Gleeful at Failure, Stupid over Incompetence: The Way Forward Anyhow

[domer]

In gross terms, the "battle lines" have been drawn (well, recognized) in the fight over our future in Iraq. Enough opponents of the president's policy can be characterized as simply sighing (or yelling), "Make it go away," while enough of the president's supporters say simply, "Bush, what him wrong?" In a real sense then, penetrating the general electorate's view of policy, the vying sides are: "Vilify Bush," or, on the other hand, "Vindicate Bush, at all costs (or die trying)." As you may deduce, this is not the best atmosphere for detached, deliberative analysis of how we proceed from here with the Iraq mess.

Despite that, I want to suggest the following as a partial list of requisites, perhaps overlapping some ISG recommendations themselves, though I don't know because I haven't seen the exhaustive list:

     1. Convene a regional conference, with Iran and Syria involved, to establish that general chaos in Iraq would be a bane to the region, threatening a wider Sunni-Shi'ite conflict;

     2. Make every effort to establish an effective process of reconciliation in Iraq, featuring amnesty, partial re-Baathification and other measures;

     3. Begin a meaningful, comprehensive and dedicated outreach to the Muslim world, perhaps conceived as a "cultural offensive," a policy to identify and build upon common ground, thereby, necessarily (if effective), reducing the influence of the radicals and constructing a viable center that can responsibly present pathways for Muslim integration into the modern world ... without losing the essence of Islam; and

     4. Commit perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 more troops, if available, to Baghdad to pacify the capital and thereby not only actually ease the situation in the capital itself but also provide a much-needed "victory" to rally the country around the government in Baghadad.

As Richard Haas, a foreign policy expert, warned on "Meet the Press" this morning, as part of an expert panel, one overriding consideration beyond actual success in our efforts -- which, incidentally, we should commit to with our hearts -- is the "narrative" that will emerge from the "Iraq venture." He counsels doing everything possible to help the Iraqis (the government) prevail not only as a goal in itself but as a geo-political fact that, if it comes to that, the Iraqis lost Iraq, not the Americans. He maintains that this narrative, which we can now start constructing anew, will have significant bearing on the stature of the US in the decades to come and thus our very power to influence events favorably.

[domer]

The above initial attempt at policy recommendations presupposes, despite the "grave, deteriorating situation in Iraq," that there is yet some hope that the US can salvage a better outcome by its continued presence than by a willy-nilly withdrawal. Of course, as a forward-looking matter, one's conclusion on this is partly fact-based (history) and partly speculation. As to the suggestion of fortifying and pacifying Baghdad, I would be inclined to a time-limited commitment, say six or eight months.

[BT]

As to the suggestion of fortifying and pacifying Baghdad, I would be inclined to a time-limited commitment, say six or eight months.

The folly of your time limits is that they are one sided. Will you also put the same constraints on the opposition?

[domer]

Thanks for playing. Pithy, quippy questions not going to the heart of the matter rather than real thought.

[sirs]

Thanks for playing. Pithy, quippy questions not going to the heart of the matter rather than real thought.

The application of some artificial time line is hardly "real thought", Domer.  And that criticism falls neatly in the prerequisate of "truth" that you're so advocating of the current administration.  Especially when it is so 1 sided, as is your thead title.  Perhaps, you haven't been thinking this one out very clearly now, after all.

[domer]

Understand, please, that the additional troop commitment, if available, would be subject to the best judgment of the "cogniscenti" as to its effect. The overall goal is to salvage as much favorable out of the Iraq mess as possible. It very well could be that even now an effort to pacify Baghdad would be doomed, and that our efforts "to salvage" should be directed elsewhere. On the specific facts and predictive methods needed to make this judgment, I have to defer to those more knowledgeable, who are also trustworthy. On time-limiting the commitment, it is a suggestion, as are most of the points I raise. In any case, with a time-limited commitment, we quite obviously could buy the Iraqi government more time in which it can pursue reconciliation, training and favorable geo-political influence. A further possible result of time-limiting our commitment could be to actually cast the decisive battle for Iraq as drawn now.

[BT]

Thanks for playing. Pithy, quippy questions not going to the heart of the matter rather than real thought.

I'm sorry , did you cover that contingency in one of your previous posts?

The best solution to the Iraqi situation is the establishment of a federation of provinces, much like the canadian model , backed by an oil trust that shares revenue by some FAIR formula to be determined by all concerned.

Pithy enough for you?

[domer]

The federation idea, whose main proponent is Joe Biden, is not faring too well in the general discussion, and seems best to keep as a "stop-gap" measure should the preferred policies fail. As I understand it, a weak federation would actually plant the seeds for continued strife rather than remove them from the land. Further, a tripartite Iraq would literally invite Irani hegemony in the south, or a close and reliable ally, while establishment of a semi-autonomous Kurdistan would roil the Kurds living in Iran and especially Turkey, inviting instability and conflict. As an aside, I'll add that, keeping with their modus operandi now, a semi-autonomous Sunni enclave could become a haven for those bent on jihad. As for sharing oil  revenues, I don't see how it would be more difficult to do in a national structure with a strong central government than it would be if political links were attenuated.

[BT]

The federation idea was also featured in the ISG report. Popularity does not matter, it's a matter of examing merits and flaws in the idea.

And you still haven't addressed the inequality of your proposed time restraints.

[domer]

The time-limit issue is almost as fundamental to the Iraq debate as the merits themselves. Without question, there is an overwhelming sentiment in the country that the war must wind down. Voices from every corner invoke the necessity of the Iraqis cleaning their own house, a place they are messing themselves. The war-weary are spread throughout our populace, from the "Marine's Marine," John Murtha, to moderate figures in the Republican Party like Chuck Hagel. We average Joes spoke in resounding fashion in the recent election: change, now. In this milieu it is not only natural but preferred to yield to the impulse to stanch the flow of American blood and treasure, especially when it appears that any further effort may be for naught. It is that combination of "facts on the ground" and political will that President Bush must negotiate.

He does not have a good track record, nor a good reputation as a planner nor as an implementer, and justifiably so. Based on that record, he cannot exhort us to action. If anything, he must lead us to it. (And, I add with considerable dismay, we are stuck with him for some two more years.) In my candid view, in this matter at least, he has precious little, if any, "political capital" left. He has, in an objective view, demonstrated himself to be incompetent. And therein lies the basis, or part of it, for a "time-limited" proposal: Bush has to be kept on a very short leash.

[BT]

He has, in an objective view, demonstrated himself to be incompetent. And therein lies the basis, or part of it, for a "time-limited" proposal: Bush has to be kept on a very short leash.

So you demand leadership, and then put unequal conditions on the US vis a vis the insurgents and timetables, basically setting up any initiative to fail. Why would any insurgent not simply wait for the clock to run out?

You might as well just surrender now. But i won't be with you or Murtha or any other Marines Marines when you do.

[domer]

Spoken like a true armchair soldier. Iceland, was it?

[BT]

Spoken like a true armchair soldier. Iceland, was it?

I served. You sat it out, right? Had better things to do,  was it?

[Plane]

"1. Convene a regional conference, with Iran and Syria involved, to establish that general chaos in Iraq would be a bane to the region, threatening a wider Sunni-Shi'ite conflict;"


I think this one is a non starter, the Saddamist government in exile is in Siria and is in possession of a large wad of cash , Iran benefits from every roumor of war , they hae no intrest at all in peace breaking out .

What carrot or stick is there to induce positive behavior in either Syria or Iran?

It might be better and cheaper to hire a whole lot of Iriquis to serve as border guards .

I like your points two and three but they would require point four to work wouldn't they?

[Xavier_Onassis]

What carrot or stick is there to induce positive behavior in either Syria or Iran?
=====================================

The stick is that if there is a lot of turmoil in Iraq, then Iran and Syria will have to cope with the refugees. No one wants to cope with millions of refugees.

The carrot could be that Syria will get US support for retrieving its lost Golan Heights territory back.
The carrot for Iran could be recognition at last of the current government as the legitimate government of Iran, and perhaps recognition of Iran's right to produce nuclear fuel for the purpose of generating electricity.

Maybe Juniorbush could take back his stuff about the "Axis of Evil".