Only One is Needed

[Universe Prince]

Yes, Domer, I am sure you could toy with me, what with your vast intellect and all. Again I say that you have allowed your preconceived assumptions to interfere with your understanding of the conversation. I have not argued that rights are self-evident. I have argued that Jefferson claiming "all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" as self-evident was not the equivalent of "because I say so". And I even admitted in my exchange with Xavier that the fact I had to explain the idea of all men being equal meant idea was not self-evident. So frankly, Domer, I really don't feel like trying to let you pin me down to a position that I'm not advocating.

I might be more inclined to try to discuss with you what I believe about this if I did not also believe that your only concern here is to try to denigrate anything I have to say with some sort of shallow dismissal about how childish you think I am. You have a pattern of that behavior, and so I just don't trust you, Domer. JS was willing to support his position about rights and the idea of them not being self-evident with some reasonable argumentation. What about you? Are you willing to explain your own position in a reasonable conversation, or did you just stop by to take a piss?

[Plane]

The utility of this line of inquiry has probably run its course. Instead of flogging the moribund nag, would it be more productive to list (and explain why) certain "rights" are so inherent in the nature of man so as to be "self-evident"?

Is the right to live not self evident?

If not , what right matters?

People establsh governments to help garuntee their rights , who would want to have a government that was no help with that?

[domer]

Please correct me if I'm wrong: you recognize the rights stated by Jefferson to be self-evident, but then deny that rights are self-evident because you have to explain them. OK, conceding that apparent contradiction and overlooking it as immaterial, I am nonetheless interested in what rights you consider "essential" or "fundamental," springing as they do from the nature of man, and why we must recognize this ideal even in the presence of the most exaggerated real-world derogation of those very rights. This is not a trick question, nor is it an attempt to trip you up, for two independent reasons: 1) the nature of man -- and not the abstract though undefined or unspecified set of rights forming the ideal -- is a much more heuristic focus; and 2) the battle you seem to be waging appears to be neo-Platonic, that is, based on a series of essences, an approach at odds with modern philosophy, especially the positivistic school, which holds, roughly, that which exists is that which is, well, perceptible. One approach (yours) seems to depend on deductive reasoning; the other (positivism) depends the inductive, scientific method. This can be a fruitful discussion.

[Universe Prince]

That I recognize rights exist does not mean I believe they are necessarily self-evident to everyone. I recognize the rights, and I recognize that they are not self-evident to everyone. I do not know why you find that contradictory.

The three most fundamental rights, in my thinking, are the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to property. And yet even these can all come down to one right, the right to property because fundamentally the concept of rights is based on the notion of a human being as an individual owning himself. I realize this is a concept, an idea that one either accepts  or rejects. But it is no less so than the idea that race does not make one person superior to another or any number of other ideas that seem self-evident in our society.

In Christian theological circles, the idea of self-ownership can be disputed with the claim that we all belong to God. And yet, there I would say even if one accepts that, God has still given us responsibility for own actions, and so we are at the very least stewards of ourselves, and so is everyone else, and to that end we are told to love our neighbor as ourselves and as one wants others to treat him so he should treat others. Thus, the rights still exist even if we are owned by God.

You mentioned the question of why we must recognize the existence of rights. Imo, to deny that such rights exist is to deny the nature of humans exists. If the rights, as I hold, exist because of the nature of humans, that we are individuals with individual bodies and minds and so therefore we own ourselves, then to say the rights do not exist means that we do not own ourselves. And if we do not own ourselves, then ownership of our lives can belong to someone else. Some people argue that humans are social animals and that we are therefore owned by society. They may not say it that way, but that is the essential meaning of the idea. I do not deny that humans are social beings, but I hold that society is not an entity unto itself, but merely the cooperation of individuals. And as such, society functions best when rights are recognized and respected.

I am explaining all this in basic terms of course, and as I said before, there are books written about this subject that explain, I am sure, much better than I can. I don't have time to write a book here, so basic terms will have to suffice.

[domer]

The notion of ownership of oneself is interesting but problematic. It casts what I perceive to be an essentially economic model on a reality (personhood), which is actually damaged by such reductionism. The essence of humanity is much more comprehensive and profound than a category derived from the marketplace. (I will not elaborate the point, noting merely that much of human thinking has been devoted to exploring the point.)

But accepting the premise, and incidentally the primacy of property rights in the list of human entitlements, you must immediately admit, as with bargaining in the agora, one can conceivably bargain away his foremost property right, that is, himself. The usual method is by contract. Take, for example, a player in the NFL: does he still own himself or does the team owner possessed of his contract? Is this arrangement, logically extended, a ceding of one's humanity?

While there are a host of issues your continued discourse on this topic raises, I will focus on only one, perhaps one of the most important and fertile: your apparent conception that a man is "king unto himself," a relatively complete autonomous actor, as opposed to being both that but also a member of a collective (or many collectives) in most situations. This difference implies a lot, the most topical to this board being the reciprocal demands an individual and a group (of whatever kind) expect of each other, indeed, can demand of each other.

At this point, maintaining for the sake of argument that my "amalgam" more closely resembles reality, I note that your positing of a foundational notion of property rights is, well, acontextual, imagined as a starting point through a method undisclosed and untested.

[Universe Prince]

The notion of ownership of oneself is interesting but problematic. It casts what I perceive to be an essentially economic model on a reality (personhood), which is actually damaged by such reductionism. The essence of humanity is much more comprehensive and profound than a category derived from the marketplace.

You're still coming at this backwards. It does not cast an economic model on reality or humanity. It does not attempt to make humanity a a category derived from the marketplace. It explains, in part, the marketplace as something something that arises from humanity. You're also apparently trying to take what I wrote as some sort of comprehensive statement of philosophy or sociology, and it is not either one. The complex answers you're looking for require pages and pages of explanation, and I don't have the time to do that here.

But accepting the premise, and incidentally the primacy of property rights in the list of human entitlements, you must immediately admit, as with bargaining in the agora, one can conceivably bargain away his foremost property right, that is, himself. The usual method is by contract. Take, for example, a player in the NFL: does he still own himself or does the team owner possessed of his contract? Is this arrangement, logically extended, a ceding of one's humanity?

No, one cannot bargain away his humanity. A player in the NFL has not signed away ownership of himself. A player in the NFL, or pretty much any other contract for work situation has merely agreed to exchange a portion of something he owns, his time and effort, for a portion of something the employer owns, generally money.

While there are a host of issues your continued discourse on this topic raises, I will focus on only one, perhaps one of the most important and fertile: your apparent conception that a man is "king unto himself," a relatively complete autonomous actor, as opposed to being both that but also a member of a collective (or many collectives) in most situations. This difference implies a lot, the most topical to this board being the reciprocal demands an individual and a group (of whatever kind) expect of each other, indeed, can demand of each other.

Pooh yi. This always comes up somewhere in these discussions, and I don't really understand why. No part of what I said denies that humans are also parts of groups of humans, society, family, community, et cetera. But society exists as a collection of individuals. People first, then society. There is no society without people, but people can exist without society. People can even exist without a family, though I would not recommend it. But you're making a common assumption, so I don't fault you. People frequently assume that talking about the individual and self-ownership means there is some sort of underlying denial or ignoring of the social and communal nature of humans, but this is not the case. The concept of self-ownership does not, as some people assume, lead automatically to a philosophy of isolationism or amoral irresponsibility toward others. In point of fact, it leads directly to people working together and respecting each other. But of course, you're talking about collectives and groups as if they were entities unto themselves and therefore able to make demands of individuals. Collectives and groups are only individuals, and so therefore the question is not what can a group demand of an individual, or vice verse, but rather what can individuals demand of other individuals.

At this point, maintaining for the sake of argument that my "amalgam" more closely resembles reality, I note that your positing of a foundational notion of property rights is, well, acontextual, imagined as a starting point through a method undisclosed and untested.

Oh for the love of pizza... After taking a deep breath and restraining my usual tendency for sarcasm at this point, I have to say, what part of "there are books written about this subject that explain, I am sure, much better than I can" did you not understand? I would be happy to compile a reading list for you. Between what I said to the member with the chosen handle "Religious Dick" and what I said to you, I gave a basic explanation of what I believe regarding rights and their origin. I'm not making this all up as I go along, and I assure you discussions about natural law and human rights go back more than a few years. I am sure you know that, Domer. Obviously, I'm no academic, but I am willing to discuss the matter as best I can, and to learn and be challenged along the way. So climb back off the high horse, please, and let's get back to discussion. Thank you.

[domer]

Except for starting point (property rights are primary) and an (over-)emphasis on autonomy necessarily flowing the notion of self-ownership, it seems that I could embrace your philosophy without too much damage to my soul, in this sense: so far as I can tell it won't lead us to dramatically different positions, and essential values will remain intact. The distinction of a group being comprised of individuals, which it surely is, as opposed to being another entity entirely possessing an independent dynamic different from the sum of its parts may be fruitful for discussion.