<<Iran prefers to give its arms to catspaws like Syria or Hezbolla in Lebanon so that the kills are second hand. >>
Really? And that's different from America's SOP how, exactly?
<<I don't suppose Iranian a-bombs would be usefull to Hezbolla as much as simply another hundred thousand rockets to replace their recently used stocks. Iran might have to create another catspaw for A-bomb delivery.>>
Crazy is still crazy. Iran has already shown us how it exercises its discretion in the arming of so-called "terrorist" groups, firstly in NOT giving them WMD such as chemical or biological weapons, and secondly in not arming groups whose primary objective is to attack Americans on American soil. What on earth would induce them to change that policy once they had nukes, when one act by a group of crazies totally beyond Iran's control would guarantee the total obliteration of their entire nation?
<<But since it is really crazy for Iran to use an A-bomb , why is it rational for them to spend a big hunk of national resorces just to make a few ?>>
It's a variation on the Cold War theory of Mutually Assured Destruction, the variation being that while Iran's destruction would be total in a nuclear exchange, America's need not be total for the deterrent to work. The theory, as varied, is that America would never risk the loss of a few big coastal cities just for the pleasure of obliterating or trying to obliterate Iran in a nuclear first strike.
History demonstrates that Americans are cowardly serial aggressors who have never once attacked a smaller country in possession of even a rudimentary nuclear capacity. The best demonstrated deterrent to a cowardly aggressor is to arm oneself with nukes. Which explains how a piss-ant country like North Korea can tell the U.S.A. to go fuck itself.