The doctrine of predstination, to the extent it encompasses all intermediate "choices," which are foreordained and immutable viewed from a standpoint where an omniscient being can "see," pretty much negates "free will," at least from the deity's perspective but also from the perspective of the human who believes this doctrine. The human's activitiy thus becomes not free-will choice but acting out a pre-set script, however unconscious or nonconscious the exercise might be.
"In the Mishnah (Ethics of the Fathers 3:15), Rabbi Akiva says it straight out: 'Everything is foreseen, and free choice is granted.' The classic commentaries don't have a problem with that. Allow me to paraphrase their very simple explanation:
"If I see a child in front of an ice cream and tell you he's going to eat it, does that mean I made him eat it? Let's say a psychologist predicts that a certain criminal, if released, will murder again. And it happens. Do we lock up the psychologist or the criminal? Of course not. The psychologist's knowledge had no involvement in the criminal's act of murder.
"Similarly, if someone came back from the future in a time machine and told you what was going to happen to the world, does that mean he is responsible for all that happens from that point on? G-d knows what you are going to do because He is beyond time. For Him, it all happened already. So, how does that imply that He denies us free choice to make those decisions?
"In other words, knowledge of the future is a result of the events of the future, not their cause. In G-d's super-temporal realm, the result can exist before the cause. But it's still a result and not a cause."
http://www.chabad.org/library/article.asp?AID=3019