If the two problems were of equal magnitude, there would be no reason not to solve both at the same time, but as the Avineri article demonstrates, Iranian nukes are not a real problem for Israel and the proof of that lies in the fact that Netanyahu himself does not really take them seriously, nor does the U.S.A. They're a distraction from the basic Israel-Palestinian dispute.
The solution to the problem could be difficult after the first hundred miles. The first hundred miles involves busting the balls of the settler movement. As long as the settler movement retains its present power, there is not even a hope of progress. But any Israeli leader who plans to bust the settlers needs to have a broad-based popular support independent of the extremist religious parties. That's easier said than done. And the reason it hasn't been done up to now is that no secular Israeli government has been able to hold power without the support of the religious right and its coalition parties. Once a government can find an appropriate base, busting the settler movement will follow naturally. Other than lone assassins, they have no real armed force, so the threat of withdrawal of protection would be as effective with them as the threat of armed repression would be with more powerful opposition.
But even assuming the neutralization of the settler lobby, the search for a security compatible with Palestinian national aspirations may be an impossible goal. I just don't know if that's possible any longer. At its very least, it would involve maintaining Israel's current status of a nation in arms indefinitely even with a diplomatically compliant region.
