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511
3DHS / Libertarianism in One Country
« on: May 26, 2007, 04:20:05 AM »
December 11, 2006, 6:00 a.m.

Libertarianism in One Country
On the Brink and beyond.

By John Derbyshire

Brink Lindsey’s “Liberaltarian” piece in The New Republic is getting commented on all over. Here at NR/NRO, Ramesh has already taken a swing at it on The Corner, with a response from Lindsey posted here. Jonah is working up an article on it, I believe. I’m going to leave these heavyweights to take on Lindsey’s piece in the round. Here I’m just going to pass comment on one aspect of liberaltarianism.

Before reading through Brink’s piece, I did a find on “immigr,” and came up with the following sentences:
Just look at the causes that have been generating the real energy in the conservative movement of late: building walls to keep out immigrants, amending the Constitution to keep gays from marrying, and imposing sectarian beliefs on medical researchers and families struggling with end-of-life decisions.

Most obviously, many of the great libertarian breakthroughs of the [past half century] — the fall of Jim Crow, the end of censorship, the legalization of abortion, the liberalization of divorce laws, the increased protection of the rights of the accused, the reopening of immigration — were championed by the political left.

Both [liberals and libertarians] generally support a more open immigration policy.

Let me mention once, then leave aside, the sneaky little sleights of hand that we have now come to expect in anything written by those opposed to enforcement of immigration laws. The purpose of the wall in that first quote is not, as Lindsey claims, to keep out immigrants, but to keep out illegal immigrants. And if, by “the reopening of immigration” in that second sentence, Lindsey means the 1965 Immigration Act, well, no mention of that legislation should be allowed to pass without a note on the staggering differences between the promises made by the act’s sponsors, and its actual consequences. Those differences are thoroughly described in any honest book that deals with the topic, e.g. Pat Buchanan’s recent bestseller, Chapter 12.

Lindsey is surely right that both liberals and libertarians “generally support a more open immigration policy.” The difference is that liberals are, from their standpoint, correct to do so, while libertarians are, from their standpoint, nuts to do so. Let me explain.

* * * * *

A liberal, in the current sense of the term, is a person who favors a massive welfare state, expansive and intrusive government, high taxation, preferential allocation of social goods to designated “victim” groups, and deference to international bureaucracies in matters of foreign policy.

It is not difficult to see why such a person would favor lax policies towards both legal and illegal immigration. Immigration, legal or otherwise, concerns the crossing of borders, and a liberal regards borders, along with all other manifestations of the nation-state, with distaste. “International” trumps “national” in every context. The preferences a citizen might have for his own countrymen over foreigners, for his own language over other tongues, for his own traditions and folkways over imported ones, are all, in the minds of a modern liberal, manifestations of ugly, primitive, and outdated notions — nativism, xenophobia, racism. The liberal proudly declares himself a citizen of the world, and looks with scorn and contempt on those narrow souls who limit their citizenly affections to just one nation.

And in the realities of the world today, immigrants to the United States are mostly people of color, who can be recruited into those cohorts of designated “victims” that form such a key legion in the modern liberal alliance. This is especially the case with illegal immigrants, who come overwhelmingly from the Amerindian- and mestizo-peasant underclasses of Mexico and Central America. Any expression of unhappiness with mass illegal immigration can therefore easily be construed as racism, the most shameful of all sins in the liberal lexicon — a form of mental illness, according to some.

Further, modern liberals have come to an understanding with capitalism. The modern liberal is not a socialist. He understands perfectly well that common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange is a total no-hoper. The lavish government programs he favors need to be financed, and socialism is not capable of financing them — the 20th century proved that a hundred times over. Only a thriving capitalism can fund all the programs, all the departments, all the bureaucrats that modern liberalism wants.

How, then, can capitalism thrive in such a way as to necessitate a huge welfare establishment? Simple: Privatize profits, socialize costs.

Private profit is of course the essence of capitalism; but how to socialize costs? The cost of your labor force is their remuneration, which ought to be sufficient to allow them to pay for their housing, health care, children’s education, and so on. To the degree that your workers’ remuneration is not sufficient for those things, you are throwing your workers on the mercy of the welfare state — socializing your costs. Thus, in an odd historical reversal, liberals are keen on a capitalism that pays the lowest possible wages. To its everlasting shame, the labor movement, dominated nowadays by public-sector and welfare-state unions, is similarly inclined. The political Left is now the party of low wages kept down by endless mass immigration. Samuel Gompers (“America must not be overwhelmed...”) must be turning in his grave.

* * * * *

The affection of liberals for mass immigration, both legal and illegal, is thus very easy to understand. Why, though, do libertarians favor it? And why do I think they are nuts to do so?

So far as the first of those questions is concerned, I confess myself baffled. I think that what is going on here is just a sort of ideological overshoot. Suspicion of state power is of course at the center of classical libertarianism. If the state is making and enforcing decisions about who may settle in territories under the state’s jurisdiction, that is certainly a manifestation of state power, and therefore comes under libertarian suspicion. Just why libertarians consider it an obnoxious manifestation — well, that’s where my bafflement begins. (That some exercises of state power are necessary and un-obnoxious is conceded by nearly all libertarians.)

Perhaps libertarians simply haven’t thought about immigration. Until five years or so ago, very few Americans had. Charles Murray’s 1997 book What It Means to Be a Libertarian mentions immigration just once — to apologize for not having mentioned it! More recent libertarian productions show some dawning awareness. Bruce Bartlett’s book Impostor gives off a strong flavor of libertarianism, yet the author confesses himself “conflicted” on the immigration issue.

The free market economist in me wants to believe that we should have free flows of labor as well as free flows of capital, goods, and services. And I do believe that, historically, immigrants have been an enormously positive addition to the United States... I believe that our willingness to accept the best and brightest of other nations has incalculably added to America’s well-being...

But at the same time, I am disturbed by the way some illegal immigrants have abused our hospitality and the way some politicians have exploited them. It is insane that some communities have forbidden local police from enforcing the federal immigration laws, even when they could be used legitimately to expel criminals from our midst. I cannot comprehend why some states would allow illegal immigrants to attend state universities and pay in-state tuition, when the native-born from other states must pay more. I am concerned about the ease with which people can become citizens, simply by being born on our soil, when they have no meaningful connection to this country otherwise. And I am bothered by the ability of terrorists to exploit the holes in our immigration system.

For a long-time fellow-traveler of the Wall Street Journal “there shall be open borders” crowd, this is startling stuff.

As to why I think libertarians are nuts to favor mass uncontrolled immigration from the third world: I think they are nuts because their enthusiasm on this matter is suicidal to their cause. Their ideological passion is blinding them to a rather obvious fact: that libertarianism is a peculiarly American doctrine, with very little appeal to the huddled masses of the third world. If libertarianism implies mass third-world immigration, then it is self-destroying. Libertarianism is simply not attractive either to illiterate peasants from mercantilist Latin American states, or to East Asians with traditions of imperial-bureaucratic paternalism, or to the products of Middle Eastern Muslim theocracies.

There are a number of responses a libertarian might make to that. Not included in those responses, I think, given the current state of our national affairs, is the argument that Providence has inscribed a yearning for liberty on every human heart.

A libertarian might, though, say that while libertarianism could indeed be a hard sell to immigrants from very illiberal political traditions, it will appeal to their Americanized children, to the second generation. Possibly so. Even setting aside the great strengthening of the welfare state caused by the preferences of that first generation, though, to sell libertarianism to the second generation would need a tremendous missionary effort. According to Brink Lindsey, only 13 percent of Americans currently lean libertarian. If decades of libertarian proselytizing have only achieved that much success with a population rooted in the traditions of Pericles and Magna Carta, of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment, of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison, how well should libertarians expect to do with the political descendants of emperors and caliphs, of Toussaint L’Ouverture and Mao Tse-tung?

* * * * *

The people who made Russia’s Communist revolution in 1917 believed that they were merely striking a spark that would ignite a worldwide fire. They regarded Russia as a deeply unpromising place in which to “build socialism,” her tiny urban proletariat and multitudinous medieval peasantry poor material from which to fashion New Soviet Man. Their hope was that the modern industrial nations of the world would take inspiration from them — that the proletarians of those nations would rise up against their capitalist masters and inaugurate a new age of world history, coming to the aid of the Russian pioneers.

When it was plain that none of this was going to happen, the party ideologues got to work revising the revolutionary dogmas. One of them — it was actually Joseph Stalin — came up with a new slogan: “Socialism in One Country!”

I think that libertarians should take a leaf from Stalin’s book. They should acknowledge that the USA is, of all nations, the one whose political traditions offer the most hospitable soil for libertarianism. Foreigners, including foreigners possessed of the urge to come and settle in modern, welfare-state America, are much less well-disposed towards libertarianism.

If less than one in seven American voters is inclined to libertarianism, then there is much missionary work to be done among present-day American citizens. To think that this missionary effort will be made any easier by a steady stream of arrivals from foreign parts, most of which have never known rational, consensual government, is highly unrealistic, to the point of delusion.

That is why I say that libertarians who favor mass immigration are nuts. If there is any hope at all for libertarianism, it rests in the libertarianism of my title: libertarianism in one country.

There is no contradiction between maximum liberty within a nation and maximum vigilance on the nation’s borders. Not only is there no contradiction between the two things, in fact, it may be that the second a precondition for the first.

National Review Online - http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YTNiMDIxNTk3NGQ0NTUyYmExMWE0NGE2NTk1Mzc1Yzk=

512
3DHS / The surprising relevance of Ron Paul
« on: May 25, 2007, 05:52:32 PM »
The New Republic Online
The surprising relevance of Ron Paul.
The Crank
by Michael Crowley
Post date: 05.25.07
Issue date: 06.04.07

A star had just been born when, a day after the May 15 Republican presidential debate in South Carolina, I met Texas Representative Ron Paul for lunch on Capitol Hill. The meeting had been scheduled for several days; but, as luck would have it, the previous night Paul had gone from an oddball obscurity to a major sensation in the political world when, answering a question about September 11, he seemed to suggest that the attacks were justified by an aggressive U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. "They attack us because we've been over there. We've been bombing Iraq for ten years," Paul explained. Illustration by Stephen SavageThe ever-macho Rudy Giuliani was quick to pounce. "That's an extraordinary statement," he marveled. "And I would ask the congressman to withdraw that comment and tell us that he didn't really mean that." The crowd roared its approval. A previously flagging Giuliani suddenly enjoyed his best moment of the race.

But it was also, oddly enough, Paul's best moment. The response to his comments was fast and furious: Angry Republicans, including the party chairman in Michigan, former Senate candidate Michael Steele, and unnamed South Carolina sources cited on Fox News, called for his exclusion from future debates. Sean Hannity couldn't wait to bully Paul in a post-debate interview. John McCain even added a line to his stump speech bashing him. But the outrage was instructive: Suddenly, Republicans were taking seriously a quirky 71-year-old Texas libertarian whose national support has hovered in the zero-percent range.

Nor was the attention all negative. Far from it. Paul won several instant polls on the debate, including one at the conservative Newsmax.com and a Fox News text-message poll. Incredibly, Paul's name began beating out "Paris Hilton" as the number-one query on the popular blog-searching website Technorati. (Granted, it's possible that Paul's fervent supporters are manipulating such online metrics.) The incident prompted a feisty exchange among the ladies of ABC's "The View," of all places. And, to top it off, within a day of the debate, Paul's campaign had raised $100,000--about one-sixth of his entire haul for the first three months of 2007. Paul's spokesman says the campaign headquarters has been "inundated with phone calls" ever since--80 percent of them supportive.

When Paul ambled through the door of a cheap Mexican joint on Capitol Hill last Wednesday, he hardly looked like a freshly minted celebrity. His slight frame, elfin face, and reserved persona suggest the doctor he used to be, not a politician. But Paul turned heads all the same. As he approached his table, a man seated nearby extended his hand with a broad smile and a hearty "congratulations." Paul explained that he had received a similar reception among his colleagues in the House. "I've had probably ten people come up to me and compliment me--including people I thought were war hawks," he said. "It was a tremendous boost to the campaign."

Who would have expected it? At its outset, Paul's campaign promised to be a curiosity. The nominee of the Libertarian Party in his previous run for the presidency (in 1988), Paul seemed likely to play a predictable gadfly role--using his stage time to press hoary libertarian bugaboos like the abolition of Social Security, the legalization of drugs and prostitution, and--Paul's special obsession--a return to the gold standard. Instead, thanks mainly to his adamant opposition to the Iraq war, he has assumed a far more serious role. In a Republican field that has marched in lockstep with George W. Bush on the war, Paul's libertarian isolationism has exposed an intraparty fissure over foreign policy that is far wider than has been acknowledged, encompassing not only disgruntled libertarians but some paleocons and social conservatives, as well as such GOP lions as William F. Buckley, George Will, and Bob Novak. As populist-isolationist Pat Buchanan wrote in an op-ed last week, Paul was "speaking intolerable truths. Understandably, Republicans do not want him back, telling the country how the party blundered into this misbegotten war."

Paul, for his part, thinks his view is commonsensical. "This is a very Republican position," he told me. "I just think the Republicans can't win unless they change their policy on Iraq."

 

Before Paul became an antiwar hero, his support consisted largely of libertarian activists--people like Michael Badnarik, the Libertarian Party's 2004 presidential nominee. Badnarik refuses to get a driver's license (even though, he conceded to me, "I have my car operational") and warns against anyone who might try to force a smallpox or anthrax vaccination on him. ("You bring the syringe, I'll bring my .45, and we'll see who makes a bigger hole.") Badnarik recounts rallying support for Paul at a recent conference of the Free State Project, a group of libertarians who have relocated to New Hampshire in the hope of concentrating their power and more or less taking over the state government. "I asked how many people would drive without a license and not pay income taxes, and three-quarters raised their hands," Badnarik recalls. "I'm choking up. I've got my heart in my throat. And I said, 'We need to do something--and Ron Paul's campaign is the shining star. We need to contribute the full two thousand dollars now. Tell all your friends.'"

Pep talks like that helped Paul to raise more than $600,000 overall in the first quarter of 2007--a pittance compared with the top candidates, but more than several better-known competitors, including former GOP governors Tommy Thompson, Mike Huckabee, and Jim Gilmore. With the help of the Free State Project, Paul actually placed second in money raised in New Hampshire, ahead of Giuliani and McCain and trailing only Mitt Romney.

But libertarians are a fractious bunch, and some hardcore activists have mixed feelings about the man now carrying their banner. For instance, libertarian purists generally support a laissez-faire government attitude toward abortion and gay marriage, as well as "open border" immigration policies and unfettered free trade. Yet Paul opposes gay marriage, believes states should outlaw abortion, decries high immigration rates, and criticizes free trade agreements--though mainly on constitutional grounds. (These divergences may be explained by Paul's socially conservative East Texas district, which lies adjacent to Tom DeLay's former district and which President Bush last carried with 67 percent of the vote. Being pro-choice simply doesn't fly there.)

As a result, Paul's candidacy leaves some of his erstwhile libertarian fans cold--particularly the intellectuals who congregate in Washington outfits like the CATO Institute or Reason magazine. "He comes from a more right-wing populist approach," explains Brian Doherty, a California-based Reason editor and author of Radicals for Capitalism, a history of the libertarian movement. "Culturally, he strikes a lot of the more cosmopolitan libertarians as a yokel." (Doherty himself is a Paul admirer.)

And, while some libertarians criticize Paul from the left on social issues, others are swiping at him from the right over the war. "Will Libertarianism Survive Ron Paul?" asked one article on the America's Future Foundation website, before continuing, "Paul's prominence threatens to make his blame-America instincts the defining characteristic of libertarianism in the public imagination. If libertarianism becomes inextricably associated with radical pacifism, will young people with classically liberal instincts be discouraged from serious political engagement?"

 

Paul's provocations have roiled the waters back home as well. After the fateful debate, the largest paper in Paul's district ran a story headlined, "some say paul should resign." More ominously, a former longtime aide, Eric Dondero, is now planning to knock his former boss out of Congress in 2008. A self-described Barry Goldwaterstyle "pro-military libertarian," Dondero first worked for Paul during his 1988 presidential campaign and finally left his office three years ago. He says it was bad enough begging Paul to support the 2001 congressional resolution authorizing military force in Afghanistan. But Paul's September 11 moment in the debate was the final straw. The next day, Dondero posted a blog item on RedState.com declaring his intention to unseat his one-time hero. "One of the really bad things about his piss-poor [debate] performance," Dondero told me, "is that now everyone in the country is going to think that all libertarians think the same way that he does."

Paul seems only to relish his newfound notoriety. "I enjoy dealing in the area of ideas," he told me over lunch. "And I want to make a difference." Paul also carries with him a certainty that he will be vindicated--and not just on Iraq. He is utterly convinced, for instance, that the United States is headed for an economic disaster that can only be averted by the adoption of the gold standard, a topic that has obsessed him for years. When I ask him why, at 71, he's putting himself through the ordeal of a national campaign, this--not Iraq--is the point to which he returns: "If there's an economic collapse," he says almost wistfully, "maybe I'll be in the right place at the right time." It's another slogan not suited for a bumper sticker, and another you would only hear from Ron Paul.

Correction: This article inaccurately reported that Ron Paul has referred to himself as "sort of" a protectionist. When asked recently on CNN whether he is a protectionist Paul said, "No, not really." Paul has criticized several recent free-trade deals, but primarily on constitutional grounds. We regret the error.
Michael Crowley is a senior editor at The New Republic.

http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20070604&s=crowley060407

513
3DHS / By All Means, Eliminate the Guy Who's Right
« on: May 22, 2007, 07:20:42 PM »
But Who Was Right – Rudy or Ron?

by Patrick J. Buchanan

It was the decisive moment of the South Carolina debate.

Hearing Rep. Ron Paul recite the reasons for Arab and Islamic resentment of the United States, including 10 years of bombing and sanctions that brought death to thousands of Iraqis after the Gulf War, Rudy Giuliani broke format and exploded:

"That's really an extraordinary statement, as someone who lived through the attack of 9/11, that we invited the attack because we were attacking Iraq. I don't think I have ever heard that before, and I have heard some pretty absurd explanations for Sept. 11.

"I would ask the congressman to withdraw that comment and tell us that he didn't really mean that."

The applause for Rudy's rebuke was thunderous – the soundbite of the night and best moment of Rudy's campaign.

After the debate, on Fox News' "Hannity and Colmes," came one of those delicious moments on live television. As Michael Steele, GOP spokesman, was saying that Paul should probably be cut out of future debates, the running tally of votes by Fox News viewers was showing Ron Paul, with 30 percent, the winner of the debate.

Brother Hannity seemed startled and perplexed by the votes being text-messaged in the thousands to Fox News saying Paul won, Romney was second, Rudy third and McCain far down the track at 4 percent.

When Ron Paul said the 9/11 killers were "over here because we are over there," he was not excusing the mass murderers of 3,000 Americans. He was explaining the roots of hatred out of which the suicide-killers came.

Lest we forget, Osama bin Laden was among the mujahideen whom we, in the Reagan decade, were aiding when they were fighting to expel the Red Army from Afghanistan. We sent them Stinger missiles, Spanish mortars, sniper rifles. And they helped drive the Russians out.

What Ron Paul was addressing was the question of what turned the allies we aided into haters of the United States. Was it the fact that they discovered we have freedom of speech or separation of church and state? Do they hate us because of who we are? Or do they hate us because of what we do?

Osama bin Laden in his declaration of war in the 1990s said it was U.S. troops on the sacred soil of Saudi Arabia, U.S. bombing and sanctions of a crushed Iraqi people, and U.S. support of Israel's persecution of the Palestinians that were the reasons he and his mujahideen were declaring war on us.

Elsewhere, he has mentioned Sykes-Picot, the secret British-French deal that double-crossed the Arabs who had fought for their freedom alongside Lawrence of Arabia and were rewarded with a quarter century of British-French imperial domination and humiliation.

Almost all agree that, horrible as 9/11 was, it was not anarchic terror. It was political terror, done with a political motive and a political objective.

What does Rudy Giuliani think the political motive was for 9/11?

Was it because we are good and they are evil? Is it because they hate our freedom? Is it that simple?

Ron Paul says Osama bin Laden is delighted we invaded Iraq.

Does the man not have a point? The United States is now tied down in a bloody guerrilla war in the Middle East and increasingly hated in Arab and Islamic countries where we were once hugely admired as the first and greatest of the anti-colonial nations. Does anyone think that Osama is unhappy with what is happening to us in Iraq?

Of the 10 candidates on stage in South Carolina, Dr. Paul alone opposed the war. He alone voted against the war. Have not the last five years vindicated him, when two-thirds of the nation now agrees with him that the war was a mistake, and journalists and politicians left and right are babbling in confession, "If I had only known then what I know now ..."

Rudy implied that Ron Paul was unpatriotic to suggest the violence against us out of the Middle East may be in reaction to U.S. policy in the Middle East. Was President Hoover unpatriotic when, the day after Pearl Harbor, he wrote to friends, "You and I know that this continuous putting pins in rattlesnakes finally got this country bitten."

Pearl Harbor came out of the blue, but it also came out of the troubled history of U.S.-Japanese relations going back 40 years. Hitler's attack on Poland was naked aggression. But to understand it, we must understand what was done at Versailles – after the Germans laid down their arms based on Wilson's 14 Points. We do not excuse – but we must understand.

Ron Paul is no TV debater. But up on that stage in Columbia, he was speaking intolerable truths. Understandably, Republicans do not want him back, telling the country how the party blundered into this misbegotten war.

By all means, throw out of the debate the only man who was right from the beginning on Iraq.

May 18, 2007

Patrick J. Buchanan [send him mail] is co-founder and editor of The American Conservative. He is also the author of seven books, including Where the Right Went Wrong, and A Republic Not An Empire.

Copyright © 2007 Creators Syndicate

 
Find this article at:
http://www.lewrockwell.com/buchanan/buchanan58.html
 
    

514
3DHS / Why the US Government Is Hated All Over the World
« on: May 22, 2007, 05:08:19 AM »
 
Why the US Government Is Hated All Over the World

by Fred Reed

Something is wrong with the United States. I think most of us have noticed it. There is a mortal rot in the country, made manifest by many little rots that are hard to integrate mentally yet are, I think, somehow related. The change is grave, accelerating, probably irreversible, and fascinating. Things are not as they were.

The United States is the most hated country on the planet, followed by, to the extent that there is a distinction, Israel. So far as I know, there are no other contenders. You can say “Who cares?” as many will say, or “Screw’em if they can’t take a joke,” or “I’d ratherh be feared than loved.” All very droll. Still, it is an interesting datum. No country ever lives up to its own PR, but there was a time when America was widely admired. Now, almost universally, it is seen as a rogue state. And is.

This carries a price. The US consulate in Guadalajara is part fortress, part prison, with barriers and cameras and bars and rentacops, and they take away a woman’s lipstick if she is going to enter. Maybe a country that fears lipstick needs to think. The French consulate around the corner is wide open, like all others that I know of. The French, Chinese, Japanese and so on aren’t hated.

(1) The US government now lives in its own, strange, insulated world.

(2) The United States is the most militarily aggressive country on the planet, followed closely by Israel. I am aware of no other contenders.

Some of this combativeness is obvious – attacking Iraq for no good reason, occupying Afghanistan, threatening Syria and Iran, attacking Lebanon by proxy, bombing Somalia, putting troops in the Philippines to hunt Moslems. The US is also looking for trouble with Venezuela, threatening North Korea, moving to “contain” China (Doesn’t a container need to be bigger than its contents?), embargoing Cuba, pushing into Central Asia, increasing the military budget, and pushing NATO ever closer to Russia. (How stupid can you get? Very. Stay tuned.) And the Pentagon now has Africom, African Command. Africa is now America’s business.

(3) Powerful domestic hostilities grip the United States. Maybe you have to be outside of it really to see it. I live in Mexico. You can go for…well, five years and counting, without hearing angry talk about this or that group. In America, women hate men and men are getting sick of American women. Blacks hate whites hate Hispanics. “Affirmative action” engenders intense hostility that doesn’t go away. It isn’t the normal friction found in any country. It is serious antagonism quashed by federal force.

And the black-white-brown thing has very real potential for getting nasty. This we don’t talk about.

(4) A curious state of fear prevails in America, but it is a governmental creation, a calculated manipulative Disneyland. Perhaps soon we will have Terror Mouse.

Recently I was in Washington. Everywhere there were the artificialities of fear. The steel pop-up barriers in the roads, the stop’em-bombs steel poles on sidewalks, the endless warnings to report suspicious behavior on loudspeakers in the subway. The searches of everything, the metal-detecting doorways even on buildings of county governments, of schools. (Schools, for Chrissakes. What is wrong here?) And of course the confiscation of shampoo at the airport. This is nuts.

(5) The bullying of people entering the US. Any country has the right to determine who enters. Fine. If you don’t want them to enter, don’t give them visas. If you issue a visa, try to be courteous.

Violeta had a visa, issued by the consulate, both times when we went to the US. Still she got bullied by the border Nazis. It was ugly. I am obviously not a Mexican, but I get the same hostile questioning as to where I am going, why I was in Mexico, and so on. It is none of their business where I go in my country. Or shouldn’t be, but there are no limitations on governmental powers now. A friend, married to a Mexicana, again with a visa, got separated from her, and both got abusive questioning. She came out crying.

America was not like this. Now it is.

Compare this with the real world. I land in Beijing – evil commie Beijing, right? Maybe twenty seconds to see whether my visa was valid, clonk of stamp, thank you, no baggage search, into a taxi. Vi and I land in Paris, en route to Italy. Glance at passport, yep, it’s a passport, no stamp, no nothing, on we go. Italy didn’t even look at our passports. Grown-ups.

I am not ashamed of the United States. It is a hell of a country. Been there, done that, loved it. In two weeks in DC with Violeta, although she is clearly not American, she was everywhere, always, treated with perfect courtesy and friendliness, whether on Cap Hill or Farmville, Virginia. Americans really are good folk. The government isn’t. It’s the gravest problem we face, both internationally and domestically.

(6) The Constitution really is going away, or has gone. It never did work as well as it should have, but few things human ever do. Habeas corpus is dead, right to an attorney, congressional right to declare war – it’s not even worth listing the list. Joe iPod in the burbs doesn’t care because it doesn’t affect him, yet. Git them Hay-rabs, ain’t no draft, plenty sushi. Urg.

(7) The increasing, detailed, intrusive regulation of life, the national desire for control, control, control. Everything is the business of some form of government. Want to paint your shutters? The condo association won’t let you. Let dogs in your bar? Never. Decide who to sell your house to? Racial matter. Own a dog? Shot card, pooper-scooper, leash, gotta be spayed, etc. Have a bar for men only, women only, whites or blacks only? Here come the federal marshals. What isn’t controlled by government is controlled by the crypto-vindictive mob rule of political correctness. This wasn’t always in the American character.

Add the continuing presence of police in the schools, the arrest in handcuffs of children of seven, the expulsions for drawing a picture of a soldier with a gun. Something very twisted is going on.

How much of the public knows what is happening, or even knows that something is happening? I don’t know. But I don’t think that it’s going to go away. In ten years it will be an entirely different place with the same name. Almost is now.

May 21, 2007

Fred Reed is author of Nekkid in Austin: Drop Your Inner Child Down a Well and the just-published A Brass Pole in Bangkok: A Thing I Aspire to Be. Visit his blog.

Copyright © 2007 Fred Reed


 
Find this article at:
http://www.lewrockwell.com/reed/reed128.html
 
    

516
3DHS / Scientists cast doubt on Kennedy bullet analysis
« on: May 17, 2007, 11:50:27 PM »
WP: Scientists cast doubt on Kennedy bullet analysis
Evidence used to rule out more than one shooter flawed, study says
By John Solomon
The Washington Post
Updated: 4:34 p.m. CT May 17, 2007

In a collision of 21st-century science and decades-old conspiracy theories, a research team that includes a former top FBI scientist is challenging the bullet analysis used by the government to conclude that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in assassinating President John F. Kennedy in 1963.

The "evidence used to rule out a second assassin is fundamentally flawed," concludes a new article in the Annals of Applied Statistics written by former FBI lab metallurgist William A. Tobin and Texas A&M University researchers Cliff Spiegelman and William D. James.

The researchers' re-analysis involved new statistical calculations and a modern chemical analysis of bullets from the same batch Oswald is purported to have used. They reached no conclusion about whether more than one gunman was involved, but urged that authorities conduct a new and complete forensic re-analysis of the five bullet fragments left from the assassination 44 years ago.

"Given the significance and impact of the JFK assassination, it is scientifically desirable for the evidentiary fragments to be re-analyzed," the researchers said.

Tobin was the FBI lab's chief metallurgy expert for more than two decades. He analyzed metal evidence in major cases that included the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 1996 explosion of TWA Flight 800 off Long Island.

After retiring, he attracted national attention by questioning the FBI science used in prosecutions for decades to match bullets to crime suspects through their lead content. The questions he and others raised prompted a National Academy of Sciences review that in 2003 concluded that the FBI's bullet lead analysis was flawed. The FBI agreed and generally ended the use of that type of analysis.

Using new guidelines set forth by the National Academy of Sciences for proper bullet analysis, Tobin and his colleagues at Texas A&M re-analyzed the bullet evidence used by the 1976 House Select Committee on Assassinations, which concluded that only one shooter, Oswald, fired the shots that killed Kennedy in Dallas.

The committee's finding was based in part on the research of now-deceased University of California at Irvine chemist Vincent P. Guinn. He used bullet lead analysis to conclude that the five bullet fragments recovered from the Kennedy assassination scene came from just two bullets, which were traced to the same batch of bullets Oswald owned.

To do their research, Tobin, Spiegelman and James said they bought the same brand and lot of bullets used by Oswald and analyzed their lead using the new standards. The bullets from that batch are still on the market as collectors' items.

They found that the scientific and statistical assumptions Guinn used -- and the government accepted at the time -- to conclude that the fragments came from just two bullets fired from Oswald's gun were wrong.

"This finding means that the bullet fragments from the assassination that match could have come from three or more separate bullets," the researchers said.

"If the assassination fragments are derived from three or more separate bullets, then a second assassin is likely, as the additional bullet would not be attributable to the main suspect, Mr. Oswald."
© 2007 The Washington Post Company

URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18709539/

517
3DHS / The middle of nowhere
« on: May 16, 2007, 04:50:54 PM »

Issue 134 , May 2007
The middle of nowhere
by Edward Luttwak
Western analysts are forever bleating about the strategic importance of the middle east. But despite its oil, this backward region is less relevant than ever, and it would be better for everyone if the rest of the world learned to ignore it
Edward Luttwak is senior adviser at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC

Why are middle east experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them.

The first mistake is "five minutes to midnight" catastrophism. The late King Hussein of Jordan was the undisputed master of this genre. Wearing his gravest aspect, he would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless… And then came the remedy—usually something rather tame when compared with the immense catastrophe predicted, such as resuming this or that stalled negotiation, or getting an American envoy to the scene to make the usual promises to the Palestinians and apply the usual pressures on Israel. We read versions of the standard King Hussein speech in countless newspaper columns, hear identical invocations in the grindingly repetitive radio and television appearances of the usual middle east experts, and are now faced with Hussein's son Abdullah periodically repeating his father's speech almost verbatim.

What actually happens at each of these "moments of truth"—and we may be approaching another one—is nothing much; only the same old cyclical conflict which always restarts when peace is about to break out, and always dampens down when the violence becomes intense enough. The ease of filming and reporting out of safe and comfortable Israeli hotels inflates the media coverage of every minor affray. But humanitarians should note that the dead from Jewish-Palestinian fighting since 1921 amount to fewer than 100,000—about as many as are killed in a season of conflict in Darfur.

Strategically, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been almost irrelevant since the end of the cold war. And as for the impact of the conflict on oil prices, it was powerful in 1973 when the Saudis declared embargoes and cut production, but that was the first and last time that the "oil weapon" was wielded. For decades now, the largest Arab oil producers have publicly foresworn any linkage between politics and pricing, and an embargo would be a disaster for their oil-revenue dependent economies. In any case, the relationship between turmoil in the middle east and oil prices is far from straightforward. As Philip Auerswald recently noted in the American Interest, between 1981 and 1999—a period when a fundamentalist regime consolidated power in Iran, Iran and Iraq fought an eight-year war within view of oil and gas installations, the Gulf war came and went and the first Palestinian intifada raged—oil prices, adjusted for inflation, actually fell. And global dependence on middle eastern oil is declining: today the region produces under 30 per cent of the world's crude oil, compared to almost 40 per cent in 1974-75. In 2005 17 per cent of American oil imports came from the Gulf, compared to 28 per cent in 1975, and President Bush used his 2006 state of the union address to announce his intention of cutting US oil imports from the middle east by three quarters by 2025.

Yes, it would be nice if Israelis and Palestinians could settle their differences, but it would do little or nothing to calm the other conflicts in the middle east from Algeria to Iraq, or to stop Muslim-Hindu violence in Kashmir, Muslim-Christian violence in Indonesia and the Philippines, Muslim-Buddhist violence in Thailand, Muslim-animist violence in Sudan, Muslim-Igbo violence in Nigeria, Muslim-Muscovite violence in Chechnya, or the different varieties of inter-Muslim violence between traditionalists and Islamists, and between Sunnis and Shia, nor would it assuage the perfectly understandable hostility of convinced Islamists towards the transgressive west that relentlessly invades their minds, and sometimes their countries.

Arab-Israeli catastrophism is wrong twice over, first because the conflict is contained within rather narrow boundaries, and second because the Levant is just not that important any more.

The second repeated mistake is the Mussolini syndrome. Contemporary documents prove beyond any doubt what is now hard to credit: serious people, including British and French military chiefs, accepted Mussolini's claims to great power status because they believed that he had serious armed forces at his command. His army divisions, battleships and air squadrons were dutifully counted to assess Italian military power, making some allowance for their lack of the most modern weapons but not for their more fundamental refusal to fight in earnest. Having conceded Ethiopia to win over Mussolini, only to lose him to Hitler as soon as the fighting started, the British discovered that the Italian forces quickly crumbled in combat. It could not be otherwise, because most Italian soldiers were unwilling conscripts from the one-mule peasantry of the south or the almost equally miserable sharecropping villages of the north.

Exactly the same mistake keeps being made by the fraternity of middle east experts. They persistently attribute real military strength to backward societies whose populations can sustain excellent insurgencies but not modern military forces.

In the 1960s, it was Nasser's Egypt that was mistaken for a real military power just because it had received many aircraft, tanks and guns from the Soviet Union, and had many army divisions and air squadrons. In May 1967, on the eve of war, many agreed with the prediction of Field Marshal Montgomery, then revisiting the El Alamein battlefield, that the Egyptians would defeat the Israelis forthwith; even the more cautious never anticipated that the former would be utterly defeated by the latter in just a few days. In 1973, with much more drama, it still took only three weeks to reach the same outcome.

In 1990 it was the turn of Iraq to be hugely overestimated as a military power. Saddam Hussein had more equipment than Nasser ever accumulated, and could boast of having defeated much more populous Iran after eight years of war. In the months before the Gulf war, there was much anxious speculation about the size of the Iraqi army—again, the divisions and regiments were dutifully counted as if they were German divisions on the eve of D-day, with a separate count of the "elite" Republican Guards, not to mention the "super-elite" Special Republican Guards—and it was feared that Iraq's bombproof aircraft shelters and deep bunkers would survive any air attack.

That much of this was believed at some level we know from the magnitude of the coalition armies that were laboriously assembled, including 575,000 US troops, 43,000 British, 14,663 French and 4,500 Canadian, and which incidentally constituted the sacrilegious infidel presence on Arabian soil that set off Osama bin Laden on his quest for revenge. In the event, two weeks of precision bombing were enough to paralyse Saddam's entire war machine, which scarcely tried to resist the ponderous ground offensive when it came. At no point did the Iraqi air force try to fight, and all those tanks that were painstakingly counted served mostly for target practice. A real army would have continued to resist for weeks or months in the dug-in positions in Kuwait, even without air cover, but Saddam's army was the usual middle eastern façade without fighting substance.

Now the Mussolini syndrome is at work over Iran. All the symptoms are present, including tabulated lists of Iran's warships, despite the fact that most are over 30 years old; of combat aircraft, many of which (F-4s, Mirages, F-5s, F-14s) have not flown in years for lack of spare parts; and of divisions and brigades that are so only in name. There are awed descriptions of the Pasdaran revolutionary guards, inevitably described as "elite," who do indeed strut around as if they have won many a war, but who have actually fought only one—against Iraq, which they lost. As for Iran's claim to have defeated Israel by Hizbullah proxy in last year's affray, the publicity was excellent but the substance went the other way, with roughly 25 per cent of the best-trained men dead, which explains the tomb-like silence and immobility of the once rumbustious Hizbullah ever since the ceasefire.

Then there is the new light cavalry of Iranian terrorism that is invoked to frighten us if all else fails. The usual middle east experts now explain that if we annoy the ayatollahs, they will unleash terrorists who will devastate our lives, even though 30 years of "death to America" invocations and vast sums spent on maintaining a special international terrorism department have produced only one major bombing in Saudi Arabia, in 1996, and two in the most permissive environment of Buenos Aires, in 1992 and 1994, along with some assassinations of exiles in Europe.

It is true enough that if Iran's nuclear installations are bombed in some overnight raid, there is likely to be some retaliation, but we live in fortunate times in which we have only the irritant of terrorism instead of world wars to worry about—and Iran's added contribution is not likely to leave much of an impression. There may be good reasons for not attacking Iran's nuclear sites—including the very slow and uncertain progress of its uranium enrichment effort—but its ability to strike back is not one of them. Even the seemingly fragile tanker traffic down the Gulf and through the straits of Hormuz is not as vulnerable as it seems—Iran and Iraq have both tried to attack it many times without much success, and this time the US navy stands ready to destroy any airstrip or jetty from which attacks are launched.

As for the claim that the "Iranians" are united in patriotic support for the nuclear programme, no such nationality even exists. Out of Iran's population of 70m or so, 51 per cent are ethnically Persian, 24 per cent are Turks ("Azeris" is the regime's term), with other minorities comprising the remaining quarter. Many of Iran's 16-17m Turks are in revolt against Persian cultural imperialism; its 5-6m Kurds have started a serious insurgency; the Arab minority detonates bombs in Ahvaz; and Baluch tribesmen attack gendarmes and revolutionary guards. If some 40 per cent of the British population were engaged in separatist struggles of varying intensity, nobody would claim that it was firmly united around the London government. On top of this, many of the Persian majority oppose the theocratic regime, either because they have become post-Islamic in reaction to its many prohibitions, or because they are Sufis, whom the regime now persecutes almost as much as the small Baha'i minority. So let us have no more reports from Tehran stressing the country's national unity. Persian nationalism is a minority position in a country where half the population is not even Persian. In our times, multinational states either decentralise or break up more or less violently; Iran is not decentralising, so its future seems highly predictable, while in the present not much cohesion under attack is to be expected.

The third and greatest error repeated by middle east experts of all persuasions, by Arabophiles and Arabophobes alike, by Turcologists and by Iranists, is also the simplest to define. It is the very odd belief that these ancient nations are highly malleable. Hardliners keep suggesting that with a bit of well-aimed violence ("the Arabs only understand force") compliance will be obtained. But what happens every time is an increase in hostility; defeat is followed not by collaboration, but by sullen non-cooperation and active resistance too. It is not hard to defeat Arab countries, but it is mostly useless. Violence can work to destroy dangerous weapons but not to induce desired changes in behaviour.

Softliners make exactly the same mistake in reverse. They keep arguing that if only this or that concession were made, if only their policies were followed through to the end and respect shown, or simulated, hostility would cease and a warm Mediterranean amity would emerge. Yet even the most thinly qualified of middle east experts must know that Islam, as with any other civilisation, comprehends the sum total of human life, and that unlike some others it promises superiority in all things for its believers, so that the scientific and technological and cultural backwardness of the lands of Islam generates a constantly renewed sense of humiliation and of civilisational defeat. That fully explains the ubiquity of Muslim violence, and reveals the futility of the palliatives urged by the softliners.

The operational mistake that middle east experts keep making is the failure to recognise that backward societies must be left alone, as the French now wisely leave Corsica to its own devices, as the Italians quietly learned to do in Sicily, once they recognised that maxi-trials merely handed over control to a newer and smarter mafia of doctors and lawyers. With neither invasions nor friendly engagements, the peoples of the middle east should finally be allowed to have their own history—the one thing that middle east experts of all stripes seem determined to deny them.

That brings us to the mistake that the rest of us make. We devote far too much attention to the middle east, a mostly stagnant region where almost nothing is created in science or the arts—excluding Israel, per capita patent production of countries in the middle east is one fifth that of sub-Saharan Africa. The people of the middle east (only about five per cent of the world's population) are remarkably unproductive, with a high proportion not in the labour force at all. Not many of us would care to work if we were citizens of Abu Dhabi, with lots of oil money for very few citizens. But Saudi Arabia's 27m inhabitants also live largely off the oil revenues that trickle down to them, leaving most of the work to foreign technicians and labourers: even with high oil prices, Saudi Arabia's annual per capita income, at $14,000, is only about half that of oil-free Israel.

Saudi Arabia has a good excuse, for it was a land of oasis hand-farmers and Bedouin pastoralists who cannot be expected to become captains of industry in a mere 50 years. Much more striking is the oil parasitism of once much more accomplished Iran. It exports only 2.5m barrels a day as compared to Saudi Arabia's 8m, yet oil still accounts for 80 per cent of Iran's exports because its agriculture and industry have become so unproductive.

The middle east was once the world's most advanced region, but these days its biggest industries are extravagant consumption and the venting of resentment. According to the UN's 2004 Arab human development report, the region boasts the second lowest adult literacy rate in the world (after sub-Saharan Africa) at just 63 per cent. Its dependence on oil means that manufactured goods account for just 17 per cent of exports, compared to a global average of 78 per cent. Moreover, despite its oil wealth, the entire middle east generated under 4 per cent of global GDP in 2006—less than Germany.

Unless compelled by immediate danger, we should therefore focus on the old and new lands of creation in Europe and America, in India and east Asia—places where hard-working populations are looking ahead instead of dreaming of the past.

http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=9302

518
3DHS / Jerry Falwell dies
« on: May 15, 2007, 04:07:03 PM »

US evangelist Jerry Falwell dies
Leading US conservative evangelist Rev Jerry Falwell has died in hospital in Virginia after being found unconscious in his office, his assistants said.
Doctors gave Rev Falwell emergency treatment at Lynchburg General Hospital but could not revive him.

Rev Falwell, 73, survived two serious health scares in 2005 but had a history of heart problems.

He became a figurehead of the religious right in the 1980s, founded the Moral Majority and later Liberty University.


Dr Falwell is a huge, huge leader here in this area and in the nation at large
Ron Godwin
Liberty University vice president
Rev Falwell was regarded as the father of the political evangelical movement.

As one of the first television preachers, he reached millions on his programme The Old Time Gospel Hour.

Ron Godwin, executive vice president for Liberty University, said Rev Falwell was found unresponsive in his office at about 1045 local time (1535 GMT) after missing an appointment.

Mr Godwin said: "Dr Falwell is a huge, huge leader here in this area and in the nation at large."

Controversial

Rev Al Sharpton said he was deeply saddened and was praying for the Falwell family. He said although he often disagreed with the reverend, they had a cordial relationship.

The BBC's Vanessa Heaney in Washington says Rev Falwell was a controversial figure who offended many.

But his alliance with Republicans in the 1980s was a key help in the elections of Ronald Reagan as president and many political leaders have since continued to seek his support.

Among them is Senator John McCain - a Republican contender for US president - who described him as "a man of distinguished accomplishment who devoted his life to serving his faith and country".

Rev Falwell was a strong opponent of abortion, homosexuality and many other issues that conflicted with his fundamentalist Christian beliefs.

His statements on feminism and race issues often outraged liberals.

In 2002, he sparked anger across the Muslim world by calling the Prophet Muhammad a "terrorist". He later apologised.

Shortly after the 11 September 2001 attacks, he said that gays, atheists, civil-rights activists and legal abortions in the US had angered God and "helped this happen".

In 1999, he denounced the BBC TV children's show The Teletubbies, because he believed one character, Tinky Winky, was homosexual.




Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/6659457.stm

Published: 2007/05/15 18:45:39 GMT

© BBC MMVII

519
3DHS / Germany, Sweden, Canada, among others, and now France....
« on: May 06, 2007, 02:01:09 PM »
...have all elected center-right governments in recent years. And unless he's caught in bed wirh a live boy or a dead girl, Tory David Cameron looks poised to be the next PM of the UK.

Looks like democratic socialism has started to lose it's luster. There's hope for Western Civilization yet.

French Voters Turn Out in Record Numbers
Email this Story

May 6, 11:39 AM (ET)

By ANGELA DOLAND


PARIS (AP) - French voters turned out Sunday in numbers not seen in nearly 40 years in a presidential election offering divergent choices for the future, with conservative Nicolas Sarkozy urging the French to work more and Socialist Segolene Royal pledging to safeguard welfare protections.

Surveys suggest Sarkozy, the son of a Hungarian immigrant, has a strong edge over Royal, who would become France's first female president if she wins. The most recent survey, taken by Ipsos/Dell on Friday, said he was leading 55 percent to her 45 percent.

As evening fell, turnout at the polls was at 75 percent in mainland France - the highest comparable rate on record, going back to 1969, the Interior Ministry said.

Both Sarkozy, who says he had to fight harder because of his foreign roots, and Royal, a mother of four who says she had to overcome sexism, are originals in French politics and energized an electorate craving new direction.

Whoever wins, the race marks a generational shift, because a 50-something will replace 74-year-old Jacques Chirac, in office for 12 years. But Sarkozy and Royal, nicknamed Sarko and Sego, have radically different formulas for how to revive France's sluggish economy, reverse its declining international clout and improve the lives of the impoverished residents of housing projects where largely minority youth rioted in 2005.

Sarkozy, 52, says France's 35-hour work week is absurd and proposes relaxing labor laws to encourage hiring. A former interior minister, Sarkozy cracked down on drunk driving, crime and illegal immigration.

He is an admirer of the United States who has borrowed from some American policy ideas. Tough-talking and blunt, he alienated many in France's housing projects when he called young delinquents "scum."

Police were quietly keeping watch for possible unrest Sunday night in France's poor, predominantly immigrant neighborhoods if Sarkozy is elected. Authorities in the Seine-Saint-Denis region northeast of Paris - the epicenter of the 2005 rioting - refused officers' requests for days off Sunday, one official said.

At a polling station near Paris' Champs-Elysees, Anne Combemale said she voted for Sarkozy because of his market-oriented economic platform.

"He has the willpower to change France," said Combemale, 43, who is unemployed.

To push through change, the winner will need a majority in French legislative elections in June. Sarkozy has drawn up a whirlwind program for his first 100 days in office and plans to put big reforms before parliament at a special session in July: One bill would make overtime pay tax-free to encourage people to work more, and another would put in place tougher sentencing for repeat offenders.

Royal, 53, is a former environment minister who believes France must keep its welfare protections strong. She wants to raise the minimum wage, create 500,000 state-funded starter jobs for youths and build 120,000 subsidized housing units a year. But she's also pragmatic and acknowledges that the 35-hour work week has had both benefits and drawbacks that she wants to smooth out.

Bechir Chakroun, a 26-year-old who works in marketing, said he liked Royal's commitment to helping the poor.

"She represents change, I want to see what a woman can do," he said.

Royal is strong on the environment and schools but has made a series of foreign policy gaffes - suggesting, for instance, that the Canadian province of Quebec deserved independence. During the campaign, Sarkozy's camp portrayed Royal as a lightweight with unclear ideas, while hers painted him as brutal, a bully - once Royal even called Sarkozy the "bogeyman."

If Royal loses, it will mark the Socialists' third straight defeat in presidential elections. The party managed to glue itself back together after splitting in two over the 2005 referendum on the proposed European constitution, when many of its leaders broke from the party line to urge the French to vote it down.

The rise of centrist candidate Francois Bayrou - who had a strong third-place showing in the first-round vote on April 22, though he was eliminated - suggests the Socialists will need soul-searching about whether to move toward the center like other leftist parties around Europe, or stick to their traditional alliances with the far-left.

This week, as poll numbers suggested Royal's chances were slim, she made a last-ditch effort to rip into Sarkozy, warning of the chance for new riots if he is elected and calling him "a dangerous choice" for France.

Sarkozy retorted in an interview published in Le Parisien newspaper's Web site: "I think that in the history of the Republic, we have never heard such violent or threatening comments."

http://apnews.excite.com/article/20070506/D8OUVDUG0.html


520
3DHS / Born in the USA
« on: April 25, 2007, 07:13:03 PM »
Born in the USA
By Nicholas Eberstadt
Posted: Thursday, April 19, 2007

ARTICLES
The American Interest  (Summer 2007)
Publication Date: April 19, 2007

   
The concept of "American exceptionalism" has been applied mainly to the political differences that separate the United States from the "Old World": the striking absence of any serious American socialist movement; the spirit of Manifest Destiny informing its foreign policy, and so on. But America's exceptionalism extends beyond the explicitly political and into the nation's very rhythms of birth and death. These rhythms constitute what may be described as American demographic exceptionalism.

Paradoxically, although the United States may well count as the "first new nation" (to borrow a phrase from the late Seymour Martin Lipset) to embark upon the project of democratic modernity, U.S. demographic patterns have not conformed to those of the world's other industrial democracies. On the contrary: After several decades of seeming convergence in population patterns in the early post-World War II era, we have witnessed more than a generation of strong and stubborn "demographic divergence" in population profiles between the United States on the one hand, and virtually all other OECD countries, on the other. And there are potentially even more dramatic divergences in store.

Two demographic tendencies separate the United States from virtually all other developed countries in Europe and Asia. The first is childbearing patterns: At a time when most rich countries report markedly low birth rates, U.S. fertility levels are close to long-term population replacement levels, making the United States peculiarly fecund for a contemporary affluent democracy. The second is immigration patterns: America's absorption of foreigners continues apace, with high and continuing inflows of immigrants from the Third World, but without (as yet) the symptoms of cultural indigestion that have lately troubled much of the European Union.

America's demographic exceptionalism would be a fascinating academic sidenote if the United States were today a tiny state, distant from the core of global power, as it was in 1790. But the United States is now the world's dominant power, as well as the most populous developed society: more than twice as large as Japan, three times as large as Germany and five times the size of France, Italy or Britain. America's exceptional demographic trends are therefore of interest not only to demographers and sociologists, but also to economists, strategists and policymakers looking at the international environment that awaits coming generations.

The Facts

From its earliest Colonial origins, childbearing was believed to be markedly higher in this frontier society than in the settled regions of Europe whence most Americans traced their roots. This American fertility premium was noted and discussed by leading thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic--Malthus in Britain, Crèvecoeur in France and Benjamin Franklin in America (who reportedly offered the vision of Americans "swarming across the countryside like locusts").

Those perceptions were grounded in demographic reality. The U.S. Bureau of the Census estimates a "total fertility rate" (TFR) in 1800 for America's whites of more than seven births per woman per lifetime, compared with contemporaneous rates of about 5.7 in England and 4.5 in France. Fertility levels were even higher for African-American slaves; the black TFR for the 1850s was nearly eight--a level more than 40 percent higher than for contemporary U.S. whites.

From this exceptionally high starting point, the United States moved more or less steadily over the course of the 19th century through a demographic transition toward lower death and birth rates. By 1900, the United States was the world's most modernized and affluent large country (excepting only Britain ), and with its white TFR by then down to 3.6, its fertility transition had progressed further than it had in most of its European counterparts (again, excepting England, as well as France).

After World War II, in the era of the developed world's baby boom, U.S. fertility levels once again jumped above Europe's. According to the UN Population Division, America's TFR in the 1950s was over 3.5, whereas Europe's was under 2.7--just three-fourths the U.S. level. But in the pervasive "baby bust" that followed, U.S. fertility declined even more sharply than Europe's, dropping to levels that, had they continued, would have presaged steady population decline in the absence of immigration. By 1976, America's "period" TFR was 1.74--lower than the fertility level of the EU--15 that same year, less than half of America's own level from the late 1950s and 18 percent lower than the requirements for longterm population stability.

At that juncture, standard-issue modernization theory seemed triumphant: Socio-economic development appeared to have brought about a basic convergence in fertility trends (at sub-replacement levels) for the world's developed regions. But a funny thing happened on the road to depopulation: America's fertility levels turned upward, and then persistently skirted replacement level. In 1989, America's period TFR rose slightly above two and has remained in that neighborhood ever since. In the 16 years from 1989 to 2004, America's TFR averaged 2.02 births per woman, suggesting a net replacement rate (NRR) of 98 percent from one birth cohort to the next.

America's limited but unmistakable fertility upsurge over the past generation marks a striking departure from trends for almost every other developed society. In the first half of this decade, according to UN Population Division projections, America's TFRs and NRRs were fully 50 percent higher than Japan's and about 45 percent higher than averages for Europe as a whole. Europe's overall fertility levels, to be sure, may currently be depressed by the post-communist demographic shocks that some former Soviet bloc countries (most notably Russia) in eastern Europe continue to experience. But even compared with the amalgam of west European societies, the U.S.-European fertility gap now looks like a yawning chasm. America's recent fertility trends have even opened a divide between the United States and Canada, countries that have long been regarded as demographic "twins." In 2004, the TFR in the United States was 35 percent higher than in Canada (with a still greater differential separating the United States and French-speaking Quebec province).

How can we explain the fertility gap now separating the United States from practically all the rest of the developed world? Experts worldwide have already begun to discuss two uniquely American social phenomena: first, America's increasingly multiethnic composition (due in large measure to high rates of net immigration), and second, the partly related phenomenon of American teenage fertility levels, which are famously high in relation to other contemporary affluent democracies. Yet however plausible such factors may sound, they cannot fully explain the gap.

Consider teenage childbearing patterns: Although America's high rates may be notorious within today's OECD societies, the fact is that U.S. teenage birthrates fell by about a third between 1990 and 2004, even though the overall U.S. TFR remained relatively high and steady. By 2004, moreover, teen births comprised just a tenth of all American births and about a tenth of America's overall TFR. In practical terms, that means that a total cessation of childbearing by women under twenty years old would still leave U.S. fertility levels more than 20 percent higher than western Europe's.

As for fertility differences by ethnicity in the United States, these are real enough, but it is easy to exaggerate their significance. With the single, albeit highly significant, exception of Hispanic Americans, fertility levels for U.S. minorities have largely been converging with the non-Hispanic majority. Indeed, average fertility levels for Asian Americans are almost identical to those for "Anglo" Americans, and Native American levels are now lower. While birth rates remain higher for African Americans than for Anglos, the current black-white differential (just 9 percent) is now the lowest it has been since the slavery era. The Hispanic-Anglo fertility gap, for its part, is mainly a matter of the high reported birth levels for Mexican Americans (whose calculated TFRs currently touch three). Some other Hispanic Americans register fertility levels fairly close to Anglo levels (for example, Puerto Ricans), or below them (Cuban Americans).

The single most important factor in explaining America's high fertility level these days is the birth rate of the country's Anglo majority, who still account for roughly 55 percent of U.S. births. Over the past decade and a half, the TFR for non-Hispanic white Americans averaged 1.82 births per woman per lifetime--subreplacement, but more than 20 percent higher than corresponding national levels for western Europe, and much higher if one compares "Anglo" TFRs with those of western Europe's native born populations.

The Reasons

What accounts for Anglo America's unexpectedly high and stable propensity to reproduce? Carefully tailored pro-natalist government policies certainly cannot explain it: The United States has none. By the same token, U.S. labor patterns do not seem especially "family-friendly." Americans work longer hours and enjoy less vacation time than any of their European friends across the Atlantic, and none of the economic or policy explanations for the growing fertility gap between U.S. Anglos and west Europeans offers a satisfying explanation.

The main explanation for the U.S.-Europe fertility gap may lie not in material factors but in the seemingly ephemeral realm of values, ideals, attitudes and outlook. Public opinion surveys, for example, have thoroughly established that Americans tend to be more optimistic about the future than Europeans--a disposition that could weigh on the decision to bring children into the world. Similarly, more Americans report being "proud" of their country than do Europeans, which, quite plausibly, could lead to more births. All else equal, patriotism or nationalism may conduce to higher birth rates. Most portentously, perhaps, survey data indicate that the United States is still in the main a believing Christian country, with a high percentage of households actively worshipping on a monthly or weekly basis. In striking contrast to western Europe, which is often provocatively (but not unfairly) described as a post-Christian territory these days, religion is alive and well in the United States.

It is not hard to imagine how the religiosity gap between America and Europe translates into a fertility gap. Unfortunately, the proposition is devilishly difficult to test. Although the United States is (in Pitirim Sorokin's term) a "quantophrenic" society, hungry for all manner of facts and figures, a more than three-decadeold Federal law expressly forbids the U.S. Census Bureau from posing questions to the citizenry about religious affiliation. This specific stricture has evolved into a broader general operational posture within the U.S. Federal statistical system that information on the religious beliefs of U.S. citizens should only be collected, if at all, under truly exceptional circumstances. Consequently, there are virtually no official national data for the United States that would permit a rigorous testing of the hypothesis that America's religiosity is directly related to its childbearing. Attempts to connect those two factors on the basis of broad, aggregate observations and trends run the risks of committing what statisticians call the "ecological fallacy"--mistakenly associating two unrelated phenomena for want of examining relationships at the individual level. For the time being, at least, this proposition must remain a speculation.

The United States has historically also been and remains a nation populated overwhelmingly by immigrants. Immigration, both legal and illegal, remains a central feature of the country's demographic life. The 2000 census count hinted at the scale of illegal immigration by noting that there were six million more residents than the "intra-census projection" had prepared U.S. officials to expect.

Western Europe has experienced its own influx of newcomers over the past generation, but in both relative and absolute terms the influx of migrants to the United States has significantly exceeded the European influx. U.S. Census estimates and projections place net migration into western Europe over the past decade (1996-2005) at roughly 740,000 persons a year, about 1.9 migrants per thousand of the settled population. The corresponding U.S. figures are about 980,000 a year and a rate of 3.5 per thousand. Some developed societies have net immigration rates today that are higher than America's--Australia, Canada and New Zealand, for example. But no large country today (defined as having at least fifty million people) has a rate even close to that of the United States. While the United States accounts for a fourth of the population of the so-called "developed regions" (including east-central Europe and Russia), it accounts for nearly half of the area's annual net migration.

In purely arithmetic terms, America's high flows of net immigration do explain much of the country's steady population growth. Currently, about a third of the U.S. annual demographic increase can be attributed to net immigration, but new descendants of immigrants account for an even greater share of that annual change. In fact, depending upon how far back we set the benchmark, we could ascribe virtually all U.S. population growth to immigrants and their progeny. A good benchmark would be 1965, the year when U.S. immigration laws were thoroughly liberalized and much higher and more geographically diverse quotas superseded the restrictive legislation of 1924.

Estimating the precise proportion of U.S. population growth since 1965 due to immigrants and their descendants is a little trickier than one might think, however. To my knowledge, no published work has attempted it. Jeffrey Passel of the Urban Institute suggests in unpublished estimates that about 53 percent of U.S. population growth since 1965 can be broadly ascribed to immigration. America's population has grown by more than 100 million over that period--from about 194 million in midyear 1965 to just over 300 million at present--this means that post-1965 immigrants and their descendants account for well over fifty million Americans, or more than a sixth of its residents.

The foreign-born population of the United States is now more than 33 million, nearly 12 percent of the total. In many urban areas, the proportion of immigrants is considerably higher. The 2000 census, for example, found that 22 percent Chicago's population was foreign- born. Corresponding proportions exceed 30 percent for Boston, 35 percent for both New York and San Francisco, and 40 percent for Los Angeles. Since less than a fifth of these migrants originated from Europe, Canada or Australia, America's new wave of immigration is overwhelmingly non-European. More than a fourth of America's foreign born, for example, now come from Asia. An estimated 52 percent of the newcomers are Latin American, with Mexican-born immigrants accounting in turn for the majority of these Latinos. The Census Bureau estimates that more than nine million Mexican-born men, women and children live in the United States today, more than half of them illegally.

America's latest wave of immigration has certainly exacerbated certain domestic tensions. Certainly, it has stimulated an undeniable measure of "nativist" political backlash. (Witness the law passed last October for erecting what would be the world's largest fence, a gigantic 700-mile barrier along the U.S.-Mexico border, and continuing proposals to seal off the rest of the border as well.) Furthermore, post-9/11 America now views the idea that seven million or more people have entered the country illegally through the prism of national security.

Yet when all is said and done, America's new immigrants are assimilating tolerably well, in the pattern of earlier historical migrations to the United States. Despite the high concentration of relatively poor, and poorly educated, immigrants in big cities, America's urban areas have not become tinderboxes for violent unrest by the foreign-born, unlike contemporary Europe. Furthermore, despite alarums that "some" immigrants (code language for Mexicans) are failing to assimilate or are positively resisting assimilation, the evidence points in the opposite direction. (A recent study in Southern California, for instance, suggests that Spanish-speaking at home among Mexican Americans declines steadily from one generation to the next, at a pace similar to the decline of foreign "kitchen talk" in America's highly successful Korean and Chinese immigrant communities)   

The United Sates has experienced anti-immigrant paroxysms in the past (such as the one resulting in the 1924 Immigration Act). Economic historian Jeffrey G. Williamson has argued that the last great U.S. crackdown on immigration was decades in the making, bringing to a flashpoint tendencies that had been gathering from the 1890s. This was an era, Williamson recalls, characterized by rising economic differences, high volumes of migration, significant pressure on wages for low-skilled native-born Americans, and gradually increasing political calls for immigration restrictions. In this earlier era, Williamson argues, America's radical immigration rollback was finally catalyzed by a "triggering event"--namely, World War I. Williamson's analysis is compelling precisely because so many of those same social, economic and political tendencies are gathering in the United States today. It thus begs the question: Could a new triggering event lead to a similar anti-immigration policy?

The Future

American fertility and immigration trends cannot be forecast with any great accuracy over the coming generation (nor can they be for any other developed country). However, if American demographic exceptionalism continues for another decade or so, the consequences could be truly profound.

Just what such exceptionalism would portend may be seen by comparing U.S. Census Bureau projections for the United States and western Europe for 2025. These projections assume a gradual improvement in life expectancies in both regions. More critically, they posit an increase in both west European and American TFRs (to 1.62 and 2.18, respectively, in 2025) and a slight absolute decline in average annual net migration for both regions (to about 700,000 and 900,000, respectively). Some reputable demographers quibble with these assumptions (the United Nations Population Division's "medium variant", for example, envisions that U.S. TFR will drop below 1.9 by 2025). In any case, these projections vividly illustrate the longer-term implications of continuing American demographic exceptionalism.

In demographic terms, western Europe and the United States would be strikingly different places two decades hence. Western Europe's total population would be shrinking despite continuing immigration, while America's would still be growing by about 2.8 million a year. Western Europe would be much "grayer" than the United States, with a median age of 46 years (as against 39 years) and nearly 23 percent of all people 65 or older (versus 18 percent in America). In this future, children under 15 would make up just a seventh of western Europe's population, but nearly a fifth of the U.S. population. Senior citizens (65 and older) would outnumber children (under 15) in western Europe by a ratio of roughly 1.6 to one, while the United States would still have more children than seniors.

Although western Europe's total population would still exceed America's by around fifty million in absolute terms (400 million versus 350 million), all of that differential would accrue from older age groups (fifty and older), with the balance weighted especially toward septuagenarians and octogenarians. For the under-25 population, on the other hand, Americans would outnumber west Europeans.

America's prospective demographic divergence will affect not only Europe, but the entire developed world--and indeed beyond.

By these same Census Bureau projections for 2025, America's population growth rate would be the highest among the more developed regions, and America's median age, apart from fascinating exceptions like Albania, would rank toward the bottom. The United States would also be the only developed country of more than fifty million people with more children than senior citizens, and the only developed country at all whose working-age population (15-64) would be growing.

Moreover, America's population trends presage a demographic divergence not only with western Europe, but also China--the nation widely regarded as today's leading contender for rising global power. Thanks to decades of sub-replacement fertility--a consequence at least in part of Beijing's relentless and coercive birth control program--China's population growth stands to decelerate sharply, and its society to age dramatically, over the coming generation.

Under current projections for the year 2025 the United States looks to be a more youthful country than China by such criteria as median age. In 2025, furthermore, China's 15-64 labor force will have been shrinking in total size for more than a decade; the corresponding U.S. manpower pool is expected to be increasing, albeit modestly. Perhaps even more striking, population projections by both the U.S. Census Bureau and the UN Population Division envision the absolute annual population growth of the United States to exceed China's by 2025.

To the extent that population structure influences economic performance, America's exceptional demographic profile could confer developmental advantages on U.S. society. All else equal, America's relatively youthful population should experience less pressing burdens from pension and health costs in the years ahead than the rest of the world's more elderly developed democracies. A growing labor force offers opportunities for innovation, start-up and reallocation of productive resources that a declining workforce does not. The best-educated elements of any developed country's workforce tend to be the youngest entrants, but while that group stands to shrink in relative and absolute terms throughout the developed world as a whole over the next two decades, America's pool of young manpower will almost certainly continue to grow.

Beyond population composition, absolute numbers also matter in international affairs. America's aggregate population size has an incalculable but nonetheless genuine bearing on the country's global predominance today. The United States is the world's third-largest country (after only China and India), and projections suggest it will remain number three in the next few decades.

With its exceptional and robust projected population growth, America is also poised to account for an increasing share of the total population of the present developed countries. Whereas the ratio of Americans to Russians today is a little more than two-to-one, by 2025 that ratio may be almost three-to-one. There are 3.6 Americans for every German today; there will be 4.4 per German in 2025. There are five Americans for every Italian today; there will be six per Italian in less than two decades. And so forth. Such trends might reinforce U.S. international predominance, even though the divergence in demographic profiles between the United States and the rest may also portend an era of diminishing affinities between the United and its historical Western allies.

Assessing the implications of such unfolding trends is, of course, speculative. But as these projections show, U.S. demographic exceptionalism is not only here today; it will be here tomorrow, as well. It is by no means beyond the realm of the possible that America's demographic profile will look even more exceptional a generation hence than it does today. If the American moment passes, or U.S. power in other ways declines, it won't be because of demography.

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at AEI

http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25988/pub_detail.asp

521
3DHS / Democratic politicians lose a soapbox with firing of Don Imus
« on: April 14, 2007, 02:51:07 AM »
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-imuspol13apr13,0,2734444.story?coll=la-home-headlines
THE IMUS SCANDAL: POLITICAL IMPACT

Democratic politicians lose a soapbox with firing of Don Imus
His show helped many of them reach a national audience of white males -- a crucial voting bloc.
By Peter Wallsten
Times Staff Writer

April 13, 2007

WASHINGTON — They came by the hundreds that hot August day in tiny Johnson City, Tenn., gathering on an asphalt parking lot to meet Rep. Harold E. Ford Jr. It was not just that he might become the state's first black senator. More than that, even in Republican eastern Tennessee, the Democratic congressman was a celebrity — a regular guest on Don Imus' radio show.

And today, with Imus' career in tatters, the fate of the controversial shock jock is stirring quiet but heartfelt concern in an unlikely quarter: among Democratic politicians.

That's because, over the years, Democrats such as Ford came to count on Imus for the kind of sympathetic treatment that Republicans got from Rush Limbaugh or Sean Hannity.

Equally important, Imus gave Democrats a pipeline to a crucial voting bloc that was perennially hard for them to reach: politically independent white men.

With Imus' show canceled indefinitely because of his remarks about the Rutgers University women's basketball team, some Democratic strategists are worried about how to fill the void. For a national radio audience of white men, Democrats see few if any alternatives.

"This is a real bind for Democrats," said Dan Gerstein, an advisor to one of Imus' favorite regulars, Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.). "Talk radio has become primarily the province of the right, and the blogosphere is largely the province of the left. If Imus loses his microphone, there aren't many other venues like it around."

Jim Farrell, a former aide to 2000 presidential candidate and Imus regular Bill Bradley, said the firing "creates a vacuum."

This week, when Sen. Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.) was asked by CNN why he picked Imus' show to announce his presidential candidacy, Dodd explained: "He's got a huge audience; he gives you enough time to talk, not a 30-second sound bite, a chance to explain your views; … and a chance to reach the audience who doesn't always watch the Sunday morning talk shows."

Though Imus was a regular destination for the likes of Dodd, Ford, Lieberman, 2004 Democratic presidential nominee Sen. John F. Kerry and others — as well as such GOP figures as Sen. John McCain of Arizona — his influence has long been debated.

Talkers Magazine ranks him far below Limbaugh and liberal Ed Schultz in terms of power. His audience is dwarfed by many others, and he is not heard in some major markets [though his show was simulcast on cable TV]. One senior Democratic strategist, requesting anonymity to avoid insulting some of his party's power players, said the show was no more than a "locker room for middle-age politicians."

Not all high-level Democrats were drawn to the self-styled "I-Man." Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.), a party presidential front-runner and a frequent target of Imus' jokes, said she never had the desire to appear.

Sen. Barack Obama (D-Ill.), the other current front-runner, appeared once — but he was the first presidential candidate to call this week for Imus' ouster.

Ford strategists believe his relationship with Imus was central to earning credibility in the eyes of white voters in conservative regions of Tennessee. "That's how I got to know Harold, seeing him on Imus," said Ben Scharfstein, owner of the One Stop convenience store in Johnson City, who turned over his parking lot that August day for the campaign event.

But even Scharfstein said he had now had it with Imus. "I'm going to have to turn Don off now," he said. "His ego has gotten ahead of himself, and that's not worth watching."

And Ford was hardly leaping to the defense of his radio ally despite repeated on-air pleas from Imus to appear in his defense. Ford on Thursday called Imus' statements "reprehensible," though he added that Imus was a friend and a "decent man."

peter.wallsten@latimes.com

Staff writer Robin Abcarian contributed to this report.



522
3DHS / High-end dog shop's sign raises neighbors' hackles
« on: April 02, 2007, 02:00:44 PM »
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/304644_highmaintenance22.html

High-end dog shop's sign raises neighbors' hackles

Thursday, February 22, 2007

By ANDREA JAMES
P-I REPORTER

If dogs desired sparkly jewelry, glittery makeup and sweet smells just like many little human girls, they'd feel like princesses in this newly opened Wallingford store.

Luckily for the founders of High Maintenance Bitch, which sells high-end pooch products, little princesses eventually grow into women dog owners -- preferably with spare cash and a strong affinity for double-entendres.
    

"Our company is probably the most high-end pet brand in the world," co-founder Lori Pacchiano said.

Though Paris Hilton and Tyra Banks may coo over products such as Gel-ous Bitch bath gel and Street Walker paw cleanser, the store has drawn the ire of some Wallingford residents who dislike the sign that hangs outside the company's flagship boutique.

"I am probably the most progressive liberal person in the world and I am personally offended by the sign," said Janet Stillman, executive director of the Wallingford Neighborhood Office. "It's so blatant and so in your face."

"Bitch" is the most prominent word on the sign, and it can be seen clearly from North 45th Street and Wallingford Avenue North -- a main intersection.

Pacchiano plans to meet today with the Wallingford Chamber of Commerce to address concerns, she said.

About a dozen people have complained, said Kara Ceriello, chamber co-president. Though she intends to support the boutique, she said that Wallingford residents are naturally educated, opinionated and vocal.
    
"It is going to be a hot issue again when we get to our Wallingford Kiddie Parade and Street Fair," she said.

Stillman fears that the sign will ruin family photos of the summer parade.

"It's the kind of sign that might've got by on Capitol Hill because Capitol Hill is the way it is. But Wallingford is not like that," she said.

"Walk by there with your 5-year-old and try to explain why that sign is there. Half of the sign is made up of the word 'bitch.' "

But if Pacchiano and her brother, Ryan Pacchiano, have their way, the word will be appearing in malls across the country. The company is interviewing angel investors and hopes to make the brand name as recognizable as Victoria's Secret.

Pacchiano said one of her goals is reclaiming the word "bitch" -- so that it only means female dog and not something derogatory toward women.

"Our store is a dog store, but the concept and philosophy is directed specifically toward women," she said.

At a cost of about $200,000 each, the Pacchianos hope to open 10 stores over the next three years. "We want to be known for growing from Seattle," Lori said.

Lori, 36, and Ryan, 27, started making pet feather boas in their grandmother's North Seattle garage five years ago. They were inspired by Lola, Lori's Boston terrier.

Today, the brand is sold internationally and the products are included in the celebrity gift baskets at the Golden Globe Awards. The Wallingford store displays photos of star customers such as Barbara Walters and Debra Messing. The products are all "human food grade" quality and made by Puget Sound-area manufacturers.

Through angel investors, the Pacchianos hope to grab a bigger piece of the growing luxury pet products market. American spending on pet goods and medicines grew to about $9.3 billion in 2006, much of that growth in the luxury market, according to the American Pet Products Manufacturers Association.

In January, High Maintenance Bitch moved its flagship boutique, owned by Jean Powell, from Lynnwood to Wallingford. The Pacchianos also retracted their trademark licensing agreements and closed a shop in Poulsbo and one on Capitol Hill.

Customer flow into the Wallingford boutique has been steady, they said.
    
On Wednesday afternoon, 3-year-old Italian greyhound Annie -- short for Princess Annabella -- ran into the store and peed on the floor. Then she looked into a stand-up oval mirror, adjusted to four-legged height.

Her owner, Suzanne Hansen, 35, of Bellevue, planned on buying a collar and body spray. But first, staffers showed off the paw nail polish and Whiskara -- a sparkly mascara for dogs.

"She's sparkly. Sparkly dog," Hansen said, bouncing Annie on each syllable.

Like most customers, Hansen said the "bitch" concept is funny. "People who are in the dog world seem to know that bitch is a female dog," she said.

To ban the sign would be a violation of free speech, said Alan Justad, spokesman for the city of Seattle's Department of Planning and Development. The city regulates size and placement, but not language, he said.

Five companies in Washington, including High Maintenance Bitch, have the word in their names, including Bimbo's Bitchin' Burrito Kitchen LLC, according to the secretary of state's corporations database.

High Maintenance's former locations drew some scrutiny, but not enough to shut down the shops.

Stuart Leidner, executive director of the Greater Poulsbo Chamber of Commerce, said that a few people complained about the store when it was located there, but there wasn't a "huge public outcry."

Lynnwood city planning manager Ron Hough said that outrage surfaced and evaporated. "It stirred the attention of a few people -- always people who'd go by and saw the sign and covered their kids' eyes real quick," Hough said. "... We didn't consider it obscene or illegal in anyway."

Wallingford residents walking by on Wednesday had mixed reactions.

"That's terrible. I don't think it should be there," said Claudia Wyman, 61, of Ballard as she passed by the sign. "Who put it there and why?"

Her grandson, Chris Elwell, 15, said, "People might get the wrong idea, but I know they're not using it, like, the wrong way."

P-I reporter Andrea James can be reached at 206-448-8124 or andreajames@seattlepi.com.

© 1998-2007 Seattle Post-Intelligencer

523
3DHS / The surprising truth about America's infant-mortality rate
« on: March 19, 2007, 02:54:45 PM »
medical examiner
Baby Gap
The surprising truth about America's infant-mortality rate.
By Darshak Sanghavi
Posted Friday, March 16, 2007, at 7:10 AM ET

Last year, a widely distributed report from the group Save the Children, funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, tied the United States with Malta and Slovakia for the second-worst infant-mortality rate among developed nations (at about six per 1,000 live births). "I'm always amazed to see where the United States is," a Rand researcher said of the list. "We are the wealthiest country in the world," a Save the Children spokesperson agreed, yet many "are not getting the health care they need."

Comparing infant mortality rates between countries is fraught with uncertainty—after all, it's hard to argue that every country's figures are reliable. But it's still worth asking what more we can do to stop babies from dying. Defined as death before one year of age, infant mortality frequently gets framed in the United States as a problem of insufficient health-care funding. In December, for example, a New York Times column blamed it on the lack of a single-payer health insurer. However, a closer look reveals the counterintuitive possibility that high infant mortality in the United States might be the unintended side effect of increased spending on medical care.

Infant deaths in poor nations are roughly six times more common than in developed areas and result mainly from easily treated infections like diarrhea in the first few months. By contrast, the majority of deaths in developed countries result from extreme prematurity or birth defects that kill a newborn in the first few days or weeks of life. According to a 2002 analysis by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, at least a third of all infant mortality in the United States arises from complications of prematurity; other studies assert the figure is closer to half. Thus—at the risk of oversimplifying—infant mortality in the United States principally is a problem of premature birth, which today complicates just over one in 10 pregnancies.

To reduce infant mortality, then, we need to prevent premature births, and if that fails, improve care of premature babies once born. (Prematurity is also linked to other problems; for example, it's the leading cause of mental retardation and cerebral palsy in children.) But modern medicine isn't good at preventing prematurity—just the opposite. Better and more affordable medical care actually has worsened the rate of prematurity, and likely the rate of infant mortality, by making fertility treatment widespread. According to a 2006 Institute of Medicine report, the numbers of women using assistive reproductive technology doubled from 1996 to 2002. At least half of their pregnancies culminated in multiple births (twins or more), which are at high risk of premature delivery.

Meanwhile, no amount of money or resources seems to reduce the rate of preterm births. Take prevention: Of numerous strategies, an inexhaustive list includes enhanced prenatal care, improved maternal nutrition, treatment of vaginal infections, better maternal dental care, monitors to detect early labor, bed rest, better hydration, and programs for smoking cessation. But, as well described in an erudite 1998 review in the New England Journal of Medicine by researchers at the University of Alabama, none of these strategies has had a substantial impact on the risk of preterm birth in clinical trials. (Of course, some of them, like better prenatal care, may be good for other reasons.) Despite a doubling of health-care spending as a portion of the gross domestic product since 1981, the rate of preterm birth has jumped 30 percent.

If preventing early birth is impossible, can we improve treatment of preemies? One promising way to reduce death after premature birth is a dirt-cheap steroid shot for mothers in preterm labor. Endorsed for over a decade by the National Institutes of Health and the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, the shot is one of the only maneuvers proven to help preemies before they are born. The injection jump-starts the fetus's lungs, so the baby is better prepared to breathe when born. Unfortunately, because of substandard practice, at some hospitals only about half of eligible women get the shot.

That leaves lots of sick preemies for the neonatologist. Most preemies depend on advanced neonatal care for survival. And there have been advances, particularly the discovery of surfactant to treat immature lungs. However, just as better funding for infertility treatment worsened premature-birth rates, more money quite possibly may harm the quality of neonatal intensive care.

How can that be? Today, neonatal intensive care is extremely lucrative, on average costing tens of thousands of dollars per preterm child. Neonatologists are among the highest paid pediatric subspecialists, and neonatal intensive-care units (NICUs, for short) are hospital cash cows—which is why the units are proliferating wildly nationwide. Yet in a startling 2002 New England Journal of Medicine study, David Goodman and his colleagues showed that the regional supply of neonatologists and NICUs bore no relation to actual need, implying that some doctors and hospitals set up shop simply because there was money to be made. More disturbingly, areas with more beds and doctors don't have lower infant-mortality rates. The authors ominously suggest that "infants might be harmed by the availability of higher levels of resources." They argue that the availability of a NICU may mean that infants with less-serious illnesses may be admitted to one and then "subjected to more intensive diagnostic and therapeutic measures, with the attendant risks."

Too many NICUs are also bad for babies because hospitals that handle a high volume of sick preemies have better outcomes. A 1996 study in the Journal of the American Medical Association confirmed this, concluding that concentrating high-risk deliveries in a smaller number of hospitals could reduce infant-death rates without increasing costs, and other studies have since concurred. (Increasing evidence suggests that experienced, high-volume centers may also save more full-term newborns with major birth defects, like congenital heart problems.)

Throwing money at unproven programs for preventing prematurity, or at cash-cow NICUs, won't improve America's infant-morality rate. Instead, it's critical to follow the data—which suggest that we need fewer, not more, hospitals to take care of the sickest babies. One reasonable suggestion is to cut funding for neonatal intensive care, since the money now is too good to encourage economies of scale (i.e., a few hospitals with high-volume NICUs). Another strategy, endorsed by patient-safety organizations like the Leapfrog Group, is for insurers to steer patients only to high-volume centers. Less money and less patient choice sound heretical—but, in this case, eminently sensible.
Darshak Sanghavi is a pediatric cardiologist and assistant professor of pediatrics at the University of Massachusetts Medical School. He is the author of A Map of the Child: A Pediatrician's Tour of the Body.

Article URL: http://www.slate.com/id/2161899/

Copyright 2007 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. LLC

524
3DHS / Sun May Be Warming Both Earth and Mars
« on: March 04, 2007, 01:21:50 PM »
Mars Melt Hints at Solar, Not Human, Cause for Warming, Scientist Says
Kate Ravilious
for National Geographic News
February 28, 2007

Simultaneous warming on Earth and Mars suggests that our planet's recent climate changes have a natural—and not a human- induced—cause, according to one scientist's controversial theory.

Earth is currently experiencing rapid warming, which the vast majority of climate scientists says is due to humans pumping huge amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. (Get an overview: "Global Warming Fast Facts".)

Mars, too, appears to be enjoying more mild and balmy temperatures.

In 2005 data from NASA's Mars Global Surveyor and Odyssey missions revealed that the carbon dioxide "ice caps" near Mars's south pole had been diminishing for three summers in a row.

Habibullo Abdussamatov, head of the St. Petersburg's Pulkovo Astronomical Observatory in Russia, says the Mars data is evidence that the current global warming on Earth is being caused by changes in the sun.

"The long-term increase in solar irradiance is heating both Earth and Mars," he said.

Solar Cycles

Abdussamatov believes that changes in the sun's heat output can account for almost all the climate changes we see on both planets.

Mars and Earth, for instance, have experienced periodic ice ages throughout their histories.

"Man-made greenhouse warming has made a small contribution to the warming seen on Earth in recent years, but it cannot compete with the increase in solar irradiance," Abdussamatov said.

By studying fluctuations in the warmth of the sun, Abdussamatov believes he can see a pattern that fits with the ups and downs in climate we see on Earth and Mars.

Abdussamatov's work, however, has not been well received by other climate scientists.

"His views are completely at odds with the mainstream scientific opinion," said Colin Wilson, a planetary physicist at England's Oxford University.

"And they contradict the extensive evidence presented in the most recent IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] report." (Related: "Global Warming 'Very Likely' Caused by Humans, World Climate Experts Say" [February 2, 2007].)

Amato Evan, a climate scientist at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, added that "the idea just isn't supported by the theory or by the observations."

Planets' Wobbles

The conventional theory is that climate changes on Mars can be explained primarily by small alterations in the planet's orbit and tilt, not by changes in the sun.

"Wobbles in the orbit of Mars are the main cause of its climate change in the current era," Oxford's Wilson explained. (Related: "Don't Blame Sun for Global Warming, Study Says" [September 13, 2006].)

All planets experience a few wobbles as they make their journey around the sun. Earth's wobbles are known as Milankovitch cycles and occur on time scales of between 20,000 and 100,000 years.

These fluctuations change the tilt of Earth's axis and its distance from the sun and are thought to be responsible for the waxing and waning of ice ages on Earth.

Mars and Earth wobble in different ways, and most scientists think it is pure coincidence that both planets are between ice ages right now.

"Mars has no [large] moon, which makes its wobbles much larger, and hence the swings in climate are greater too," Wilson said.

No Greenhouse

Perhaps the biggest stumbling block in Abdussamatov's theory is his dismissal of the greenhouse effect, in which atmospheric gases such as carbon dioxide help keep heat trapped near the planet's surface.

He claims that carbon dioxide has only a small influence on Earth's climate and virtually no influence on Mars.

But "without the greenhouse effect there would be very little, if any, life on Earth, since our planet would pretty much be a big ball of ice," said Evan, of the University of Wisconsin.

Most scientists now fear that the massive amount of carbon dioxide humans are pumping into the air will lead to a catastrophic rise in Earth's temperatures, dramatically raising sea levels as glaciers melt and leading to extreme weather worldwide.

Abdussamatov remains contrarian, however, suggesting that the sun holds something quite different in store.

"The solar irradiance began to drop in the 1990s, and a minimum will be reached by approximately 2040," Abdussamatov said. "It will cause a steep cooling of the climate on Earth in 15 to 20 years."

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/02/070228-mars-warming.html

525
3DHS / Kicking the Crotch of America.... Round II
« on: March 01, 2007, 05:37:44 PM »
Giuliani Will Meet The Right

BY RYAN SAGER
March 1, 2007
URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/49557

When Mayor Giuliani takes the stage at the Conservative Political Action Conference at the Omni Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C., at noon tomorrow, it will mark the end of a long, strange, fitful anti-courtship between the man increasingly known as "Rudy" and a venerable right-wing institution that just doesn't know what to make of a crime-fighting, welfare-reforming, abortion-supporting, drag-wearing foreign-policy hawk.

CPAC is the conservative movement's annual family reunion. Two years ago, Mr. Giuliani was the black sheep. Though he won the yearly CPAC presidential straw poll in 2005, measuring the mood primarily of younger convention-goers, he was decidedly persona non grata with the higher-ups. The former mayor, known for his leadership after the September 11, 2001, attacks, asked to speak — he even offered to waive his usual fee — but was flatly rebuffed. "I would assume he wanted to come here to boost his conservative credentials, but we didn't think that would be useful," David Keene, the head of the American Conservative Union, which runs CPAC, sniffed at the time to a Rudy-friendly columnist, Deroy Murdock.

That, of course, was in the heady days after President Bush's reelection, when conservatives thought the good times would never stop rolling. Cut to a year later: In 2006, as the GOP's fortunes began to sag, Mr. Keene extended Mr. Giuliani an invitation, but it was a grudging (and last-minute) one. "A lot of people wanted to hear him on the terror question, so we invited him," Mr. Keene told me at the time — taking care to add, "If you ask me if he's a viable candidate for anything: no." Mr. Giuliani chose to stay away, citing prior engagements. Mr. Keene said the mayor had a standing invitation for 2007. Cut to this month, with the Republican Party in free fall — Congress lost, Mr. Bush's approval ratings in the gutter, and the fortunes of more conventional conservatives such as Senator McCain of Arizona and the former governor of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney, fading — and it could hardly be a more auspicious time for the now-indisputable front-runner for the Republican nomination to come face-to-face with the wary base. But wait. If the base is really so wary, how exactly is Mr. Giuliani so far ahead in the polls?

The fact is, the base is already fairly comfortable with Mr. Giuliani and is quite seriously considering his candidacy. It's primarily a few gatekeepers — such as Mr. Keene, Focus on the Family head James Dobson, and Richard Land, president of the Southern Baptist Convention's Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission — who stand truly dead-set against him. And these gatekeepers are becoming increasingly irrelevant in a party that wants to find its way out of the political wilderness and, to some extent, blames the more extreme elements of the religious right for leading it into the woods in the first place.

The polling on this point is unambiguous. (It has been for well over a year now, but people are only now finally beginning to believe it.) Mr. Giuliani is far and away the front-runner in the race for the Republican nomination. And that support comes not from moderate or liberal Republicans, but from conservatives — including the white evangelicals who have made up such an important part of Mr. Bush's base.

Is Mr. Giuliani going to run away with the nomination? The early signs certainly point in that direction. He's leading Mr. McCain in Iowa; he's in spitting distance of Mr. McCain in New Hampshire, where the Arizona senator made his mark with the help of political independents in 2000; he's polling strong down South (though trailing in South Carolina), and the prospect of a California-New York-Florida primary in early February 2008 is nothing but good news for America's mayor.

Meanwhile, Mr. Giuliani seems to have a certain charisma, a certain likability factor, that's going to make it hard for anyone else to catch up. And that's not a matter of opinion. It's a measurable phenomenon. A Gallup poll released at the beginning of last month had some truly astonishing numbers. Don't tell Al Sharpton, but Mr. Giuliani is considered "more likeable" than Mr. McCain by Republicans and Republican leaners by 74% to 21% (a spread of 53 points). These same folks say Mr. Giuliani would be "better in a crisis" by a margin of 40 points. They think he "would do more to unite the country" by 37 points.

The reception Mr. Giuliani gets at CPAC tomorrow will be telling. Two years ago, even a year ago, he could have gotten a hero's welcome — a thank you for his service on September 11 and little scrutiny otherwise, with the presidential contest so far away. Not so here in early 2007. By the time this crowd meets again, the primary could be all but decided. Tomorrow will be a time for sizing up, a time for kicking the tires, a time for some tough questions from a room filled with people who could hardly have imagined a former mayor of New York City being the frontrunner for the Republican nomination just a few years ago.

Because, after all, the conservative movement has to begin dealing with the fact that Mr. Giuliani is now not only the "viable candidate" Mr. Keene denied he was, but far more — he is the front-runner.

    Mr. Sager is the online editor of The New York Sun. He can be reached at rsager@nysun.com.

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