Considering the plethora of Reagan allusions that is rife in the rhetoric of government officials in this current American administration, there is seldom any emulation of the man?s approach to foreign policy, especially towards regimes deemed threatening to US interests. As the days turn to weeks, it is becoming increasingly apparent that a new cold war is well underway between the United States and Iran.
Although Iranian obstinacy towards the nuclear issue is clearly at the forefront in the minds of speculators in Washington, a closer look will reveal that this one concern is only a tangential matter. The real battle is the future of the Middle East.
With the American military bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the devaluing of US credibility, and the lack of trust amongst once staunch American allies towards the West?s vision of what their neighborhood should be like, the Iranian regime has become the recipient on new power vacuum in the Middle East.
The contents of the Pandora?s box that was opened when the Baathist regime of Iraq fell has not only surprised US policy makers but has severally strained relations with governments of the region that have historically amicable ties to Washington.
Although rooted in different contexts, Turkish and Saudi Arabian frustration towards the new realities of the Middle East are now manifesting themselves like never before. Turkish concerns about the rise of an independent Kurdistan in the Iraqi state are not, in any way, over-inflated.
The newfound Kurdish power, growing nationalism, and attempts at self-determination are becoming an existential threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic, which is host to roughly half of the world?s Kurdish population. As a result, severe backlash has emerged within the Turkish political arena towards any real assistance to Bush?s plans to democratize the Middle East. The Turks are willing to help, but not at the expense of losing their southeast portion. In addition, Northern Iraq, the new ?Kurdistan?, has become a nest for the terrorist organization knows as the Kurdish Worker?s Party (PKK). For the better part of thirty years, the PKK has been engaged in an armed struggle against Ankara, at a cost of the lives of thousands of innocent Kurds and Turks. Teheran, with its own Kurdish nuisance, has sympathized with Ankara and has recently stepped up cooperation with the Turkish government to combat rogue Kurdish elements in the mountains of Northern Iraq.
American apathy towards Turkish concerns and the Islamic Republic?s genuine assistance to the Turkish government has earned Iran the title of ?concerned neighbor?, all at Washington?s expense.
The Saudis view the region?s new realities through a different prism. For years, their fellow Sunni ally, Saddam Hussein, was seen as bulwark against Iranian Shiaism. Yet after Baghdad?s fall, the Shia tide has ebbed closer to the House of Saud. With 10-15% of Saudi Arabia?s population as Shia and given that government sanctioned Wahhabism has marginalized this minority for decades, both politically and economically, the House of Saud has made the calculated decision to open up new channels of communication to Teheran. Although no concrete evidence suggests that the Kingdom?s Shia minority will look to the East for support, the last thing that Saudi officials need is a religious division within their own borders that might be propagated from a Persian element.
Given the Saudi suspicion of Iranian hegemony in the Persian Gulf and the I.R.I.?s growing influence in Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, Washington has prodded the Kingdom to take a tougher stance towards Iran, and possibly to undermine the Iranian regime itself. Yet any talk of regime change in a region riddled with despots is usually frowned upon. This action would only shed unwanted light on the Kingdom?s unholy proclivities towards their own population.
As a result, Washington?s concerns have fallen on deaf ears. Growing speculation about the region?s new dynamics suggest that the security pact signed between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2001 might be in jeopardy; notwithstanding, the tenuous agreement still stands. Ahamdinejad?s visit to Saudi Arabia this past March was a clear indication that the Saudis, at least for now, are attempting to appease the I.R.I. by giving them more access to the ears of Arab leaders. Instead of isolating Teheran at the behest of American policy makers, the House of Saud is doing the exact opposite.
And now Reagan-
For one thing, as Texas congressman Ron Paul has often stated, ? Reagan understood the irrationality of Middle Eastern politics? and therefore did not overtly impose American idealism in the Middle East. His actions after the 1983 bombings of the marine barracks in Beirut are illustrative of how the man understood the limitations of foreign influence on Middle Eastern countries in adopting true Westernized democracy.
However, his administration implemented a foreign policy of confrontation based not upon fantasy and idealism but upon pragmatics that deal with the historical milieu of each individual nation. His approach towards the USSR serves as an example of how the American government should approach Iran. Reagan, for his part, never hid his odium for the foundational tenets of communism and how the average Soviet chafed under the political system that was imposed upon them. The man never wasted an opportunity to lambaste Soviet policy.
Nevertheless, he met with their leaders on their home turf, maintained clear lines of communication, and in many instances, bypassed the influence of the Soviet autocracy by appealing to the basic human characteristics that is endemic to all peoples.
This is a stark contrast from Bush?s ?cowboy diplomacy?. The image that the nations of the Middle East have towards the current American president is by no means similar to the image that an average Soviet had towards Reagan. By visiting the Soviet Union and meeting with Gorbachev all the while being openly critical of Soviet policy, Reagan circumvented the official communist filter that was in place and conveyed true American principles directly to the people of the Iron Curtain. He understood how to sell America and not to impose it.
Yet while evoking principles of freedom, tolerance, and pluralism, the current American president visits and embraces despots of the Middle East, some of whom rule countries which have become clear breeding grounds for terrorism, and at the same time demonizes the government of the Islamic Republic, for engaging in activities similar to that of America?s ?moderate Arab allies?.
Although the majority of the citizenry of Middle Eastern nations are weak and powerless, they are by no means stupid. They see the schism between American rhetoric and the results of its foreign policy. Undemocratic tyrants from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and even the Sudan, a nation that is actively committing government-sponsored genocide on its own population, have clear lines of communication with Washington. Yet, because of its intransigence, the stubborn Islamic Republic of Iran is shunned and isolated.
One might assume that Iran?s pariah label stems from the fact that they support terrorist groups, yet this is clearly a red herring. If the abandonment of terrorist ideals was a prerequisite for establishing foreign relations with the US, then countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, and Pakistan would have no presence in Washington.
Yet, for now, each autocracy has its use, and therefore America sets its own ideology aside. Although, there is no shortage of conjecture about Bush?s real intentions, the true motivation of the Iranian regime, or what the future of Iraq will entail, in the seventh year of the ?War on terror?, the American government finds itself having severe strains with Middle Eastern allies as a result of its policies and having emboldened a reactionary government such as the I.R.I.
The US must talk to Iran now, before events in the region spiral out of control.
The mid-level meetings between American and Iranian officials within the last few months were nothing more than a charade. The only topic discussed was Iraq?s security concerns, yet this approach will bear no fruit.
America knows that it needs productive Iranian influence in the war-torn country in order to quell the daily bloodshed. Yet, at the same time, it holds to a policy of regime change in Iran. In essence, it is requiring help from a government that it wishes to topple. At the same time, Iran needs Iraq to be stable for many reasons (i.e. the influx of refugees, regional stability, security concerns, and so on) but cannot accept an American victory in Iraq because that would threaten its own rule, although unlikely to bring down the government. American duplicity and Iranian paranoia are the primary reasons that progression in Iraq has hit an impasse.
Nevertheless, the larger issues concerning Iran and the United States must now be addressed. These eclipse the nuclear issue or Iraqi stability. Acceptance of Iran as a regional power, the cessation of terrorist support by the Islamic Republic, and a fundamental change in both nations foreign policy towards each other are the central issues.
For the better part of three decades, America?s schizophrenic policy towards Iran has yielded no substantial results. On one hand, American policy makers have made it clear that they wish for regime change in Iran yet at certain points have required the Islamic Republic?s cooperation, such as in the invasion of Afghanistan, counter intelligence as it relates to al-Qaida, or even at the start of the Iraq War. At other times, America has called for a behavior change from the Islamic Republic yet they have an ?open-door policy? towards Iranian opposition groups such as the exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi or the terrorist cult known as the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK) who are bent on overthrowing the theocratic government. This is clearly duplicitous.
In order to obtain true, fundamental change in the behavior of the Islamic Republic, America must now abandon the policy of regime change.
Lasting change in Iranian behavior cannot be imposed but must come from within, by the empowerment of its own people. Yet two-faced policies, advocated by this American administration and the former, have only radicalized the I.R.I., driving them to crack down on most opposition groups within the country and severally marginalizing the reformers.
Because of the American threat, the paranoia of the mullahs has left a fragmented and fragile opposition within the country. As for the opposition outside Iran, most of them haven?t stepped foot in the nation they wish to rule for three decades. They no longer comprehend the social, political, and economic dynamics of their former homeland.
Hence, no more time and energy should be wasted on supposed ?alternative? opposition groups who are based in France, Britain, or the United States. The notion that some exiled leader is going to ride into Teheran on their white horse and save the Iranian people from all their ills is sheer lunacy.
The majority of these opposition groups have specific political agendas, all of which differ greatly from one another and are based on an Iran that does not exist anymore. Their leaders are viewed my most Iranians as nothing more than irrelevant figureheads of a time long passed.
For the fundamentalist wing in Washington, Iranian American rapprochement may seem an unacceptable option. The lofty goal of regime change in Teheran might be so central to their Middle East policy that they would continue their failed course of action of isolation and sanctions. Yet reconciliation with the reality on the ground suggests the opposite. Isolation of rogue regimes rarely hurt those in power and almost never leads to regime change. The examples of Cuba, North Korea, and Libya are quite self-evident. However, what isolation accomplishes is further punishing those who have no political power and no say in a policy matters whatsoever, in other words, the common citizen.
Although the possibility of d?tente with Iran might seem fanciful, the results of such an action will result in both short term and long term gains for American interests. The Islamic Republic has many concerns as it relates to its future, yet security and economics are at the forefront.
If America assuages both concerns, a three-pronged result will ensue. The Islamic Republic, having realized that America?s policy towards it no longer includes regime change, will quell its domestic oppression of its own citizens and reign in its Islamist proxies, including Hizbullah.
American policy makers must realize that Iran has no stake in an independent Palestine, fractured Lebanon, or a destroyed Israel. If any of these happen, the Islamic Republic would gain nothing from it.
Therefore, Iran is much more likely to cease support for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Mahdi Army, and Hizbullah, if it understands that their security concerns have been alleviated.
In addition, the Islamic Republic will be much more willing to assist the US in bringing stability to Afghanistan and Iraq. We must remember that the constant flux of refugees and instability in both these war-torn nations affects Iran before any other country. In terms of long-term change, Washington must accept the fact that the possibility of 1979 redux is unrealistic.
However, a robust approach to diplomacy that includes nothing less than the normalization of relations with the Iranian regime will reap rewards in terms of a radical behavioral modification of the Islamic Republic.
Restoration of economic power and social freedoms for the Iranian population will eventually lead to a much less paranoiac and much more stable Iran that both its neighbors and the West can live with.
The mullahs who rode in on Khomeini?s coat tails in the early months of 1979 are daily meeting their demise.
The focus now should be on the future leaders of Iran, the 70% of the population that is under the age of 35 and that do not view the world through the lens of Islamic dogma.
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