Al Qaeda Plans Nuke Attack On US

[Amianthus]

However, I didn't bother to modify my post  because I recalled reading somewhere that John von Neumann, one of the project's star mathematicians, DID have access to the most powerful computer of the day when he was at Los Alamos.

He did not begin to use computers until he started work on thermonuclear explosives ("hydrogen bombs") after the war. Interestingly enough, some of the mathematics work that he did for the Navy prior to the war was used to develop the computer that the Navy had, but he didn't know about it until after the war. Although his theories allowed him to setup groups of mathematicians to do the complex calculations needed for the Manhattan Project as if they (the mathematicians) were a massive computer. Just one that needed sleep, food, and coffee breaks.

[Michael Tee]

<<Uranium does not require an implosion just that two sub critical masses be brought to gether at a rate greater than the rate that they can repel themselves , if you made a hammer and anvil out of highly enriched Uranium smacking them together by hand would produce an explosion , but not an optimum explosion , the explosion would be random in its output and tend to be on the small side , increaseing the speed at which they approach each other makes the process more dependable and yeild more , if they are in full contact before the chain reaction occurs the exposion will be optimised .>>

I guess the first thing that comes to my mind is the intense sensation of waste - - astonomical amounts of wasted money and wasted time, due to those Neanderthals over at the Manhattan Project not realizing how easy it was, had they only gone to simple hammer-and-anvil design and bypassed all the hi-falutin mathematical and physical theories those Nobel nincompoops were so busily spinning, controlled explosions, critical mass, etc.  no doubt to keep their overinflated paycheques coming in regularly.  Critical mass my critical ass.  plane, where you when they needed you?


<<It is rediculous to state that the sub critical masses must be very finely machined . . . >>

I never stated that.  I don't know if they must or they mustn't, but I rather suspect that they were very finely machined, probably for very good reasons unknown to schleppers like me.

 

[Amianthus]

I guess the first thing that comes to my mind is the intense sensation of waste - - astonomical amounts of wasted money and wasted time, due to those Neanderthals over at the Manhattan Project not realizing how easy it was, had they only gone to simple hammer-and-anvil design and bypassed all the hi-falutin mathematical and physical theories those Nobel nincompoops were so busily spinning, controlled explosions, critical mass, etc.  no doubt to keep their overinflated paycheques coming in regularly.  Critical mass my critical ass.  plane, where you when they needed you?

Actually, they had designed a number of types of weapons (over 20, if memory serves), but chose the two simplest designs for their working bombs. One was so simple they did not even test it - the one called "Little Boy" - which was essentially what Plane described. A ball of uranium is fired down a tube towards a "spike" of uranium. When the spike impales the ball, a critical mass is achieved and the explosion commences. Since the "spike" is attached to a hemisphere, the combined mass is explosively forged into a sphere by pressure, to create a chain reaction that is efficient. As I said, the design was so simple, they didn't even bother to test it.

The second design chosen - implosion type - using the "explosive lensing" that von Neumann designed, was more complicated, and therefore they did an actual test of a prototype bomb to make sure that the design would even work. This is what the "Trinity Test" was for. While the explosive yields of an implosion type weapon are higher, the higher death rate at Hiroshima (which used the previous "gun type" design) shows that it is a sufficient design.

The main difference is that implosion type physics packages work with both uranium and plutonium. Gun type physics packages will only work with uranium.

[Michael Tee]

On von Neumann's access to computers in developing the Bomb, I found this on Columbia University's website:

<<6 February 1945:
"To give all possible aid to the war effort  . . . a computing laboratory has been established at Columbia University by [IBM.]  The new laboratory . . . the Thomas J. Watson Scientific Computing Laboratory at Columbia University . . . attracted attention all over the scientific world; visitors included  John von Neumann, Hans Bethe, and Richard Feynman . . .

<<It turns out that the presence of Bethe, Feynman, and von Neumann was not entirely coincidental. Herb Grosch writes that in May 1945, calculations at Los Alamos were falling behind. . . .  "They came to IBM for help. . . "    New space was needed, and found, for Watson Lab's first task: solution of temperature-pressure equations for completion of the A-bombs at Los Alamos [57] (more about this HERE and much more in Chapter 03 of Dr. Grosch's book) >>

There was a very interesting link in the article to Evolving from Calculators to Computers on the Los Alamos National Laboratory History but unfortunately the link did not work.

[Michael Tee]

<<One was so simple they did not even test it - the one called "Little Boy" - which was essentially what Plane described. A ball of uranium is fired down a tube towards a "spike" of uranium. When the spike impales the ball, a critical mass is achieved and the explosion commences. Since the "spike" is attached to a hemisphere, the combined mass is explosively forged into a sphere by pressure, to create a chain reaction that is efficient. As I said, the design was so simple, they didn't even bother to test it.>>

But even this design requires sophisticated calculations - - the relative mass of the ball and spike, the dimensions of the spike, the velocity of the collision, etc.  The end result of any of this is relatively easy to describe in words but the formulation and details are the result of hard work and plenty of high-level thinking and research.

[Amianthus]

<<It turns out that the presence of Bethe, Feynman, and von Neumann was not entirely coincidental. Herb Grosch writes that in May 1945, calculations at Los Alamos were falling behind. . . .  "They came to IBM for help. . . "    New space was needed, and found, for Watson Lab's first task: solution of temperature-pressure equations for completion of the A-bombs at Los Alamos [57] (more about this HERE and much more in Chapter 03 of Dr. Grosch's book) >>

This does not jive with my understanding of computer history - which is also my profession. The device that existed at the first location for Watson's lab - the one visited by von Neumann, et al, during the development of the atomic bomb - was a prototype and known to be unreliable. Actually, it is from this machine that we get the term "bug" for describing flawed software, since sometimes the presence of insects would cause problems with the computations (it was an open device that used mechanical accumulators, not electronic). It was not until they moved to their new, larger offices in September of 1945 that reliable computers were actually setup, and it was these that von Neumann used later for his thermonuclear work. It's entirely possible that he brought problems with him to test the equipment but I'm sure he had his team of mathematicians verify the results before they were used.

It's my understanding that the only working, reliable computers during WWII was the Navy machine at Harvard ("Mark I") and the several ones named "Colossus" at Bletchley Park.

Sounds to me like Columbia is trying to make themselves sound more important. ;-)

[Amianthus]

But even this design requires sophisticated calculations - - the relative mass of the ball and spike, the dimensions of the spike, the velocity of the collision, etc.  The end result of any of this is relatively easy to describe in words but the formulation and details are the result of hard work and plenty of high-level thinking and research.

Ahh, but these calculations are done and widely published. Would you like the numbers?

[Universe Prince]

Is casting a Bullet ,to fit a barrell, a rare skill?

The question should be: Is casting a bullet made from uranium with intention of creating a nuclear explosion a rare skill? And I feel fairly certain the answer would be yes.

It is true that one would have to protect the Uranium from Oxigen while it was melted , that makes the difficulty equal to working in Magmeisium but not so difficult as titainium.

Again, I think you are severely underestimating the difficulty. If it were as easy as you make out, seems to me we would not worry about other countries developing the ability to make nuclear weapons because the other countries would already have nuclear weapons. If you are to be believed, all they need is enough money to buy some uranium, some scrap metal and a couple of machinists to put it all together. I remain skeptical.

[Amianthus]

Again, I think you are severely underestimating the difficulty. If it were as easy as you make out, seems to me we would not worry about other countries developing the ability to make nuclear weapons because the other countries would already have nuclear weapons. If you are to be believed, all they need is enough money to buy some uranium, some scrap metal and a couple of machinists to put it all together. I remain skeptical.

The uranium is the hard part. To make a gun type nuclear bomb, you need a fair amount of reasonably pure uranium. Making reasonably pure plutonium is easier, so most countries concentrate on the implosion type nuclear bombs, which can use plutonium for fuel, but they are trickier to make.

Actually, several of the earlier gun type nuclear bombs were literally made with guns - they used artillery barrels, which were readily available. And the uranium was machined into discs with a hollow core (like slices of pineapple) so the "spike" would fit right into the center.

[Cynthia]

Again, I think you are severely underestimating the difficulty. If it were as easy as you make out, seems to me we would not worry about other countries developing the ability to make nuclear weapons because the other countries would already have nuclear weapons. If you are to be believed, all they need is enough money to buy some uranium, some scrap metal and a couple of machinists to put it all together. I remain skeptical.

The uranium is the hard part. To make a gun type nuclear bomb, you need a fair amount of reasonably pure uranium. Making reasonably pure plutonium is easier, so most countries concentrate on the implosion type nuclear bombs, which can use plutonium for fuel, but they are trickier to make.

Actually, several of the earlier gun type nuclear bombs were literally made with guns - they used artillery barrels, which were readily available. And the uranium was machined into discs with a hollow core (like slices of pineapple) so the "spike" would fit right into the center.

Reading these threads.....I am reminded of my father who's worked centered around the Nuclear Bomb for 30 years. Of course, growing up in New Mexico, I was always aware that my dad's work was top secret. I never got a chance to hear all these details growing up. He's still alive.  I should ask him about such interesting details.

[Christians4LessGvt]

The "Dirty Bomb" Scenario

By TONY KARON - June 10, 2002

Osama Bin Laden has made no secret of his ambition to join the nuclear club, he has even proclaimed it a "religious duty" for Muslim states to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to attack the West. But intelligence officials believe that the best he has managed to achieve, thus far, is a limited membership of that club, in the form of radioactive material that could be dispersed using conventional explosives , the so-called "dirty bomb."

Speculation over a possible al Qaeda nuclear threat has mounted since John Ashcroft announced the arrest of Abdullah Al Mujahir, a U.S. citizen and former Chicago street gang member for allegedly conspiring with al Qaeda to detonate a diry bomb inside the U.S.

But that plot isn't the only thing worrying U.S. officials. The Times of London in November reported that Western intelligence officials believe bin Laden's organization has acquired nuclear materials, allegedly from Pakistan. Although the Pakistani government pooh-poohed the reports and insists its nuclear program is in safe hands, it had earlier placed two of its best-known former nuclear scientists in "protective custody." One had been an outspoken supporter of the Taliban.

Concerns over Pakistan's nukes aren't limited to the possibility of small amounts of nuclear waste finding its way into the hands of Al Qaeda. Know-how remains an essential component of any nuclear weapons program, and Western intelligence services are plainly concerned over the possibility of bin Laden's network attracting sympathetic individuals from among Pakistan's nuclear scientists.

But even if Al Qaeda is in possession of nuclear material, it need not necessarily have come from Pakistan. Unsubstantiated rumors have abounded for much of the past decade about the possibility of small nuclear bombs being lost by Moscow during the breakup of the Soviet Union, and possibly being sold by criminals to terrorists. In the past eight years, 175 cases have been recorded worldwide of nuclear materials (not bombs) being smuggled out of former Soviet territories and other countries. Such material could have reached bin Laden through criminals, intelligence officials reportedly believe Al Qaeda operatives have been stung more than once by con men offering them relatively harmless spent fuel disguised as weapons-grade radioactive material or by sympathizers in Chechnya. Bin Laden operatives reportedly also tried in 1993 to buy enriched uranium produced in South Africa on the black market.

While it may be far from inconceivable that bin Laden's network may have the capability to create a dirty bomb, operating a nuclear program would be a Herculean challenge for an organization whose survival depends on its relative invisibility. Even fully-functioning states such as Pakistan have needed decades of research and the assistance of nuclear-capable allies to develop their bomb programs, and they haven't had to hide the extensive scientific and industrial infrastructure required to build nuclear weapons. And given that a dirty bomb's function is primarily to spread terror through contamination, terrorists may be inclined to view chemical and biological weapons as a more attractive investment.

But just as the September 11 terrorists created fearsome weapons out of America's own civilian transport system, their successors may seek to do the same with the U.S. civilian energy infrastructure. The International Atomic Energy Agency warned last fall that "we have been alerted to the potential of terrorists targeting nuclear facilities or using radioactive sources to incite panic, contaminate property, and even cause injury or death among civilian populations," and called for massive new investment in the security of the world's nuclear energy facilities. Indeed, the first order of business in defending against an Al Qaeda nuclear threat may simply involve rendering America's atomic energy plants safe from attack.

WHAT IS A 'DIRTY BOMB'?
 
TIME Pentagon correspondent Mark Thompson explains:

"Dirty nukes are what you may choose to build if you're unable to create a real nuclear bomb, i.e. one whose explosion is based on a nuclear reaction. A dirty bomb is a conventional explosive salted with radioactive isotopes in order to spew out that nuclear material and contaminate a wide area. The military usefulness of such devices have always been in dispute. In fact, the TNT in such a bomb may still be more dangerous than the nuclear material. Its destructive power would really depend on the size of the conventional bomb, and the volume and nature of the nuclear material.

"The assumption has been that forces who would build a dirty nuke would do so because it's far, far easier than to build a nuclear bomb. It's unlikely to kill 10,000 people, but any bomb that killed people and set off Geiger counters would terrify a whole city. It's ultimately a pure terror weapon." 


http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,182637,00.html

[Xavier_Onassis]

THey'd have to add a bureau to the government to decontaminate people, and your Christian plan 4 less government might not come to fruition.

[Christians4LessGvt]

Gvts and intel agencies don't worry Universe Prince proclaims we "underestimate the difficulty".
Lets stick our heads in the sand.
 



Uranium Could Have Made Dirty Bomb
Police Say Seized Radioactive Material Was Suitable for a Terrorist 'Dirty Bomb'

By KAREL JANICEK and WILLIAM J. KOLE Associated Press Writers
BRATISLAVA, Slovakia Nov 29, 2007 (AP)



Two Hungarians and a Ukrainian arrested in an attempted sale of uranium were peddling material believed to be from the former Soviet Union, police said Thursday. Officials claimed it was weapons-grade uranium, but outside experts questioned that assessment and suggested it might be far less lethal.

The three men, who were arrested Wednesday in eastern Slovakia and Hungary, were trying to sell about a pound of uranium in powder form, said First Police Vice President Michal Kopcik.

"It was possible to use it in various ways for terrorist attacks," Kopcik said.

Kopcik said investigators believed the uranium was suitable for a radiological "dirty bomb." He said the uranium had been stashed in unspecified containers, and that investigators determined it contained 98.6 percent uranium-235. Uranium is considered weapons-grade if it contains at least 85 percent uranium-235.

But nuclear experts who were shown police photographs of radioactivity readings contended the material was probably not as dangerous as authorities believe.

Experts suggested the police confused a scientific reading of the material as dealing with its "concentration" of uranium-235, when in fact it was just a "confidence" level of the machine to give an accurate reading.

"Uranium is not very radiotoxic," said David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector who is now president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington.

"The net effect of dispersing half a kilo (about a pound) of uranium who cares? Each person would get so little it would have no effect," Albright said.

Alexander Glaser, a researcher at Princeton University's Program in Science and Global Security, said any discussion of dirty bombs in this case was "off topic."

"Even naturally occurring uranium would be more effective than this in making a dirty bomb," he said.

Investigators were still working to determine who ultimately was trying to buy the uranium, which the three allegedly were selling for $1 million.

Kopcik said police had intelligence suggesting that the suspects whose names were not released but were all men aged 40, 49 and 51 originally had planned to close the deal sometime between Sunday and Wednesday. Police moved in when the sale did not occur as expected, he said.

One of the Hungarians had been living in Ukraine.

Kopcik said three other suspects including a Slovak national identified only as Eugen K. were detained in the neighboring Czech Republic in mid-October for allegedly trying to sell fake radioactive materials. It was unclear to what degree, if any, they played a role in the thwarted uranium sale.

"According to initial findings, the material originated in the former Soviet republics," Kopcik said.

The arrests heightened long-standing concerns that Eastern Europe is serving as a source of radioactive material for terrorist weapons.

Experts say roughly 55 pounds of highly enriched uranium or plutonium is needed in most instances to fashion a crude nuclear device. But they say a tiny fraction of that is enough for a dirty bomb a weapon whose main purpose would be to create fear and chaos, not human casualties.

Vitaly Fedchenko, a researcher with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said people should not get the idea that the world is awash in easily obtainable bomb components.

"The danger is definitely there. But there's no reason to panic," he said. "Most of the 'buyers' out there are law enforcement agents. And not all of the materials out there are weapons grade."

Eastern Slovakia's border with Ukraine is the European Union's easternmost frontier, and authorities have spent millions tightening security in recent years, fearing terrorists or organized crime syndicates could smuggle in weapons, explosives and other contraband.

In 2003, police in the Czech Republic, which borders Slovakia, arrested two Slovaks in a sting operation in the city of Brno after they allegedly sold undercover officers natural depleted uranium for $715,000.

Slovak and Hungarian police worked together on the new case starting in August, Kopcik said.

Ukraine's Interior Ministry declined immediate comment on the arrests. Marina Ostapenko, spokeswoman for the National Security Service, said she did not have any information, and the Ukrainan atomic agency could not be reached for comment.

But Natalia Shumkova, head of the Fuel and Energy Ministry's nuclear energy department, said the International Atomic Energy Agency strictly controls all the enriched uranium that is used in Ukraine.

Ukrainian authorities, Western governments and international watchdogs repeatedly have warned that radioactive material from the nation's 15 operational reactors and the Chernobyl nuclear power plant could find its way into the hands of terrorists.

In recent years, Ukrainian authorities have arrested more than a dozen people on suspicion of smuggling or purchasing radioactive materials.

The IAEA, which closely tracks reports of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials, said it was trying to contact Slovak and Hungarian authorities for more information.

Richard Hoskins, an IAEA official who administers the tracking database, said that last year alone, the U.N. nuclear watchdog registered 252 reported cases of radioactive materials that were stolen, missing, smuggled or in the possession of unauthorized individuals a 385 percent increase since 2002.

But Hoskins cautioned that the spike probably was due at least in part to better reporting and improved law enforcement efforts. Of the 252 cases, about 85 involved thefts or losses, and not all the material was suitable for use in a weapon, he said.

Even so, "there are far too many incidents of material not being properly controlled," Hoskins told The Associated Press in a telephone interview. "If we can do a better job, we can help keep these materials from falling into terrorist hands."

If terrorists ever succeeded in gathering enough material to make a nuclear weapon and detonate it, he added, "the consequences would be so catastrophic, the world would be a different place the next day."

Concerns about nuclear smuggling have generally been focused on Russia and countries of the former Soviet Union, where security at nuclear-related industries deteriorated after the 1991 Soviet collapse.

The U.S.-based Nuclear Threat Initiative, an organization dedicated to reducing the global threat from nuclear weapons, said in a report last year that Russia remains the prime country of concern for contraband nuclear material.

In 2006, Georgian agents working with CIA officials set up a sting that led to the arrest of a Russian citizen who tried to sell a small amount of weapons-grade uranium that he had in a plastic bag in his jacket pocket.

In 1997, seven men who officials said planned to smuggle 11 pounds of enriched uranium to Pakistan or China were arrested in Novosibirsk, Russia. That uranium reportedly had been stolen from a plant in the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan.

http://abcnews.go.com/International/WireStory?id=3930475&page=1

[Plane]

Well, I realized after posting that computers had become much more widely available and computing power vastly increased since the days of the Manhattan Project.  However, I didn't bother to modify my post  because I recalled reading somewhere that John von Neumann, one of the project's star mathematicians, DID have access to the most powerful computer of the day when he was at Los Alamos.  It was my understanding that the Project therefore was working with the advantage of computers.  I stand to be corrected, of course.

I presume that you have access to a computer equal to the most advanced design existing in 1945?

I consider this likely because you are posting on the internet which requires much more computing power than any Computer had prior to 1975.(or earlyer)

I have purchased Computers roughly equivelent to the Univac for five dollars or so.

A compter might be very usefull in makeing a triggering mechanism , but in coputeing the needed mass of fission fuel , why compute anything? The masses of successfull bombs have been published.

Also , if the sub critical masses were brought to gether with insuffecient force hey would undergo a chain reaction early and before they were close enough together to sustain the reaction this would produce a small explosion probly just enough to wreck the bomb Even this sort of fizzle would be a dirty bomb and not a waste to a terrorist.

Sub Critical Masses bought to gether at any speed above the minimum needed would behave the same , once the chain reaction is established in a critical mass its progress depends on the motion of particles at lightspeed. So once the needed propellent power is determined haveing a little excess is just insureance , the premeters are not tight or difficult to acheive.

The last cupple of days I have learned stuff ablut Atomic Bomb building that maes me think that I had overestimated the difficulty.
Makeing a wheel for a Helicopter or Sports car from Magneisium is much more demanding technically.

Uranium is very hard to refine into fuel suitable for an Atomic Bomb ,every other step in the process of building a bomb is simple and widely understood. It is quite difficult to make one of these bombs lightewight and optimise its effeciency , but to make one that could be carryed in a truck is not much of a challenge.

[Plane]

<<Uranium does not require an implosion just that two sub critical masses be brought to gether at a rate greater than the rate that they can repel themselves , if you made a hammer and anvil out of highly enriched Uranium smacking them together by hand would produce an explosion , but not an optimum explosion , the explosion would be random in its output and tend to be on the small side , increaseing the speed at which they approach each other makes the process more dependable and yeild more , if they are in full contact before the chain reaction occurs the exposion will be optimised .>>

I guess the first thing that comes to my mind is the intense sensation of waste - - astonomical amounts of wasted money and wasted time, due to those Neanderthals over at the Manhattan Project not realizing how easy it was, had they only gone to simple hammer-and-anvil design and bypassed all the hi-falutin mathematical and physical theories those Nobel nincompoops were so busily spinning, controlled explosions, critical mass, etc.  no doubt to keep their overinflated paycheques coming in regularly.  Critical mass my critical ass.  plane, where you when they needed you?


<<It is rediculous to state that the sub critical masses must be very finely machined . . . >>

I never stated that.  I don't know if they must or they mustn't, but I rather suspect that they were very finely machined, probably for very good reasons unknown to schleppers like me.

 

One of the test rigs thay used was a tower with a shaft . A Sub critical mass was dropped down a pipe where it would pass through another sub critical mass that was torous shape . They would observe the effect of the momentary contact. One of the things that they had to be carefull of was that this rig never produced a supercritical mass. Carefull figuring allowed this test to be conducted with masses that were short of citical mass when combined  , but were large enough to give interesting results . This sort of eperiment need never be repeated , what they learned there wasn't forgotten.

The principal of a criticalmass is simple enough that a muleskinner could catch on , is a Schlepper a freight hauler?The math invoved need not be completely understood by a bomb assembler , but would a high level of intelligence truely preclude terrorists from being able?