Author Topic: Doesn't Look Lost To Me  (Read 903 times)

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BT

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Doesn't Look Lost To Me
« on: April 24, 2007, 02:16:57 PM »

Monday, 23 April 2007 
Just back inside some civilized wire (Camp Fallujah) and am reading Harry Reid's declaration then track back on the war in Iraq being lost.

The odd thing--is that I think there are parts of Al Anbar province where the war may be over and we just don't realize it.

The following post explains.

Tribal Mojo

Driving along the four-lane highway from Habbaniyah to Ramadi there are the usual coalition check points, Iraqi Army Outposts, markets, black market gas stations and Police Stations.

But, off the main highway, on the access roads leading back into the Euphrates canal country, every half mile, gun men wearing Keyfahs and wielding AK-47s man road blocks--and they are the best allies we can have against the jihadists.

Months ago Michelle Malkin and others blogged about a very simple power point presentation by a Marine Civil Affairs Officers.

That presentation is now taking hold along the Euphrates river valley.

THE AO

The 3rd Battalion of the 6th Marine Regiment's AO runs upstream along the West bank of the Euphrates from Fallujah to Habbaniyah to Husabayh Jawal South of Ramadi.

The area is bordered by the desert mesa, lake Habbaniyah and the Euphrates and populated in a series of villages through the fertile canal country.

Predominantly Sunni, some parts of the area resemble a Baathist retirement community with homes that would put John Edward's to shame.

The economy is mostly agricultural with some light manufacturing.  The markets are vibrant and business is brisk.

It has also had a large Baathist Insurgent presence that used to cooperate with the Jihadist elements.

THE AWAKENING

Last Summer few Sheiks, notably around Ramadi flipped to the coalition and government side of the conflict.

The tribes sent levies to the Police Academies in Baghdad and Amman, Jordan.  They have also started taking matters into their own hands with some men from each clan and tribe defending their villages.

What I saw in Husabayah Jawal was not the Iraqi Police or the Iraqi Army, but the beginings of the end of the insurgency in Iraq.
 
Whether they are the Sons of Al Anbar, Sawa, TAA, the militia or the Tribal Neighborhood Watch, tribes and clans across across the Euphrates river valley are taking charge of their own security with back up from the Marines.

 
Not IP, not militia, this man is a volunteer standing post at a check point leading to his village.  By agreement with the Chief of Police in Habbaniyah, local tribes and clans can establish a Provisional Security Force. 


MAYLAYA PRECEDENT

In the Maylaya Emergency, a communist insurgency running from 1948-1960, the British formed a police station in every village augmented by a Home Guard of men from the village.

The Communist Guerillas of Maylaya, like the jihadists of Iraq, engage in campaigns of terror and intimidation against the locals.  These campaigns don't usually involve bombings, but resemble the shake down schemes of the most the most violent organized crime gangs.

The strength of the insurgents comes from the inaction of the people and their unwillingness or inability to stand up for themselves.

In Mayalya, the fledgling Police and Home Guard were backed up by the British Military.

With the strength of the military to back them up in a fight, the Police and Home Guard soon began to effectively combat the terror and intimidation campaigns in the villages and provided intelligence on Communist operatives in the villages.

THE AWAKENING

The Iraq variant of the Home Guard emerged last year as many of the top sheiks, some who had opposed the coalition and some who had a foot in both camps saw that AQIZ was not following through on their promises and that the coalition was following through on their promises.

The other point that flipped the Sheiks is the simple fact that no one except for the hard core jihadists want to live under Sharia law--which is all the jihadists have to offer.

The Sheiks, sub-sheiks, former military leaders including a hero of the Iran/Iraq war who lived in the Khalidiayah area began the process of standing up neighborhood watch check points.

The neighborhood watch is supported by the Police District and Mayor.  The Marines keep a close eye on the volunteers who man the check points but have no official involvement in their activities.

The Anbar Awakening is allowing one of the key aspects of counter insurgency operations to begin--population control and control of movement in and out of areas.

IP RISING

In Khalidiyah, a city that used to be the farthest outpost of the Sassanid Empire, the local neighborhood watch has grown from a few tribal levies to something that is begining to resemble an actual police force.

As recruits are graduated from the police academy, they are mentored by PTT 6, based in Habbaniyah and the MNFWTC which provides advanced courses in use of small arms.

Further up stream, in Husabahy Jawal, the local neighborhood watch mans check points on the roads leading into the villages.

Each clan village in the area north of Habbaniyah is hemmed in by the Euphrates and a series of canals.  There is only one way in and out and the local neighborhood watch knows who should be there and who shouldn't.  If you shouldn't be there, the locals...well, they don't take kindly to strangers.

 
The only people allowed through the check point are residents of the village and Marines.  The Police Chief provides the neighborhood watch with sand bags, Hesco barriers and some concertina wire to fortify their position.


The Marines, operating out of small platoon and squad sized patrol bases are constantly in the villages.

With accurate census data, the patrolling Marines are able to move beyond suspicion and factually determine if a person should or should not be in the area and if their explanations make sense.  They are also able to determine if new cars come into the area or if a car permanently disappears from the area for no plausible reason.

The IP and neighborhood watch, being from the area take it the next level as they have lived in the village for decades.  They know who belongs and who doesn't on sight.

Once security is established, the PTT works to develop a professional police force.

It is obviously an uphill battle.  But the slow starts at success in the Khalidiyah station show what can be done.

Detainees are booked, evidence is collected, bagged, tagged and logged.

The network of informants used by the Police has led to several High Value Individuals being detained with troves of valuable information--laptops, thumb drives, cell phones.

PATRONAGE

The Sheiks, the arbiters of power in Anbar for centuries, are loath to give up their power to a professional police force based on merit, a police force beholden to civil law instead of tribal patronage.

But the Sheiks are also tired of the capriciousness of the Jihadists and of appearing powerless before their tactics of terror.  While many of the Sheiks doubtlessly supported elements of the insurgency, they saw their power would be cut off by the Sharia courts.

For people used to being courted for their political sway, the approach of the jihadists was dead end.  The Americans, even the units doing Hammer and Anvil, were a better alternative. 

The foundations of the Tribal Mojo are not found in Hammer and Anvil clearing operations or in mere presence patrols.

The foundations are found in showing that the Marines can wage effective counter insurgency operations which start with figuring out who should be somewhere (census), who shouldn't be there and effective targetting of the Jihadists (data base).

As the same Marines work the same clan area (small patrol bases), trust is developed.  As trust is developed tips come in.  Terrorists are busted and the locals become more willing to flip over to the coalition side and the next step is a neighborhood watch that can be made into a police force.

Are the militias rag tag looking?  Yes.  Are they professionally operated?  No.  Do they conform to Western standards?  No.  Are they effective against the jihadists?  Yes.

So effective that the Marines who actually work the patrol bases and combat outposts say everything is really boring and their main job is as QRF for the neighborhood watch.

As for my time in Husabayh Jawal and Khalidiyah, it was really boring, but boring is good.

OBSTACLES TOWARD COMPLETION

The only barrier left overcome in 3/6 upstream AO is the slow moving bureacratic regime.

Because the neighborhood watch is approved by the local Police District but not by the MOI and Coalition, the Marines cannot directly support them.

The Mayor of Habbaniyah and the Chief of Police have deputized the men who serve, but there are too few slots at the police academies.  If they have not attended the academy they are not sworn officers and therefore cannot be supported.

The final phase that could secure 3/6 upstream AO would be sending the watchmen to a police academy and then having PTT 6 work with them to move beyond a secure check point and into professional police work.

FINAL THOUGHTS

A Marine Officer offered this thought to me, "could it be that we have won the war but are too dense to realize it?"  From what I saw in Khalidiyah, I would say we are on track.  Time will tell if the watchmen and IP will continue to progress and eventually choke out the jihadists.  But from what I saw in my time, maybe they already have.

 
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Plane

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Re: Doesn't Look Lost To Me
« Reply #1 on: April 24, 2007, 07:07:18 PM »
This is all we could have hoped for.

But the truth depends on how much there is of this ,and how much there is of otherwise.

How do we learn what the purportions truely are?

BT

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Re: Doesn't Look Lost To Me
« Reply #2 on: April 24, 2007, 08:03:53 PM »
Quote
How do we learn what the purportions truely are?

Map it.