No, no, no, no,? he said.

?Why not?? I asked.

?Because I did not do anything.?

He stood up to leave. The session had lasted five minutes and 32 seconds.

I had set out to find a monster, but Kony turned out to be a rather pathetic, frightened man. It wouldn?t have mattered much, if it weren?t for the fact that Kony?s satanic image had obscured the fear of annihilation among his Acholi people that both gave rise to the war, and helped to sustain it. Seduced by the legend of a jungle-dwelling demi-god, journalists, aid workers and diplomats had all been blind to the deeper reasons why the conflict persisted. As long as the war was understood as the result of one man?s lunatic quest to impose biblical laws, there was little hope of a solution.

Peace talks that began in Juba in July 2006 have yet to deliver a final settlement, though they have led to a sustained period of peace in the north. Much now depends on whether Kony, still fearing arrest, will leave his hideout.

I would have liked to talk to him about his plans. But when I looked up Kony had vanished, back into the bush.

Matthew Green reports for the FT from west Africa. His book, ?The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for Africa?s Most Wanted?, is published by Portobello (?12.99). It is available from the FT bookshop for ?10.39 plus p&p

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008

27
3DHS / The Unfinished Business of Martin Luther King Jr.
« on: May 14, 2008, 02:13:46 PM »
Unfinished business: Martin Luther King in Memphis

ISJ
Issue: 118
Posted: 31 March 08
Brian Kelly

On the fortieth anniversary of his assassination, eulogies on the life of Martin Luther King Jr come cheap, and often from the most unlikely quarters. The gesture is by now an almost obligatory one for American politicians, including many who have devoted the years since King?s death to overturning the very reforms that the black freedom movement managed to force out of a reluctant ruling class. Thus we have the spectacle of a deeply unpopular George Bush, the pampered son of an elite dynasty whose legacy will forever be associated with the twin crimes of Iraq and New Orleans, offering up pious homage to a man whose public life embodied a commitment to struggle against everything his administration has stood for.

There are slightly less offensive, but equally misplaced, pieties on offer from other sources. Over the past generation public memory of the civil rights movement in the US has been powerfully shaped by the corporate right, which throughout the 1950s and early 1960s had been implacably opposed to King and the movement.1 Today mega-corporations such as McDonald?s and Wal-Mart whose profits in the US depend so heavily on the exploitation of cheap, non-unionised black labour have assumed the role of guardians of the civil rights legacy, sponsoring school curricula with titles like  Black History Makers of Tomorrow , footing the bill for publications like the  Make Your Own History Resource Guide , and adorning their corporate boards with prominent figures from the civil rights establishment. The result, as historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall has pointed out, is a dominant narrative [that] suppresses as much as it reveals about the past, preventing  one of the most remarkable mass movements in American history from speaking effectively to the challenges of our time .2 King is remembered as a saintly figure, an apostle of non-violence who merely asked that the American dream be extended to black folks; the movement reached the end of the road, we are told, when formal segregation was finally ended in the mid-1960s.

King?s actual legacy and especially the evolution of his thinking over the last year of his life points in a very different direction from the sanitised version on offer. Few of his adoring fans in the White House or the boardrooms will want us to remember that he spent his final year trying to draw together a campaign that would confront the two most pressing issues in American society: the massive poverty left untouched by the triumph over segregation and the criminal slaughter being carried out by the US military in Vietnam. Nor are we likely to be reminded that he spent his final days not secluded in negotiations with the high and mighty but standing shoulder to shoulder with striking black sanitation workers (bin men), among the lowest paid workers in Memphis, a Southern city built on racism and exploitation. But if the story of the Memphis strike brings discomfort to those who want to serve up the meek and mild image of King and the freedom movement, for socialists and anti-racists it contains important lessons that point the way towards rebuilding a movement that can take up King?s unfinished business.

Memphis and the background to the strike

Sitting high on bluffs overlooking the Mississippi River, Memphis? development was from the outset linked inseparably to slavery and the expansion of cotton cultivation. A port city 400 miles up river from New Orleans, by the early 19th century it served as the main hub for exporting cotton out of the Mississippi Delta, and was closely linked to the vast plantation economy of northern Mississippi, Arkansas and west Tennessee. Emancipated slaves laid claim to their freedom briefly in the region, flocking into the city when Union forces occupied it during the Civil War and laying the foundations for a free community in the years immediately afterwards. But by the mid-1870s blacks throughout the Delta like their counterparts across the South fell victim to a deadly, well orchestrated paramilitary campaign led by their former owners. Abandoned by an increasingly indifferent federal government, they were pulverised back into a new slavery. The overthrow of Reconstruction left them deprived of the franchise and other basic rights, re-chained to the plantation economy and periodically subjected to brutal racial terror.

Memphis?s black population about 40 percent of the city?s residents by 1968 was made up almost completely of refugees who had come north out of Mississippi to escape the horrific treatment and desperate poverty of the cotton belt. Immediately after emancipation, and then in waves around the First and Second World Wars, black labouring men and women arrived with hopes and expectations that Memphis might offer something different. For the most part they were sorely disappointed. Throughout the early 1950s Memphis remained closely tied to the plantation regime. When the sanitation workers strike broke out in 1968, nearly 60 percent of its African American population remained trapped in poverty.

Some industrial development took place in the first half of the 20th century, mainly in the massive rubber, timber and furniture-making industries headquartered in the city, but they offered no route out of desperation for black workers. Most black women who worked earned a pittance either in large commercial laundries or as domestic servants in white homes. Black men able to find employment in manufacturing or on the docks were mainly confined to low-paid, menial positions. As late as 1945 government officials noted an unusual spectacle that does not exist in any other city in the country some 15,000 black workers being carried out of the city on trucks every morning to pick cotton across the river. Memphis seemed too many black workers less a break with the plantation legacy than its adaptation to an urban setting. Psychologically, Memphis has always been in Mississippi, one black resident insisted. Its presence in Tennessee is a geographical accident.3

None of this made Memphis exceptional in the mid-20th century South. Employers had been boasting since the 1890s that the region?s main industrial advantage was its large supply of cheap, disfranchised black labour. In Richmond, Winston-Salem, Jacksonville, Birmingham and Houston black Southerners found themselves in a very similar predicament. What was different about Memphis, though, was the method by which local elites maintained their grip on power. From the first decade of the 20th century Memphis life was dominated by the corrupt Democratic Party machine of Boss Edward H Crump. Through a combination of old-style Southern paternalism and racial terror, Crump and his allies managed to keep themselves in charge of a rigidly segregated city whose prosperity rested on low wage, non-union black labour.

Its seems incredible today, but throughout the middle of the 20th century Crump boasted that Memphis under his machine rule had succeeded in finding the perfect formula for  racial harmony . And there was certain logic to his assertion. Within the confines of US-style apartheid, Crump presided over a city that managed over long periods of time to successfully contain the very sharp tensions produced by massive racial and class inequality. Key to this stability was Crump?s courting of a small but influential layer of local black elite?s ministers, business people, school principals and community leaders who acted as his lieutenants in the black community. The machine became adept at buying black votes, writes Laurie Green, collecting payments from illicit saloons and gambling dens to use for poll taxes, and distributing registration receipts to blacks who were transported to polling places. Crump drew into his circle a select group of black leaders who delivered votes and advanced racial cooperation, in return for patronage positions and the construction of segregated institutions such as public schools .4

When on occasion tensions did burst through and push came to shove, Crump could match any of his Southern counterparts in doling out brutality. His Klan-ridden police force was notorious for its attacks on defenceless blacks: it crushed attempts at union organising in the 1930s and again during wartime; its involvement in a string of sexual assaults on black working women in the 1940s became the focus for a campaign that escaped the control of Crump s black allies; it led a series of coordinated raids on Beale Street, the heart of the black community, in what national critics labeled a reign of terror  during the same decade; and it would do its best to contain a new round of militancy among young African Americans in the post-war period.

Despite the difficulties, black workers had a history of taking advantage of any cracks in the edifice to assert their rights. Their attempts to push out beyond the boundaries laid down by Crump frequently led them into confrontation with their self-appointed community leaders. During the CIO union drive of the late 1930s black workers, many of them women in the garment and furniture industries, initiated a series of wildcat strikes independent of any formal union structures or paid organisers.5 During the Second World War they took advantage of federal intervention to demand an end to wage discrimination, break down the barriers to skilled work, and organise into unions; 20,000 Memphis workers joined the CIO during wartime, forcing even the conservative AFL to move away from its exclusive focus on skilled white craftsmen. The ferment spread to the 3,000 women working in commercial laundries, among whom federal officials detected a smouldering desire to strike .6

Gearing up for the anti-Communist crusade that Memphis employers would show such enthusiasm for in the immediate post-war period, the Crump machine dispatched  plainclothes policemen to the homes of black workers  to obtain admissions from them that the CIO advocated racial equality .  In the context of wartime militancy, the city banned a planned speech in Memphis by the black socialist and labour leader A Phillip Randolph, and in doing so demanded, and received, the support of some of Memphis s most prominent black community leaders. Randolph, whose authority among black workers had been boosted by his launching of the Double V campaign (victory against fascism abroad and racism at home) eventually turned up in the area, where he asserted before a thousand black and white workers that Labour?s mouth has been muzzled in France, Italy, and Germany. It has been attempted in Memphis but it will not and must not succeed.  He denounced Crump s black allies as well kept slaves .7

The wave of militancy that swept over Memphis during wartime gave way to a more mixed post-war period, marked by intensified racebaiting and red baiting. The CIO s feeble attempt to organise the South, Operation Dixie, stuttered and then expired. The effort was hammered from the outside by powerful employers united in their determination to safeguard the region s anti-union legacy. Internally the CIO was divided between a conservative bureaucracy and a left wing dominated by the Communist Party, itself compromised by the patriotic turn it had taken during the Second World War. The local effects were devastating. Rabid segregationists, led by Mississippi Senator James Eastland, orchestrated anti-Communist hearings for Memphis, exacerbating the left-right split in the CIO and dealing a serious blow to the only section of the labour movement that had shown any inclination for organising black workers.

The local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP),8 whose ranks had swollen through massive working class enrolment during the war, shrunk to  a shadow of its former self , and by the early 1950s the prospects for working class activism seemed dim. One or two prominent black conservatives testified against black union militants in the Eastland hearings, and others, now freed from pressure from below, retreated back into seeking racial advance within the bounds established by the Crump machine. A letter to the Memphis World denounced the city s  totally demoralised, disorganised, program-less, fearful,  back-gate  talking,  front-page  whispering, bewildered, and supine Negro leadership .9

There were three countervailing developments locally during this period. The first was the long-awaited death of the Boss himself in 1954.  Good riddance was, understandably, the most common response among Memphis blacks and many whites as well. Second, black students at nearby Lemoyne College, insulated from the worst ravages of McCarthyism (and some of them veterans transformed by their experiences during the war), seemed to be moving in the opposite direction towards increasing militancy and a break with the old order. This was reflected both in organised protest and in the developing revolution in black popular culture. An important crossroads between the rural Delta and urban life, Memphis had long been associated with black musical innovation. By the late 1950s this expressed itself in the emergence of black-oriented (but not yet owned) radio and in the convergence of gospel and rhythm & blues in soul music in some ways a pre-political sign of the times.10

The third exception to local trends came from an unexpected quarter: the outlying plantation districts. There the picture looked very different from Memphis. Instead of the decline in working class militancy that had settled upon the city by the early 1950s, the Delta seemed to be moving towards a new round of rural confrontation. In northern Mississippi a movement had emerged, initiated by a handful of black war veterans, which aimed to secure the franchise and address the desperate poverty prevalent among Delta sharecroppers. A similar movement was in the making just east of Memphis in Fayette county, where African Americans made up three quarters of the population of the third poorest county in the US, and in bordering Haywood. It was the emergence of this grassroots rural movement that led Ebony Magazine to announce in 1955 the emergence of a new, militant Negro, a fearless, fighting man who openly campaigns for his civil rights, who refuses to migrate to the North in search of justice and dignity, and is determined to stay in his own backyard and fight. The long established link between the Delta and Memphis, which had in the past brought crops and migrants into the city, would play a crucial role during the early 1960s in transmitting the confidence and militancy taking shape in the rural freedom movement to Memphis s hard pressed black working class. One of the first fruits of this development was a meeting of 200 Memphis sanitation workers in 1960, their first (unsuccessful) attempt to organise themselves into a union.

King and the crisis in the civil rights movement

The trajectory of events that brought King to Memphis in 1968 is a complicated and uneven one. The resistance that had been percolating beneath the surface of Southern society since the war received a powerful push in the mid-1950s. The US Supreme Court s ruling in Brown vs Board of Education (1954) struck down the legality of  separate but equal , the rationale that had propped up formal segregation since the end of the previous century, but offered no means to enforce change. The following year the brutal murder and mutilation of 14 year old Emmett Till by four white Mississippi men had brought home powerfully the horror of Southern racism, and at the end of that year blacks in Montgomery, Alabama, launched the first public confrontation of the modern civil rights era: a successful 384-day boycott of the city s segregated bus system that made King a nationally-known figure and gave his Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) organisational clout in the emerging movement.11

By late 1964, however, the movement was at an impasse, deeply divided over strategy and tactics. King?s approach throughout the early period was based on the assumption that by appealing to the moral conscience of the nation (and of white Northerners especially) he could wring concessions out of a reluctant administration in Washington. The Kennedys, beset by divisions in their own Democratic Party, considered the movement more a nuisance than a crusade worthy of support. But along with their predecessors Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower they realised that the ugly scenes being beamed across the world from the Deep South represented a liability in their competition with the Russians to shape the post-colonial world. So while on the whole there is no question that the state played a reactionary role throughout most of the civil rights agitation closely monitoring all of the big and small players in the movement, handing over information and logistical support to local bigots like Eastland, and attempting by every means to disrupt the movement in the long run both the Kennedys and Lyndon Johnson hoped to be able to come to terms with the more moderate, middle class wing of the movement.

King was amenable to this kind of an agreement through much of the early phase of the movement. Reacting against his canonisation in the mainstream, some biographers have gone over to the other extreme and tried to portray King as a born revolutionary, with a clear left wing agenda and a lifelong orientation to the labour movement.12 But it is more useful to view the early King as someone more or less cut from the cloth of New Deal era Democratic Party liberalism, with the exception that, for someone from a relatively privileged background, he was acutely sensitive to the problems of black Southerners, themselves overwhelmingly working class and poor. By the mid-1960s King found himself in a difficult position because the liberal perspective he had embraced since the mid-1950s could not point to a way out.

In his Letter from a Birmingham Jail (1963) King wrote of being caught in the middle of two opposing forces in the Negro community. The first he described as a force of complacency, made up in part of Negroes who, as a result of long years of oppression have adjusted to segregation; and in part of a few middle class Negroes who, because of a degree of academic and economic security and because in some ways they profit by segregation, have become insensitive to the problems of the masses. The other, which by 1963 was on the ascendancy, he described as a force driven by bitterness and hatred expressed in the various Black Nationalist groups that are springing up across the nation, and made up of people who have lost faith in America .13

There was plenty to be bitter about. Civil rights organising was dangerous, occasionally lethal, in many places throughout the South. It was grassroots activists overwhelmingly poor and working class, many of them women not the well-known personalities surrounding King in the SCLC leadership, who bore the brunt of the backlash. Before the movement even got off the ground in Mississippi in 1955 seven activists had been murdered, some of them in broad daylight. Fannie Lou Hamer, who would become one of the key figures in Mississippi, was in some ways typical of the kind of people the movement set in motion at local level. The youngest of 20 children born to a Delta sharecropping family, she had been forced to leave school at 12 to work in the cotton fields and had been sterilised without her consent at the age of 44. On the day she registered to vote in August 1962 she was fired from her job and threatened by the Klan.

The gap between the religious moderates grouped in the SCLC and increasingly militant young people who began to mobilise through the sit-in movement that erupted across the region in 1960 grew out of frustration with unanswered racist violence and the federal government s unwillingness to act. Out of the sit-ins had emerged the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), 14 in its early days heavily influenced by Ella Baker, a seasoned activist with ties to the labour left who was critical of the SCLC s moderation and eager to build on the emerging militancy. In her speech before SNCC s founding meeting at Raleigh, North Carolina, Baker drew a clear distinction between the old guard leadership [including the SCLC and the NAACP] and the more militant new leadership represented by the students, warning against having the sparks [they] had ignited smothered by bureaucratic organisations and reminding the students that their sit-ins were part of a worldwide struggle against many forms of injustice and oppression .15

This perspective resonated as young people tired of King?s attachment to non-violence and grew sceptical about a strategy that depended on the goodwill and support of white liberals. King was not naive about the dangers he faced he had to be coaxed by advisers into giving up the arsenal of weapons he kept on hand in Montgomery in 1955 but he had been won to non-violence as part of his overall strategy of moral conversion, and he maintained this position in the face of a relentless campaign of racial terror. Others were not so willing to go down that road. Nor was it clear to many of them that an alliance with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party and sections of the labour bureaucracy would ever pay off.16

The internal debate had a generational aspect, but it was more than simply a division between an old guard and the young militants. There was growing resentment at the grassroots over the disproportionate credit being claimed by the  preacherocracy , the layer of black ministers who positioned themselves as arbitrators between the movement and its adversaries. While individual clergy across the region played heroic, critical roles in galvanising the grassroots movement, historian Charles Payne suggests that the church has gotten more credit for generating the leadership than it deserves. In urban areas, he writes,  where churches were larger and better financed, where ministers were not so subject to reprisal,  they could afford to  play a more active role .17 But in the rural South  the church became involved more gradually, and only after much effort by organisers . In Mississippi the black establishment generally maintained its distance from activism in the early, treacherous period, but by the late 1960s, as  it became clear that the movement was going to bear fruit, those who had worked hardest to make it happen were pushed aside .18

Class divisions were perceptible in some of the internal tensions that began to rack the movement from 1964 onwards.  Freedom Summer , the mass voter registration campaign SNCC brought to Mississippi that year, brought together white and black students from elite universities in the North and black Mississippians who had never left the Delta, and who had been pushed out of the schoolroom and into the cotton fields at a young age.  Although I have finished high school, one Mississippi activist said at the time, some of them big words they say, man, I just don t get the meaning of them.   Ain t nobody like to be made like a fool when he come to contribute something, another agreed. And beyond Mississippi a more substantial gap was developing between a national civil rights leadership oriented towards legislative advances and an expectant grassroots for whom such gains would mean little if they did not also lift them out of poverty.

By 1964 the internal crisis affecting SNCC, the most vibrant and left wing section of the movement, was made much worse by mounting external pressures. Through patient grassroots organising SNCC had managed to launch the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), which sent locally elected delegates to the national Democratic Party convention in Atlantic City that summer with the objective of replacing the regular all-white Mississippi delegation. Once there, presidential candidate Lyndon Johnson and the Democratic machine subjected them to intense pressure to accept a rotten compromise that would have allowed them only token representation. Their refusal to submit outraged Johnson, and from that point forward the MFDP bore the brunt of a cynical all-out assault from the Democratic establishment that left them outraged and empty handed.  For many people,  one activist recalled,  Atlantic City was the end of innocence.  SNCC leader Bob Moses called it  a watershed in the movement because up until then you were working more or less within the Democratic Party .  Never again , another SNCC worker recalled,  were we lulled into believing that our task was exposing injustices so that the  good  people of America could eliminate them  After Atlantic City, our struggle was not for civil rights, but for liberation .19

The turn to Black Power

One of the ironies of civil rights history is that the movement s most substantial legislative gains, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of the following year, coincided with a period of deep crisis in the movement. Internally the divisions between young militants and more conservative forces grouped in the SCLC and the NAACP threatened to fragment the movement. Upon its return home to Mississippi the MFDP was picked apart by black moderates and anti-communists sent out to do the dirty work of the Democratic Party. There developed in Mississippi a kind of internal feuding within the Negro community in which the traditional leadership that had been displaced by SNCC tried to restore itself and take the leadership over from this new class of leaders .20

The soul-searching brought on by persistent racist violence and the betrayal at Atlantic City brought the tensions within SNCC to the boil, though the fallout took a different form than perhaps anyone anticipated. The incident that clarified the fault-lines that had been developing since 1964 was the shooting of James Meredith by a roadside sniper in June 1966. Meredith s admission as the first black student to the University of Mississippi four years earlier had sparked riots that were quelled only after Kennedy s deployment of federal marshals. His shooting on the second day of a self-proclaimed March against Fear ended, for many of the young blacks in SNCC, the debate over non-violence. When SNCC chairman Stokely Carmichael was arrested while continuing the march, he responded angrily, raising the slogan  Black Power :

Bailed out, he showed up at that evening s rally boiling mad. When he spoke, he announced that this was his 27th arrest, and he intended for it to be his last. It was time for some changes. For years, black people had been shouting, ?Freedom Now!?  and had little to show for it. Cops were still doing anything they pleased. It was time to start shouting Black Power! 21

The response to Black Power in 1966, and its changing meanings over the next five or six years, was complex. For obvious reasons the slogan struck a chord among young militants tired of being abused and subjected to terror. Even among the more moderate elements in the movement there was no unanimous position. Roy Wilkins of the NAACP condemned it as the reverse of Mississippi, a reverse Hitler, and a reverse Ku Klux Klan, a position endorsed by white liberals affiliated to the Democratic Party. Hubert Humphrey, the hatchetman sent out by Lyndon Johnson to sideline the MFDP at the 1964 convention, who had never lifted a hand to try to relieve the reign of terror in the Deep South, tut-tutted that racism is racism and there is no room in America for racism of any colour . But King, who was on the march with Carmichael and was, according to Payne,  himself going through a period of frustration [and] philosophical transition ,  refused to join the condemnations , stressing  the more pragmatic elements of the slogan and [noting] that there was nothing wrong with racial pride . Black Mississippians, Dittmer adds, were drawn to the slogan and to Carmichael s fiery denunciations of a caste system that had oppressed them for generations. Yet they also revered Dr King and did not seem eager to be forced to choose between the two men .22

Vague, but rhetorically defiant, the most significant short term effect of the  Black Power  slogan was to give definite form to SNCC s fragmentation, then already well developed. The crisis that had been festering developed by late 1964 into a three-way split between a core of black militants increasingly attracted to a separatist vision; a smaller group of whites, some of them longstanding, dedicated SNCC activists, now told that their contribution to the movement consisted of organising exclusively among other whites  around black needs, around black history, the relative importance of blackness today ; and another group of African Americans unconvinced by or opposed to the nationalist reorientation.23

It is important to recognise that the split in the SNCC around this new reorientation did not develop around a left-right axis, nor were working class black Southerners (like Hamer) necessarily more attracted to separatism than relatively privileged black students from the North. Naturally enough, conditions on the ground in the Deep South lent themselves to the call for black racial solidarity, and in a society that had so consistently enforced the humiliation of African Americans the turn to racial pride and assertiveness was an important and positive development. But in SNCC the turn to a hard separatism was driven by a core of Atlanta based activists, most of them Northern students, some of whom had been involved in urban based black nationalist organisations [such as] the Nation of Islam .24 Above all the new turn was the product of a crisis of orientation that had been developing over months and years, a crisis out of which Black Power could not ultimately point a way forward.

Whether coincidentally or otherwise, hand in hand with the turn towards separatism went a withdrawal from the grassroots relationship with the working class constituency that the movement had developed over nearly a decade of activism.  Though he identified himself with the interests of poor blacks, SNCC historian Clayborne Carson writes, Carmichael did not attempt to mobilise blacks by stressing their common class interests in his speeches he gave little attention to the economic problems of blacks, presenting instead ideas that would appeal to blacks of all classes .25

There was an alternative to both the liberal approach, which made black freedom subject to Northern benevolence, and to the more militant-sounding but ultimately unproductive separatist solution, which attached little importance to mobilising black working men and women in their own interests and looked increasingly towards a military (and elitist) solution to the problem of black oppression,26 but it had been only partially glimpsed in the first half of the decade. Black industrial workers in Birmingham, Alabama, organised twice weekly meetings where they would study union rule books and contracts, looking for ways to bring the struggle into their workplaces. SNCC activists had experimented, briefly, with trying to organise workers in the Delta in the year before the  Black Power  controversy erupted.27 At its height the Mississippi Freedom Labour Union had a membership of more than a thousand, organising strikes for wage raises, free medical care, and accident insurance involving at times upwards of 700 of the most impoverished workers in the Delta. Ultimately the movement there could not overcome a more general crisis affecting cotton cultivation, but new circumstances would bring a renewed focus on black workers in far more favourable circumstances several years later.

Watts, Vietnam and King?s radicalisation

To King?s credit, he groped for a way out of the impasse the movement found itself in after 1965 and in the process shed much of his earlier conservatism. Partly this was due to the simple fact that the strategy he had pursued since 1955 seemed to have played itself out after the passing of the Voting Rights Act a decade later. The Democratic Party establishment could be dragged, sometimes kicking and screaming, into passing legislation that would redress the most flagrant aspects of racial inequality, but they were unwilling to move beyond this and would deploy all their considerable power to block attempts to attack the systemic causes of inequality.

The importance of the struggle against social and economic inequality was brought home powerfully to King just four days after the signing of the Voting Rights Act. On 7 August 1965 police brutality touched off four days of rioting in the mostly black ghetto of Watts in Los Angeles. By the time it ended 34 people had been killed and a thousand injured. King arrived to try to ease tensions but was jeered by young people who considered him out of touch. Weeks later he told a group of New York trade unionists that the rioting showed the need for a shift in the focus of the struggle [that] is going to create tensions in the North that will not abate until the root causes are treated, a change of direction that put him into conflict with some of his supposed liberal allies in the Democratic Party .28

King?s outspoken opposition to the US war in Vietnam from early 1967 onward widened the rift further, bringing widespread condemnation from many who had venerated him as the safe alternative to Black Power. In a speech at Harlem s Riverside Church, exactly a year before his assassination, King offered what one historian has described as the most severe moral indictment of imperialism of his generation. More than this, he managed to link, in the most powerful and concrete language possible, the carnage of the war abroad with the problems of racism and poverty at home. After an extended discussion of the history of the Vietnamese struggle for independence King turned to the war s effect on young American men being drafted in to see through the Pentagon s mission:

While I have tried in these last few minutes to give a voice to the voiceless on Vietnam and to understand the arguments of those who are called enemy, I am as deeply concerned about our troops there as anything else. For it occurs to me that what we are submitting them to in Vietnam is not simply the brutalising process that goes on in any war where armies face each other and seek to destroy. We are adding cynicism to the process of death, for they must know after a short period there that none of the things we claim to be fighting for are really involved. Before long they must know that their government has sent them into a struggle among Vietnamese, and the more sophisticated surely realise that we are on the side of the wealthy and the secure while we create hell for the poor.29

The reaction from the liberal establishment was universal denunciation. The New York Times published an editorial (Dr King?s Error) calling into question his fusing of two public problems [war and poverty] that are distinct and separate. By drawing them together, they insisted, King has done a disservice to both.  The Chicago Tribune described it as arrant nonsense, and the NAACP s board of directors unanimously condemned the speech. An adviser to President Johnson told him that King had thrown in with the commies. But King was in no mood to back down.  We seek to defeat President Johnson and his war, he told the press two weeks later.30

These two burning issues criminal slaughter in Vietnam and stark poverty at home framed King?s activism throughout the final year of his life. More than anything he sought a unifying theme and strategy that would lead to the realisation of economic and social justice as well as civil rights. He would conceive of his Poor People s Campaign during the SCLC convention in August, but when it was launched in January 1968, it still had no solid organisational link to working people and, even with King?s pleading, the middle class clerics banded in the SCLC showed little enthusiasm for a turn to multi-racial organising among workers and the poor. The early signs were not promising.  There s no masses in this mass movement, fretted King. But his project was about to be rescued by a group of militant black workers in Memphis.31
Back to Memphis

A core of black activists had been attempting to organise Memphis s sanitation workers since the beginning of the decade. Many of them had served in the military and some, like T O Jones, understood the benefits of union organisation from having worked in the shipyards and the defence industries during and after the war. Wages among the men were so low that most of the full-timers qualified for welfare relief. The city would not raise their pay, but it banned the men from picking through the rubbish for anything they might salvage, and it docked their pay on rain days. Conditions were filthy and the men had to buy their own gloves and protective clothing. The racist management style was fully in keeping with the plantation mentality. The first attempt at organisation was betrayed by Teamsters union officials; the second and third were frustrated by the city s blacklist. But, led by Jones, the workers persisted, and in 1964 AFSCME, the biggest public sector union in the US, offered to charter a local union. More than 80 percent of workers had joined Local 1733 by early 1965, but the city, pointing to anti-union legislation barring public employees from organising, refused to negotiate a contract. The men threatened to strike in 1966 but backed down in the face of an injunction and threats to hire scabs.

This jockeying for position might have continued indefinitely, but the death of two men on the job in February 1968 opened the floodgates of workers anger. Echol Cole and Robert Walker, who were seeking shelter from the rain at the time, were chewed up like refuse in the back of a garbage compactor, one of many that the men had been trying to convince the city to upgrade for years. Workers in the sanitation and water and sewer divisions responded with fury. Jones suddenly found himself overtaken by workers who were adamant that they would not go back without a union contract and resolution of their grievances, including complaints over safety.

The strikers found themselves up against a mayor steeped in the traditions of Southern white paternalism and used to having things his own way. Henry Loeb s family had made its fortune running a commercial laundry, one of the largest employers of black female labour in the city. He was initially elected with black support but had repositioned himself as a segregationist to endear himself to a white electorate being pulled to the right. With money and influence behind him and a bright political future in front of him, Loeb had little time or patience for the sanitation workers or their representatives. He vowed that there would be no union while he was mayor. In part, the city s opposition to the sanitation workers was based on fears that any negotiations would set a precedent for other low-paid public workers, both black and white.

A handful of relatively progressive, racially mixed industrial unions maintained a foothold in Memphis, but overall the labour movement was weak and divided. As late as 1968 the craft unions were exclusively white, and therefore the sanitation workers could not count on much labour support locally. They did have the backing of AFSCME s national leadership, but like most trade union bureaucracies they had no stomach for a long drawn-out strike. Had it not been for Loeb s arrogance, the union leaders would have tried to find a way to cut and run. However, the strikers? militancy touched a raw nerve among black working women and men. The strike saw rallies of upwards of 25,000 black workers in support of a workforce of just 1,200, and this solidarity would carry the men through a difficult struggle. Aided by a handful of local activist clergy, the strikers won the attention of King, and as a result the Memphis strike would come to represent the high point in fusing the spirit of freedom movement and black working class militancy.

Dejected by his failure to pull together the Poor People s Campaign, King was energised by the strikers? determination, and they drew upon his powerful rhetoric to understand how their local struggle fitted into a broader freedom movement. More than 20,000 workers and their supporters heard King in mid-March.  What does it profit a man to be able to eat at an integrated lunch counter if he doesn?t earn enough to buy a hamburger and a cup of coffee, he asked.

Don?t go back on the job until the demands are met [cheers]. Never forget that freedom is not something that is voluntarily given by the oppressor. It is something that must be demanded by the oppressed. Freedom is not some lavish dish that the power structure and the white forces in policy making positions will voluntarily hand out on a silver platter while the Negro merely furnishes the appetite [applause]. If we are going to get equality, if we are going to get adequate wages, we are going to have to struggle for it.

Buoyed by the militancy of the crowd, he went further.  I tell you what you ought to do and you are together here enough to do it: in a few days you ought to get together and just have a general work stoppage in the city of Memphis!  The 20,000 stood, Mike Honey writes, celebrating the very audacity of this idea: black people could shut down Memphis! 32

In the end the one-day general strike never came off as planned not because either King or the strikers backed down but because snow shut down the entire city on the designated day. A relatively small group of Black Power supporters calling themselves the Invaders resented King?s popularity among the strikers and aimed to introduce a military shortcut for winning the strike. One local minister accurately described them as sideliners in the movement. They talked militancy but actually did little in terms of leafleting, marching, organising or any of the other things that built a movement. Despite their lack of influence, however, the Invaders (very likely egged on by police agents) succeeded in instigating disruption of a mass march. King left the city shaken by the confrontation that had broken out between marchers and the police, but returned to address a mass meeting on the night of 3 April 1968.

Shaken again by a bomb threat against the plane that had brought him to Memphis, King gave his last public speech.  Like anybody, I would like to live a long life, he told the audience.  But I?m not concerned about that now I?ve seen the Promised Land. I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight that we as a people will get to the Promised Land.  Within 24 hours he was dead, shot through the jaw as he shared a joke with his co-workers on the balcony of Memphis s Lorraine Motel. As news of his assassination spread, fierce rioting erupted in cities across the US and among serving troops in Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson ordered the largest domestic deployment of troops since the Civil War nearly 125,000 in all.  In its sweep and immediacy, Time magazine reported, the rioting that swept the nation s black ghettoes after Martin Luther King?s murder exceeded anything in the American experience .33

Conclusion

In the wake of King?s assassination the city of Memphis quickly settled the strike with AFSCME Local 1733, and the example of the sanitation workers opened up a period of public sector organising that lasted more than ten years. The  spirit of Memphis  had brought about what prominent strike supporter Reverend James Lawson called a  threshold moment  for the freedom movement, and even without King?s presence it seemed possible in the short term that a focus on black working class activism might point a way forward. Mike Honey writes that in the aftermath of the Memphis victory  public employees became the leading force for union expansion and dozens of sanitation workers  strikes swept the nation . A year later black women hospital workers in Charleston, South Carolina, picked up the torch, striking for 113 days and winning recognition against employers as intransigent as Loeb had been. Even into the early 1970s the Memphis spirit infused an upturn in industrial struggle marked by the prominent participation of black workers. In Detroit and elsewhere young militants pulled off a series of wildcat strikes in the heart of the auto industry. 34

In some ways the turn towards black workers by King and the movement marked a return to a tradition that had won a foothold among Southern workers in the upheaval of the 1930s but was then lost and buried during wartime and in the anti-communist hysteria of the 1950s.35 The main contribution of the left wing forces that had played a central role in building the CIO and the broader anti-racist movement during the 1930s was its insistence on linking the struggle against racial oppression to the everyday struggles of working people of both races against economic exploitation. When the new round of struggle began to emerge there was no core of seasoned activists who could reintroduce that perspective. This was a serious deficit, which was overcome, in practice, only partially, through an uneven process of trial and error.

To his credit, King groped his way toward a focus on mobilising black workers and the poor of all races. By the last year of his life he had shed many of the illusions he had entertained when he first turned up in Montgomery in 1955. But by the time of his death in 1968 the powerful combination of black militancy, growing anti-war sentiment and youth rebellion came together in a New Left that, with few exceptions, dismissed the perspective of working class mobilisation as tainted by its association with old-style Stalinism and unsuited for conditions in the United States. Thus, while the period did see important struggles among organised workers, in the main the radicalisation manifested itself in the rise of groups like the Black Panther Party and a student based anti-war movement that looked to Third World struggles to compensate for the lack of revolutionary potential in the US itself. The fusing of the black freedom movement and workers struggles came, but too late to put its decisive stamp on the movement that emerged from 1968. When, by the mid-1970s, the tide began to go out on social movements, a form of identity politics, which at its most frivolous end elevated the fragmentation of the New Left into a matter of principle, dominated the debris left on shore.

The black freedom movement that King?s life is so closely bound up with broke the back of segregation and brought real gains to African Americans and many others in the US in the years since his death. The triumph over Jim Crow made it possible for a small number of blacks to break through and become absorbed into the American ruling class, and a wider layer that includes much of the former civil rights establishment has risen to prosperity and influence on corporate boardrooms, in government and the military, and in big city politics. But the failure of an earlier round of struggle to fundamentally challenge the foundations of US capitalism means that inequality today is growing, not disappearing. Large numbers of African Americans and many others remain trapped in poverty and all the misery that attends it in American society. As in King?s time, the massive amounts being squandered on war come directly out of public funds that should go to relieve those hardest hit by the ravages of neoliberalism.

In the harrowing aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, when for a brief moment the corporate media lost control of the script, questions began to be asked about just how far the US had come since that day in Memphis in 1968. Surveying the destruction of one of the great cities of the world, and the criminal negligence that left its most vulnerable citizens to die in its streets, the historian Mark Naison asked a question that brings us back to the problem first posed by Memphis s sanitation workers in the very last days of the black freedom struggle:  Is this what the pioneers of the civil rights movement fought to achieve, a society where many black people are as trapped and isolated by their poverty as they were by segregation laws  36 The best way to honour King today, the best way to commemorate the heroism of the black freedom movement, is to return to the project of the radical redistribution of power that he gave his life for a generation ago.

28
3DHS / The Balkan Identity
« on: May 12, 2008, 11:22:57 AM »
The ideal Yugoslavian

Milijenko Jergovic on Balkan identity, as told through the story of his family


http://www.signandsight.com/features/1450.html

My father, two of my uncles on my mother?s side, and I all went to the same high school in Sarajevo. Before World War II, when the three of them enrolled, it was called the First High School for Boys. After the war, when schools turned co-ed, it was simply called the First High School. In 1984, just before I graduated, the school changed its name a third time. It was called Heroes and Revolutionaries of the First High School. It received its fourth name during the war, when it became the Bosniak First High School.

Although it has been almost fifty years since my older uncle enrolled in the high school, and that was in 1934, the inside of the building has not changed, as my grandmother, who attended parent-teacher meetings there in both his day and mine, could attest. The same teacher who taught the history of art to my younger uncle and to my father, who enrolled five or six years later, also taught me. When the old teacher died at the start of my sophomore year, all three of us went to his funeral.

From its inception in the 1880?s, it was an elite school. After many travails, Bosnia?s only Nobel prize winner for literature, Ivo Andric, graduated from the school, later talking about it with horror and a whiff of disgust. That is probably why Andric?s name was never mentioned at school ceremonies when the principal listed all the illustrious figures who had attended our school. In my day its greatest alumni were considered to be communist revolutionaries and the assassins of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand. Gavrilo Princip, the man who actually shot the Archduke and his pregnant wife, did not attend our school, but his close collaborators did.
Our teachers repeatedly told us how we should look up to such people as shining examples. We lived in a socialist society where shining examples were held in high regard. This included our parents and uncles, who were often hailed as examples of age-old sacrifice and heroism.

There was my father, for instance, a top student, one of the best of his generation. And there was also my younger uncle, who was to represent the Yugoslav metallurgical industry in the Soviet Union and become a man of the world. The two of them were often mentioned and cited as models worth emulating. My older uncle, who had been a better student than both his brothers, was not mentioned. He was not a shining example. Most Yugoslavs had someone like him in their family, someone they did not talk about. It was like in a fairytale: at least one of the three sons was not a shining example.

My older uncle was a straight A student. He corresponded in Latin with foreign friends, solved unsolvable math problems, played the guitar and wrote an essay about Paul Valery. Blond and blue-eyed, tall and frail, in photographs he looked like a young aristocrat straight out of a Thomas Mann novel, who at the end of the book would die of, say, meningitis or tuberculosis, but it would be no ordinary death, no, it would symbolize the fate of a family or of an entire generation. That was what my older uncle may have looked like but there was nothing Mann-like about his life, except that on his non-existent headstone I would have gladly inscribed the words with which Serenus Zeitblom, doctor of philosophy, bid farewell to his friend, the composer Adrian Leverkuhn: A lone man clasps his hands and says: "may God have mercy on your poor souls, my friend, my homeland." (more)

But I am not quite certain that I know what my older uncle?s homeland was. What is more certain is that I myself have no homeland. In the end, therefore, I am not sure what such an epitaph on his invisible grave would actually mean.
My older uncle?s homeland might possibly have looked like this: he was born in Usori, a small town in central Bosnia, where his father, my grandfather, was the railroad stationmaster; he grew up alongside the tracks built by Austria-Hungary, often changing friends and landscapes; he learned Slovenian from his father ? a Slovene by origin, his mother tongue was Croatian, but he started speaking German before either one or the other. He learned it from his grandfather, my great-grandfather, a senior railway official, who was an ethnic German from Banat, born in a small town in what is today Romania, and educated in Budapest and Vienna. His whole working life was spent with the Bosnian railway.

Clearly, my older uncle, and perhaps I should say here that his name was Mladen because it is too confusing to continue without names, lived in a complicated linguistic situation and environment. And you are about to see just how complicated a language can be, and how it can decide a person's fate. Mladen?s grandfather Karlo was conscious of his Germanness; he spoke only German to his four children until the day he died. He never uttered a word of Croatian to them. His sons-in-law, two Croats and Mladen?s Slovene father, all spoke perfect German, but to them he spoke Croatian. With his grandchildren he spoke both languages, but only once they had addressed him in German. If they greeted him in Croatian, Otata Karlo would pretend not to hear them.

They say that Sunday family lunches were something to behold. There was a strict linguistic protocol, which today probably exists only at the headquarters of the European Union, but nobody ever wondered why. Otata Karlo felt very strongly about his Germanness and about his select position, and they all had to respect it. In return, nobody, least of all him, stopped them from being who they were or from speaking whatever languages they wished amongst themselves. Otata was fond of his sons-in-law, he did not mind that they were not German and was proud of their occupations. For him belonging to the railroads was like belonging to a secret organization, a Masonic lodge, whose members have a different view of the world than others and a different role to play. A German railroad man and a Croatian railroad man were like brothers who understood each other better than any compatriots. Otata Karlo had leftist leanings and at the turn of the 20th century he wound up in jail and then lost his job for supporting a railway workers? strike. It would not have been such a scandal had he not been the stationmaster and a German living among the wild Slavs, so he was severely punished by the powers that be of King and Empire for betraying his national origins and his position in society.

But ideological issues were never discussed at home unless they concerned upbringing, wherein everybody had the same rights, regardless of religion or assets. The poor little land of Bosnia, where in the 1920?s and 1930?s almost ninety per cent of the population was illiterate, where typhoid and cholera epidemics were recurrent and endemic syphilis ran rampant and was passed on from generation to generation like an ominous tradition, this Bosnia was an ideal place for Otata Karlo and his ideas. He never thought of returning to Banat or moving to Vienna or Germany. Though he was German, Germany was a foreign country to him. If we asked him about it, he would say that he could never live there because "the people over there are different." To this day I have not heard a clearer definition of what is not one?s homeland.

My uncle Mladen was closer to his grandfather than the other grandchildren, but he did not resemble him. Old Karlo had dark hair, a long gray beard and was on the short side; judging by his photographs he looked more like a Romanian rabbi or at the very least a Jewish scholar than a German. Mladen, on the other hand, got his Nordic blue eyes, height and bearing not from his mother?s German side but from his father?s line of Slovene peasants from around Tolmin. Looking at the faded black-and-white photos of the two of them makes me wonder how their lives would have turned out had Mladen not learned German so easily, not enjoyed listening to his grandfather play the violin, not sat so near him at Sunday lunch. I wonder what would have happened had the old man hated the Slav in his grandson at least a little bit.

In the courtyard of the building where my family had been living since the early 1930?s, there was a big new Ashkenazi synagogue. Everybody, not just the Jews, called it Temple. People who had come to Sarajevo by will of the emperor and king, Franz Joseph, and who had stayed, like Otata Karlo and my Slovene grandfather, came here to pray. In earlier Turkish times, Sephardic Spanish Jews had lived in our city and there were no Ashkenazi. They were usually poor, and distrusted the new occupying authorities and would not let the newcomers into their temple. In a way, they did not believe that these people were Jewish, and so, like their imperial and royal protectors, they called them Krauts. Eventually, a second, Ashkenazi or, as they called it, Kraut synagogue had to be built and everybody called it temple.

At the very start of the war, a day after the Ustashas took power, a mob broke into the synagogue and smashed everything in sight. These were not people in uniform, they were plain, perfectly civilian folk. They included city bums and bullies, small-time crooks and better class citizens, and Romanies, the very same people who only a few days later would find themselves being transported alongside Sarajevo?s Jews to the concentration camps.

My Slovene grandfather, his name was Franjo, watched the temple being destroyed from his window. Grandma Olga tried to pull him away so that nobody would see him, but, his fear notwithstanding, he stayed at the window. It was a measure of his courage.

At the time, their son Mladen was in his junior year in high school. They had taught him that what was happening was wrong, they told him that Pavelic was mad and Hitler a lunatic who would certainly lose the war in the end. The two of them, along with Otata Karlo, taught him everything that would be important and necessary from today?s perspective. But they also told him, of course, that he should never ever, no matter what, speak his mind about Hitler or Pavelic. And that he should steer clear of people who protested against the new Ustasha authorities. My grandparents, like their parents and our entire greater family, were principally against any opposition to the authorities. There?s nothing we can do about it. It?s not up to us to change the state. You?ll just wind up in jail.
They told Mladen to stay away from members of the Ustasha Youth, not to attend their events or get-togethers, and, if asked, to say that he felt German not Croat. Who knows whether he ever had to tell anybody that he was German in order to avoid the consequences of being Croat; certainly, his knowledge of German and of some of the finer skills that Germans are famous for, such as their artistry with the foil or the violin, led to the preception that he was not a Croat and so could not be an Ustasha.

A year later, after graduating from high school, Mladen was making plans to study in Zagreb or Vienna. We had lots of relatives in Vienna, they were not poor and he could live with them. It would have been a bit harder in Zagreb. He wanted to study forestry, because Otata had always told him that it was crazy to be in Bosnia and not live in the woods.

But in the early summer of 1942, he received his call-up papers for the army, written in German and Croatian as per the regulations of a united Europe. The unit Mladen was assigned to was a part of the Wehrmacht, not the Croatian army, and only Sarajevo?s top young men, usually of German or Austrian descent, were sent there.

There were two possibilities: Mladen could either report for duty and go to war, or run off to join the partisans. Not for one moment did his parents, my grandfather Franjo and grandmother Olga, doubt that Hitler would lose the war and that Pavelic would end with a noose around his neck. I know I have said this before, but it bears repeating: never, not for a single day, not for a single hour, did Franjo think that the people who had destroyed the temple and carted away our Jewish neighbors could win the war. Though he was not religious, there was no way that evil could win out. He was not a communist, but his father-in-law, Otata Karlo, was a bit of one, and the partisans to whom Mladen would be escaping from his German draft papers certainly were. To join them would place him on the side of justice in every respect.

My grandparents knew that, but all the same they sent their son, my older uncle, to the Germans. They figured that he would stand a better chance of survival with them. He would spend a few months in boot camp, by which time Hitler would have lost the war. They figured wrong, however, because fourteen months later my older uncle was killed fighting the partisans. It was his unit?s first battle and he was its first and last casualty. Several days later, the entire unit, along with its command, crossed over to the partisans. After the war, in the summer of 1945, four of Mladen?s wartime comrades came to see his parents. They were now part of the liberation army and Franjo and Olga were the parents of a dead enemy soldier. After her son died, my grandmother never went to mass again, she stopped crossing herself, stopped celebrating Christmas and Easter and when, at the age of fifteen, I asked her if there was a God, she replied:

"For some there is, for some there isn't."

"And for you?"

"There isn?t."

"And for me?"

"That you have to figure out for yourself."

While his grandson was fighting as a German soldier, Otata Karlo was living on the outskirts of Sarajevo in his house in Ilid'a, where various, mostly drunken troops would come tearing through. When the Ustashas set off on their nocturnal rampages, killing and plundering Serbian houses, Otata would take the neighbors, sometimes as many as fifty, into his house. And when the Ustashas came to search the house, he would stand at the door, bearded and scowling, and tell them in Croatian:

"This is a German house, you're not setting foot in here!"

No matter how drunk they were, they would turn on their heels and leave without a word. The look of hatred on his face as he watched them go made him hard to recognize. He was like a different man. A terrible man. I was once told that I had inherited that look from him.

Sarajevo was liberated in April 1945. A couple of months later they came to take Otata away to a holding camp from where he was to be deported, along with his German compatriots, to Germany. It was a kilometer-and-a-half-long walk to the train station in Ilid'a. He was flanked by two partisans, while a third kept prodding him in the back with the barrel of his rifle. The man knew him from before the war, he knew exactly who and what Otata Karlo was, but he got a kick out of pushing him around. That's how it is in life. You never know who will be carted off to a concentration camp, when or why, it's just that people seldom think it will be them.
But when they reached the train station, Otata's Serb neighbors had already gathered in front of the cattle cars used now by the partisans to transport their victims to the camps. They shouted that he could be German ten times over but for four years he had saved them from the Ustashas and they were not going to let comrade Karlo go; if he went, they went. The partisans tried to break up the crowd, rifle butts flashed through the air, a few heads were bashed, but the harder they hit, the more stubborn the people became.

That day, they brought Otata Karlo home and never came back for him again, even though he was a German and, along with other Yugoslav Germans, slated for deportation to Germany. Who knows whether he would have made it there alive. It can be said that his life was saved by the very people whose lives he himself had saved. Like in a fairytale, his good deeds were rewarded. Otata died fifteen years later, at the start of the decade in which I was born.

His daughters were not treated as Germans in Yugoslavia, because they were married to Slavs. His only son, Rudolf, known as Nano to everybody except his sisters and mistresses who called him Rudi, was not considered German either and so was not carted off to the camp. What were the criteria used by Yugoslav communists when sending Germans off to the camps after the war and what, from their viewpoint, defined a person as a German? That is a question I have been unable to answer to this day. Our Nano looked more German than his father, he carried his last name, never Croatianized it or gave it a phonetic spelling, he had a library full of German books, went to concerts of classical music, spoke German with his friends, strolled through the streets of Sarajevo?s Barija with relatives from Vienna and his beautiful girlfriends, all of them Austrian, but the partisans did not consider him German. Why not? Probably because, with their policeman's sixth sense, they figured that our family?s Germanness had ended with Otata Karlo and that Rudolf was not interested in his German roots. That was enough for them to spare a person from the camps and, in this respect, communist concentration camps could not be compared with German or Ustasha camps.

After the liberation of Sarajevo, my younger uncle Dragan and my father were mobilized by the partisans and fought in one of the bloodiest battles of the end of the war, somewhere around Karlovac. They were still in high school when they were sent to war and only graduated after they were demobilized. My uncle later studied metallurgy and my father medicine. Both made a success of their professions and became respected members of society. And both carried family stigmas in their hearts and minds, and in their names which were registered in their police files. My uncle's was his brother, who died as a German soldier, while my father had his mother and her two sisters, who were very active in the Ustasha youth movement in Sarajevo, as a result of which, after the war, she was sentenced to prison and her sisters emigrated to Argentina.

My uncle and father joined the League of Communists and remained loyal members until the break-up of Yugoslavia. As did my mother who had been only one year old when her brother was killed. But even she was told on occasion, when it was thought necessary, that her brother had fought on the wrong side in the war. She felt a little guilty about it. So did her brother. And her future husband, my father, felt guilty because of his mother and aunts.

This guilt marked their lives and shaped their identity. It is a part of my own identity although I have never felt guilt myself, just as I have never felt the Germanness of my great grandfather Otata Karlo or the Sloveneness of my grandfather Franjo. My case, I know now, is rather more complicated, because my identity consists more of what I am not than of what I am.

In the summer of 1993, with Sarajevo under siege from Mladic's and Karadzic's tanks, I left the city in a US military plane that was transporting aid relief, foreign and local journalists to Split and I thought I might be leaving it forever. I was simply trying to stay alive. My parents, who had divorced many years earlier, stayed behind. It struck me that I might never see them again. But, after seventeen months of war and siege, I had to save myself. I was doing what my older uncle had not been able to do. I was running away from my war.

I knew that I was going to Zagreb, to Croatia. Even though it was the land of my language, even though I am Croatian, I went there the way Otata Karlo went to Germany. But I did not know it at the time. In saving my neck I never thought how "the other people" in Croatia lived, and I was a foreigner in their midst, just as Otata was a foreigner in Germany. He was a German whose Germanness could only exist in the context of people who were not German, in daily contact with others, in the peculiar linguistic ceremonies that formed part of family Sunday lunches, in his arrogant behavior towards the Croatian fascists who wanted to search his house. My Croatianness was Bosnian and even more than that, it was a carpetbagger?s. That was the name given to people who, in the days of Emperor Franz Joseph, had come from different parts of the Monarchy to settle down in Sarajevo. They, with their different cultures and languages, created a non-national identity, whose cultural substrate was stronger than their sense of national belonging. In my case and in the case of my family, this means that we are Bosnian Croats whose identity is defined by Slav, German, Italian and who knows what other nations form the former Monarchy. Without Austria-Hungary I would never have been born, because my parents would never have been born, because their parents would never have been born, because the parents of their parents would never have met? In that respect, my birth was a political project.

Once in Croatia, in the land of "the other people," I realized that I could spend my whole life here and even be happy, but I would never be one of them. When I utter the word we, it is usually a false we, the kind of we that makes one slightly ashamed. So I prefer to say them and me rather than we. When talking about myself I usually say things that people don?t like hearing, things that they themselves would never say because they don?t want to be different. It doesn't matter whether the difference is positive or negative; as soon as there is a difference, as soon as you stand out from the crowd in any way, it invites antagonism.

At the time of my arrival, Croatia was an ethnically highly homogenous country, with Croats and Catholics accounting for ninety per cent of the population, most of whom were extremely hostile to anyone who belonged to a minority. This hostility was at the heart of the State's ideology, but it was also shaped by the fact that there was a war raging in the country and that one third of its territory had been occupied. The role of occupier was played by the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army, and the role of local traitors by members of the Serbian national minority. But members of the small Croatian Muslim community were also seen as enemies because at the time, and that was in the autumn of 1993, the Croats had launched attacks against Muslim regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among the other non-national enemies were atheists, who were a reminder of forty years of communist rule, and also probably of people?s own hypocrisy when it came to matters of religion and God. For as long as this had been the desired social norm, people negated religion en masse, but now that times had changed, they rushed to church, again en masse.

Yet, people reveled in their hatreds and enmities. That is nothing new: no emotion is as all-embracing and fulfilling as hatred, and nothing but hatred can grow from a private to a public and societal emotion. In the nineties, during the time of Franjo Tudjman, Croatia was very much a country of hatred. That hatred was directed mainly inwards, against parts of its own society, against its own culture, history, identity, language? In Croatia even words were hated if they did not sound Croatian enough. And sounds could often be deceptive. If there was no object to fix their hate on, people focused on things that had nothing to do with minorities or different identities.

At such times, you can find all sorts of reasons for wanting to be with the majority. Especially if you have come from a besieged city, if you are there on your own, a subtenant, an intellectual proletarian? After all, Sarajevo was under siege from members of a nation that was hated with a passion in Croatia at the time. So why wouldn?t you not agree to such hatred, to being accepted as a member of society, to switching, as is only fair, from a state of exile to a degree of stability and situation in society? If we forget the moral norms that speak against it, and such norms are always problematic if they are in the mouth of an individual opposed to society, and if we forget that hatred also presumes a certain intellectual and social effort ? which does not come so easily to everyone ? then it is truly difficult to find a reason why a person who arrived from Sarajevo in 1993 should speak out against the prevailing mood in the city and country to which he had just arrived. I am not so vain as to have to be different whatever the cost. And I know that such differences are not a recipe for particularly good living conditions.

So the reason why I reduced we to I, why, during the long season of hatred, I wanted to be an exception, even though it gave me no moral pleasure or satisfaction, had to do with how my own identity had been formed, an identity which in different ways was shaped by what I was not and who I was not. My great grandfather was a Banat German living in Sarajevo who spoke Croatian with a lot of Turkish words typical of Bosnian Muslims. He hid his Serb neighbors from the Ustashas not because he was a good or selfless man, at least not primarily for that reason, but because they formed an important part of his world, for what kind of German would he be without them being Serbs? He probably did not know what it meant to be a German where there were no Serbs (Croats, Bosnians, Moslems, Jews?). From his point of view and mine, hatred in a multinational community is the same thing as self-hatred. Which is why my Croatianness was substantially different from that of the people I found when I arrived in Zagreb, and even from my friends. Because while they rejected hatred for intellectual and moral reasons, or simply because that is how they were brought up, I rejected it because it threatened me. Although I am a Croat, it threatened the Serb and the Bosniak (Muslim) in me.

My younger uncle Dragan, who was to become a well-known metallurgist and trade representative of Bosnia?s heavy industry in the Soviet Union, was born in Kakanj, yet another of the little towns where my grandfather Franjo had worked as a stationmaster. The majority population in Kakanj was Muslim, and Dragan was the only Christian in his school class. In the 1930?s, religion was a compulsory subject in all schools in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and so my uncle had to learn to believe in God from a tender age and under unusual circumstances. For their first class of the day, all the children would go to the Islamic teacher in the nearby mosque for instruction, while Dragan stayed behind alone in the classroom because there was no Catholic religious teacher in the school, and the local priest, who could stand in for him when needed, had no idea that there was a little Christian sheep waiting for him in the school. And so, sitting alone in his classroom, staring at the blackboard and the photograph of King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic hanging on the wall, my uncle felt the kind of desperate, confusing loneliness that makes even adults flee from towns and countries where they are the minority to towns and countries where will be the majority.

But instead of moving away with his family or having his son taught to believe in God by the parish priest while the rest of the boy?s classmates were being taught religion by the local hodja, Dragan?s father, my grandfather Franjo, told the teacher that since he did not want to separate his son from the other children the boy might as well go with them to Islamic religious classes. It was an unusual but not unlawful request and no one had anything against it.

That was how Dragan completed all four years of the mekteb, the Muslim primary school, and so even though he had been christened a Catholic, he knew the rules of Muslim prayer from an tender age and firsthand. It made him no less of what he was nationally or religiously, but it did distinguish him from others of his faith and nation. The important thing here is not so much that he finished the mekteb, as that he came from a family that was prepared to send their child there because they did not want him to be left sitting alone in his classroom, deprived of what the school and the place gave all the other children.

The difference, however, lies not in a multinational versus a more homogeneous society, but in the attitude to differences. We can revel in hatred and use it to shape our identity, or we can live without it. If we do not hate, then we necessarily look to others and they necessarily become part of our identity. Otata Karlo knew that when he refused to go to Germany, because other kinds of Germans lived there. How would he communicate with them, how would they understand one another, how could a German like him live in Germany except in conflict and opposition?

I have written in my novels and stories about my great grandfather the Banat German and his family, about my uncle who died an enemy soldier, about my grandparents who sent him to that enemy army, and about other important and not so important figures from my childhood. I mixed fact and fiction, brought them to life and extended their lives. I have told their stories many times in many places and forms. Even this present story, where unfortunately there are no inventions, has already been told several times. I cannot detach myself from it and I cannot let my uncle, whose grave has long since disappeared into the grass of a village cemetery somewhere in Slavonia, lie among millions of Hitler?s soldiers. He is a part of my identity, of the guilty conscience that is passed on from one generation to the next, just as I add to my own national identity. I am such and such a Croat, but also such and such a person. Often, collective national and even religious identity is not encapsulated in a name. Often to be a Catholic goes against the widely held notion and identity of Catholics.

I thought that after the death of Franjo Tudjman and the implosion of the nationalist oligarchy in Croatia, the differences between us would, with time, fade, and that my bad reputation among the national elite would simply disappear into the mist of the past, be diluted, like all other hatreds which had started to be diluted with the end of the war. After all, this was a time when Croatia was beginning to take to its bosom dissidents from the nineties, to hand them national decorations and attestations of exemplary patriotic conduct. Nationalistic pathos turned into the pathos of collective Europeanization, which might be just as irritating but at least is easier to live with. The flag of the European Union now flies next to Croata's, even though Croatia is not a member. Perhaps this is a reflection of some kind of colonial allegiance, a fragmented and schizophrenic identity, or maybe it is just that there are three flagpoles in front of every public institution and it would be silly to fly a flag on just one of them. The three flagpoles date from the days when the Yugoslav flag was flown from the middle pole, with the Croatian and Communist Party flags flying on either side of it. Today, the European flag is flown next to the Croatian, and flying from the third flagpole is some invented town or county flag?

But our lives are not determined by flags. Yesterday?s banner of nationalism may be today?s flag of freedom. And vice versa. Just look at how much the importance of the American flag has changed in the five or six years of the Bush administration. My older uncle wrote on a postcard to my aunt in Sarajevo: ? It?s Sunday, a day off, the camp-ground is deserted, the German flag is flying. We sold ours.? Though not entirely clear, this was his only political statement. After the war, the surviving members of his family could console themselves with these words but actually they do not mean much. We are people who do not really know which flag is ours. Those who did know also knew that hatred is sweetest when brandished under a flag. Why else would flags be waved so fervently at soccer games or the Olympics? Our flags are there to humiliate the losers more than to celebrate the winners. Everybody knows it. The best known soccer song sung by Croatian fans says: ?Croatia is world champion, suffer and too bad?. Why would anybody have to suffer because Croatia is world champion? Anybody who even asks such a question is probably not a true blue Croat.

A year after the fall of nationalist rule, during the coalition government led by the Social Democrat Ivica Racan, whose Europeanism brought to a sigh of relief to all of Europe, including Croatia?s first neighbors, I was at the film festival in Istria. It was held in a small ancient hilltop town once inhabited almost entirely by Italians, who, when Istria became part of Yugoslavia, were given a choice by the communists to become Italians or stay as Yugoslavs and so, with bags in hand, they left, only to spend years living in refugee camps in Italy, never to see their Istrian homes again. This festival in this little town was a kind of cultural but also social and political testimonial to a new, anti-nationalist Croatia. It was attended, of course, by the new minister of culture, dubbed the "Croatian Malraux" by his supporters and sidekicks, a title he readily accepted since in Croatia, and generally in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, it is both customary and desirable to liken one?s top figures to the great names of the world, be it Franz Beckenbauer, Emperor Selassie or Shakespeare, it doesn?t matter. Our minister of culture, this Croatian Malraux, had previously worked in the field of lexicography, in other words he mostly lazed around, holding intellectual coffee-house debates after checking the couple of lexicographical entries placed on his desk that day. I did not like the way he ran the ministry and I wrote a newspaper article to that effect, though admittedly it wasn?t harsh, it was far less harsh than what I wrote about Tudjman?s nationalists.

The article was far from my mind that afternoon when I walked up to the caf? table where, seated in the shade of the huge Slav tree were a collection of film directors, producers and general practitioner intellectuals, along with Minister Malraux. I knew these people, the minister included, and I merely wanted to say hello to them the way I would on any day.

?Beat it, you piece of Bosnian garbage, go back to where you came from or we?ll pack you off ourselves!?, cried Malraux.

I wasn?t overly angry because the minister was obviously still recovering from a long and busy night which had left him with a hangover well into the afternoon. Still, I stopped and looked at the famous director, who had been blacklisted in Tudjman?s day and his films banned from television. He had been a major dissident, almost like Kundera if not more so. The man lowered his eyes and said nothing. He had to be careful around the hungover minister because he wanted to make another movie and in Croatia, that required money from the state. The producer also lowered his eyes, this young man of promise, this fighter against all forms of nationalism and apologist for love between nations, and so did the others, all dissidents from Tudjman?s time, until, having stood there waiting for too long, I turned on my heel and, to the shouts of the Croatian Malraux, walked away and down the Istrian hill.

I left and am still going, a happy man, because unlike Otata Karlo, I was not taken away by two men with a third prodding me in the kidney. This is an important nuance in our identities and because of it, we live where we do, although we are not part of the majority. Happiness keeps us here and happiness, I am deeply convinced, has often cost us our lives. At peace with what we are, and with a sense of what we are not, we represent identities that no word, no passport, no identity card or permit can define. The masses know what they are from their coat of arms, flag and name, and then they chant it out, while we are left with our long, confusing explanations, novels and movies, stories both fictional and not, a need to visit with a village in Romanian Banat where there are no more Germans but where the horizon has not changed since Otata Karlo was a boy, we are left with deserted little towns in Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Poland, inhabited by people who quite literally went up in smoke, we are left with blurred memories, the feeling that we are one thing today and another tomorrow, that our hymns and state borders keep slipping away from us, we are left with remorse, a long and painful sense of guilt because our relative lived and died as an enemy and that makes us a bit of an enemy ourselves, we are left with faith in what we hide behind our language, with the truth that our homeland is no more, and maybe it never even existed, because for us every inch of land is a foreign country.

*

This article originally appeared in the July/August issue of Literaturen.

Miljenko Jergovic, born in Sarajevo in 1966, is an award-winning writer and columnist. He lives in Zagreb.

Translated from the Croatian by Christina Pribichevich Zoric.

29
3DHS / For Love of Judaism
« on: May 06, 2008, 07:48:44 PM »
There are some folks in here who do two things constantly:

1. They defend Israel no matter what that nation's government does.
2. They constantly use the terms Islamofascism or Islamo-nazi.

So we have a situation in Italy and the UK were real Fascists won elections. I'm not talking about right-wingers who get labeled "fascist" by their detractors. I'm talking about politicians who are Fascists and make no qualms about that fact.

In Rome the Jewish community protested the new mayor and PM Burlesconi's fascist references in his victory speech. The BNP picked up council seats in the UK, including a coveted seat on the GLA.

Real Fascists. No semantics. No invented terms to inspire hatred. True fascists who joined Fascist parties.

Yet, these same crusaders for Israel and courageous captains-of-the-guard, vigilantly pursuing Islamic militarism wherever it may hide - said nothing. Nada. Zip. Zilch. Zero.

That leads me to ponder two points.

1. They really could give a damn less about the Jewish people. The important thing is the Israeli state and its usefulness. I'd go further and say that Ethiopian Jews, for example, are ultimately meaningless. They have no western values or European culture. The important thing is the Israeli state and how they can be used to kill Muslims.

2. Fascism isn't an enemy at all. The moniker is simply useful to tag onto the end of Islam because it degrades all of Islam. Fascists in Europe are perfectly acceptable, if not appreciated. After all, they are legitimate allies with the right-wing and no one loathes illegal immigration and absolutely loves uniculturalism more than true Fascists. Nationalism is their lynchpin, how bad can real European fascists be to the right wing?

30
3DHS / Cries of 'Duce! Duce!' salute Rome's new mayor
« on: April 29, 2008, 07:26:11 PM »
Cries of 'Duce! Duce!' salute Rome's new mayor

John Hooper in Rome

guardian.co.uk

Tuesday April 29 2008

Italy's new parliament met for the first time today with applause for Rome's mayor-elect, Gianni Alemanno, a day after followers celebrated his triumph with straight-arm salutes and fascist-era chants.

Alemanno, a former neo-fascist youth leader, took 54% of the vote in a run-off on Sunday and Monday, crushing his rival, Francesco Rutelli, a deputy prime minister in the last, centre-left government.

Silvio Berlusconi, who won a general election earlier this month, welcomed the latest evidence of Italy's leap to the right by declaring: "We are the new Falange". Although he took care to wrap his remark in a classical context, his choice of words appeared to be a nod and a wink to his most extreme supporters.

The original Falange ? the word means "phalanx" ? was the Spanish fascist party, founded in the 1930s, which supplied Francisco Franco's dictatorship with its ideological underpinning.

The prime minister-elect's closest ally, Umberto Bossi, the Northern League leader, kept up the intimidating rhetoric, arriving for the first session of Italy's parliament warning of violence if the centre-left did not go along with his plans for federalism.

"I don't know what the left wants [but] we are ready," he told reporters. "If they want conflicts, I have 300,000 men always on hand."

On Monday night, the area around Rome's city hall rang to chants of "Duce! Duce!", the term adopted by Italy's dictator, Benito Mussolini, equivalent to the German "F?hrer". Supporters of the new mayor gave the fascist Roman straight-arm salutes.

Alemanno, however, has promised to be the mayor of all Romans. He yesterday sent telegrams to both the Pope and the Chief Rabbi. Rome's Jewish community was shaken by the prospect of a mayor with Alemanno's record. During the campaign, there was a protest aimed at him in the city's old Jewish ghetto, where many of the city's Jews still live.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/29/italy1

(btw - Alamanno is a former youth leader of the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement, the MSI)


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