How Good Was the Good War?

[Religious Dick]

July 14, 2008 Issue
Copyright ? 2008 The American Conservative

How Good Was the Good War?

For many Americans, World War II remains the Great Crusade. For George W. Bush, John McCain, and legions of Churchill-worshipping neoconservatives, it is that and more: they take from the war?especially the war against Hitler??lessons? that must inform current American statecraft. Patrick Buchanan disagrees. In Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, a book critically reviewed for TAC by historian John Lukacs, he depicts the war as an avoidable disaster and object lesson in what not to do.

Revisionism is the lifeblood of history. Facts may not change, but with the passage of time perspective can.  Perhaps the moment is ripe for Americans to take a fresh look at World War II, one that might revolve around the following questions:

Do the war?s canonical lessons, such as Munich, retain their instructive power, or does the war offer other lessons of greater relevance? Does Churchill provide a model of statesmanship useful for American presidents? What about the largely forgotten Pacific War? Are there other wars, for example, the Great War of 1914-18 in which Churchill also figured prominently, that might offer more when it comes to illuminating the present?

While it would be impossible to respond to all of these questions in a brief essay, we invited several TAC contributors to use them as guideposts in offering their own interpretations of the lessons of World War II.

Scott McConnell
Thomas E. Woods Jr.
Andrew J. Bacevich
Stuart Reid
Christopher Layne
Ted Galen Carpenter
Michael Vlahos

http://www.amconmag.com/2008/2008_07_14/cover.html

[BT]

Interesting read.

[Michael Tee]

Most of the authors cited were of the same view with regard to the "lessons of Munich," and I agree with them.  Munich was unavoidable for Britain and France simply because they needed time to rearm, and war at that time with the Axis powers would have had them at a disadvantage.  The real "lesson of Munich" is "Don't start a war with a country that's much better prepared and better armed than you are."  The fake lesson is, "Strike hard at an enemy without waiting for him to strike at you."  This was easily fitted into justification of wars of gratuitous aggression, such as Viet Nam and  Iraq.

[_JS]

That's a very common talking point nowadays about "appeasement" and especially Neville Chamberlain. It is rarely mentioned exactly how Britain was to prevent the annexation of the Sudetenland, or that the German residents of the Sudetenland were generally accepting of the takeover. Another piece of the puzzle is that the Nationalist Party of Slovakia was supported directly by the Nazis. Specifically, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, who later became the Fascist ruler of that country and was even verbally praised by Hitler for his role in turning Jews over to the death camps. (Not that Christian nationalism had anything to do with Fascism mind you - <sorry, couldn't resist the sarcasm>).

Germany easily had the greatest army in the world at the time (and until '44 probably).

As a side note, it is interesting in the US that Churchill is probably the most famous British politician (well, maybe Blair now). In Britain Clement Attlee easily defeated Churchill and is as admired today as Churchill ever was (by Tories, Labour, and LibDems). 

[Plane]

The "lessons of Munich," ... ."

Munich was unavoidable for Britain and France simply because they needed time to rearm, and war at that time with the Axis powers would have had them at a disadvantage.  The real "lesson of Munich" is "Don't be so weak that you must kowtow to the demands of insidious  but strong tyrants.

[Michael Tee]

<<The real "lesson of Munich" is "Don't be so weak that you must kowtow to the demands of insidious  but strong tyrants.>>

It sounds like you ignored most of the post that preceded yours in this thread, which is a pity because _JS made some very solid points.  "Kowtowing" is hardly the term to use when (a) Britain and France had no vital interest at stake in Czechoslovakia, (b) the population of the Sudetenland, which was mostly ethnic German, had no real objection to being incorporated into Nazi Germany and becoming part of a nation which spoke their language and was of their own ethnicity and (c) the "Slovakia" part of Czechoslovakia had no objection at all to the deal.  (Incidentally, Father Joseph Tiso, the Nazi-loving RC priest who led Slovakia as a German satellite during the war and zealously delivered all of its Jews to Nazi death camps, was promptly strung up after the war by the "evil" Red Army.)

Nor have any "insidious but strong tyrants" ever demanded that the U.S. "kowtow" to their "demands" since the end of WWII.  It is in fact the U.S. which has demanded time and again that others kowtow to its demands.

For the War Party, the "lesson of Munich" seems to be:
1.  Attack only those who you think can't fight back;
2.  Paint your victim as Hitler, his country as Nazi Germany, yourselves as Churchill and your opposition as Neville Chamberlain.
3.  NEVER underestimate the stupidity of the American people.

[Xavier_Onassis]

Munich was unavoidable for Britain and France simply because they needed time to rearm, and war at that time with the Axis powers would have had them at a disadvantage.  The real "lesson of Munich" is "Don't be so weak that you must kowtow to the demands of insidious  but strong tyrants.
=============================
I disagree that Munich was the issue.

When Hitler decided to retake the Saar, that was when both the French and the British had the power to prevent this. Pretty much every expert I have read agrees that before the Saar takeover, Germany had neither the strength or the adequate support to hold onto the Saar. Without the Saarland, Germany lacked the resources to build the sort of army needed to invade Poland, and perhaps the Sudatenland.

[Michael Tee]

<<When Hitler decided to retake the Saar, that was when both the French and the British had the power to prevent this. >>

ANOTHER excellent point.  And IMHO, the reason why Britain and France let Hitler take back the Saar was because he had a lot of silent and not-so-silent support from the ruling class in both countries.  Hitler was seen by them as the bulwark against Communism, someone who would keep the means of production out of the hands of the people and safe in the hands of those who truly deserved them, the industrialists and financiers.   And hopefully, with a little more time and a bit of luck, Hitler would take care of the Soviet Union for them, too.