A Parallel Illustrating a Point of Character

[Plane]

As the Bush administration attempts to rally support for a U.S. military invasion of Iraq, the world questions whether such an action would be an illegal first strike under international law or an acceptable application of "anticipatory self-defense?"

'Self-Defense' is in the eye of the defender
On June 7, 1981, Israeli fighter-bombers attacked and destroyed Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor near Baghdad only days before the reactor was set to come online.

Since no state of war existed between Israel and Iraq at the time, and no recent military engagement between the two nations had preceded the attack, Israel came under immediate and sharp criticism from the global community.

http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa091011a.htm

The policy of 'anticipatory self-defense'
Rather than a violation of the loosely defined "rules" of international warfare, Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq was, in hindsight, justifiable under the policy of "anticipatory self-defense" established in 1837 by American politician Daniel Webster. Under the policy of anticipatory self-defense, any nation facing a threat considered to be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation," is considered justified in launching an attack before actually being attacked itself.

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This reactor if use by itselfwould require years of plutonium production and extraction for the production of each bomb.

But the airstrike that destoyed it was done in the last moments that such destruction could be done without causeing widespread radioactive contamination.

The concept of Imminence requires what in terms of time horizon?

If there is certainty that action is required , why then must there be waiting ?

On the other hand, global warming is not imminent ,why not wait till it is?

[Plane]

I'll give you my own snap definition, Plane, which I submit meets the rationality test: Imminent means before such time expires as would no longer give you a meaningful and effective opportunity to eradicate the threat, and during a time when the threat actually exists and can be executed.

I concur , but I don't think that the argument is ended.
The effectiveness of action often depends on its tardiness.
So the greatest effect and least cost is often on the side of striking at the earlyest possible moment.
Counterbalanced by the consideration that more than the usual certainty of need should precede very drastic action.

So the latest appropriate moment , or the soonest , would be a matter of subjective measurements , a judgement call.

[sirs]

Listen, cowboy, whether Bush or any of his aides ever used the word is immaterial because "imminence" is the operative concept for a preemptive strike under both domestic precepts and international law.

*snicker*.  In other words it doesn't matter if no one actually said so or even inferred so.  Yea, and we're the ones biting        Pre-emptive strike could also be used for dealing with a known threat before it becomes a more substantive threat.  i.e. taking out a nuclear reactor that's been determined to be refining plutonium for a nuclear weapon.  It could also be used to take out a potential threat of WMD being sold and/or offloaded to known terrorist enterprises

[gipper]

Yes, Plane, I think we're honing in on a common position. I think two adages should guide decision, used honestly and responsibly: "War (or belligerent action) should be a last resort," but "he who hesitates is lost." This states the appropriate tension that should bear on the problem. But the idea to wait until waiting would be too dangerous is the major guidepost. Just imagine, in one example of countless, that a change of authority occurs in the target state (if it is a state), scrambling the dynamics and basically scuttling any intent to harm.

[Michael Tee]

I will tell you why I believe Bush lied.  I followed the debate fairly closely in the press and on TV.  Unfortunately, I failed to keep notes of every day's events, particularly who said what on a day-to-day basis.  And unless I'm going to write a book on the subject, I don't intend to go back now and research the day-to-day pronouncements of the Bush administration.  So quite frankly my conclusions that Bush lied are based on my own recollection of the events preceding the war and certain facts that came to light after the event (the PNAC story primarily, some analyses of the event, particularly the one that pointed out Saddam's declared intention to price crude oil sales in euros and revelations of the immediate aftermath of 9-11 when Bush and some of his Cabinet members were particularly eager to implicate Iraq.)

What's my recollection?  Very simple:  Intelligence reports were accusing Iraq of possessing and/or developing WMD.  There was a U.N. inspection program meant to detect such efforts, but Saddam was frustrating the inspectors.  A UN resolution was passed requiring Saddam to "account for" all his WMD by a certain deadline.  Saddam complied, a few days short of the deadline.  The accounting was fairly massive, IIRC about 75 spiral-bound volumes of print and I believe 12 CDs of data.  The general consensus of most UN members, except for the U.S. and the U.K. was that, given the number of years that Saddam had had a WMD program and the number of weapons involved, the accounting given by Saddam was about as complete as could humanly be expected.  The U.S. and U.K. were not satisfied with the accounting and claimed Saddam was non-compliant.  The U.S. drafted a Security Council resolution authorizing use of force but failed to put it to a vote when it realized that the other Security Council members (Britain only excepted) would not vote for it.  Then they invaded anyway.

In the argument leading up to the invasion, I recall the following statements being made, either by the Bush administration or by administration-friendly columnists (Judith Miller of the New York Times standing out particularly in my mind) presented as coming from administration sources and allowed to stand uncontradicted by the administration:  -
1.  That the urgency of the situation would not permit giving the UN inspectors more time to finish the job
2.  That the evidence of Saddam having the WMD was clear and unequivocal
3.  That Saddam had a nuclear weapons program
4.  That Saddam was crazy enough to either use the WMD against the U.S.A. or hand them off to unspecified "terrorists" to use on the USA
5.  (Specifically, by Condoleeza Rice):  That the search for the evidence could not be allowed to continue until the smoking gun turned into a mushroom cloud.

Those are my recollections of the public debate.  No, I'm not going to go back and research a source for each one of them.  If I'm wrong, I'm wrong but it's impossible for me to be wrong on each and every memory I have of the public debate.  I got most of it and I got the gist of it:  there was a terrible danger to the USA presented by Iraq and only swift and drastic action could remove it.  

I did not separate out (except in the case of the mushroom cloud remark) who in the administration said what.  I don't even separate out what was said by the administration and what was said in the press - - to do so would be very naive and foolish, simply because today the administration has many ways to get its message out, and press leaks to friendly journalists are just one of them.  When a public debate is in process edging towards war and important journalists, claiming to have heard the story through administration or intelligence sources add to the debate by circulating powerful pro-war stories, the administration can choose to deny such material or let it stand uncontradicted.  Whatever action the government takes with regard to such stories (and silently standing by is an available option, it's also an action) is a contribution to the overall message, either for or against.

I regard most of the above statements made not only as lies, but as obvious, plain-faced and bald lies.  It was apparent to any thinking observer that there was no way in hell that the Iraqi government and all its weapons could pose any threat at all to the U.S.A. that wouldn't have involved minimal damage to the U.S. and total anihilation for the Iraqis.  So the issue of what weapons the Iraqis actually had was a non-issue, a distraction and a farce.  

Further, the evidence at the time was far from clear and a close examination of it would have revealed, for example, that some of it - - the yellowcake purchase letters for example - - were crude forgeries.  The failure to detect crude and obvious forgeries, particularly on documents which were referred to in a State of the Union speech on the issue, is a glaring example of a carelessness which is absolutely incompatible with a genuine search for truth in intelligence.  In other words, this information was received with other information without critical examination of any kind, which indicates not carelessness - - it's inconceivable that any administration interested in getting to the bottom of the WMD story would accept unscreened and unexamined evidence - - but a predetermined conclusion that Iraq was to be invaded.  If anything came up that said "WMD present" they just did not want to examine it any further.  Otherwise, had they examined it further, the forgery was easily detected.  Similarly the "failure" to trace back most of the "intelligence" relied on by Bush to its single source - - the Iraqi National Congress, the one organization (apart from the big oil and contracting companies) with the most to gain from an invasion.  Source is a key component, obviously, in evaluating intelligence - - it's just unbelievable that "carelessness" was the reason why no such analysis was conducted prior to the invasion.  The scale of "carelessness" required for this massive "failure of intelligence" is compatible only with a desire not to know, a desire to use any superficially plausible piece of "intelligence" as a tool to justify a predetermined policy.

As in any other crime, we also have motive - - the PNAC  policy papers, originally shown to the Clinton administration in the hopes of convincing them to invade Iraq.  PNAC, a creation of Cheney, Wolfowicz, Perle and Rumsfeld, the people closest to the "President" in his policy deliberations, had already determined BEFORE Sept. 11 to invade Iraq.  

So I say connect the dots.  If any of you recall something much different than I do concerning the run-up to the Iraqi war, then by all means find a different conclusion.  To anyone who remembers the events more or less as I do, I say:  add in what is now known of PNAC, the names of its members and founders, their relationship to the "President," their early attempts to sell the Clinton adminstration on an invasion of Iraq) and - - forgetting completely about Saddam wanting to price oil in euros, forgetting completely about the post-911 Cabinet meetings, that's just the icing on the cake - - Just. Connect.  The dots.

[Plane]

I don't think that priceing oil in Euros would harm the US much , if at all.

How much has the price being in Dollars ever hurt Europe?

I don't even think it would hurt China , where they are holding a lot of Euros and Dollars both.

If it would hurt the US, the effect wold be marginal unless the Saudis went along with it , but how exactly would it harm us even if they did?

I remember the free falling dollar of the late seventys , the main harm was our increaseing exports and improveing balance of trade, oh wait , that isn't harm.

[Michael Tee]

I think that Iraq alone pricing oil in euros probably would not have been a disaster for the U.S.   If the practice spread, it would be a disaster for the dollar.  Oil is a huge market and everyone who buys pays in U.S. dollars.  They need U.S. dollar reserves which helps maintain demand on the dollar.  If the demand slackens off, the price of the dollar relative to other currencies will fall.  The U.S. is not only an exporter.  Sure a falling dollar helps exports, but competition in export markets is fierce, and the Chinese and other exporters could probably still maintain an edge over the U.S. even allowing for some devaluation of the dollar.  Put another way, the dollar would have to fall considerably before any significant advantage over Chinese competitors would be realized.  OTOH, much of the U.S. standard of living is dependent on foreign imports, including raw materials, oil, etc.  Every cent that the dollar falls will be felt by every American on every foreign import that he or she buys directly or indirectly.

Iraq had to be squashed the same way that Cuba or Viet Nam had to be squashed - - for the potentially threatening example they set, or would set if they succeeded.