From the link provided in the opening post.
"It is alleged that McCain gave the numbers of aircraft in his flight formation, information about location of rescue ships, and the order of which his attack was supposed to take place. According to retired Army Colonel Earl Hopper, McCain divulged classified information North Vietnam used to hone their air defense system, including “the package routes, which were routes used to bomb North Vietnam. He gave in detail the altitude they were flying, the direction, if they made a turn … he gave them what primary targets the United States was interested in.” As result, Hopper claims, the U.S. lost 60 per cent more aircraft, and in 1968 “called off the bombing of North Vietnam, because of the information McCain had given to them.”"
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Some facts concerning the air war over North Vietnam. Of particular interest:
"North Vietnamese to increase their missile firings from 30 per month in the first 11 months of operation to 270 per month between July 1966 and October 1967. >>>>The latter month, with between 590 and 740 SAMs fired, was the peak month of firing until the Linebacker II operations of 1972.<<<< From October 1967 to the bombing halt on 1 April 1968, SAM firings averaged 220 per month. During this period, the American airmen observed 5,366-6,037 SAMs, which downed 115-128 aircraft.
Despite the increase in SAM firings, their direct effectiveness declined. In 1965 it took almost 18 SAMs to down each American aircraft, a figure that rose to 35 in 1966, >>>>to 57 in 1967, and to 107 in 1968. <<<<"
BSB
"The Vietnam air war changed dramatically on 24 July 1965 when a Soviet SA-2 [(Russian ?-75, NATO reporting name SA-2 Guideline] missile downed an Air Force F-4 and damaged three others. Proving this shoot down was no fluke, two days later an SA-2 destroyed an American drone. .................................................................................................
........................................................................................Despite knowledge of the missile since 1957, and its potential (similar to the Nike Ajax), the United States made only mixed progress with countermeasures. Tight budgets in the late 1950s hampered these efforts. Airmen assigned high priority to countermeasures against the SA-2 in budgets for fiscal years 1964 and 1965, but had nothing effective in hand when the need arose. As a result, in 1964, some airmen believed that aircraft could not operate in SAM protected areas. ...
The potential SAM threat grew as the North Vietnamese incorporated more missiles into their inventory. North Vietnamese SAM battalions increased from one in 1965 to 25 the next year, to 30 in 1967, and to 35-40 in 1968. This growth in units permitted the North Vietnamese to increase their missile firings from 30 per month in the first 11 months of operation to 270 per month between July 1966 and October 1967. The latter month, with between 590 and 740 SAMs fired, was the peak month of firing until the Linebacker II operations of 1972. From October 1967 to the bombing halt on 1 April 1968, SAM firings averaged 220 per month. During this period, the American airmen observed 5,366-6,037 SAMs, which downed 115-128 aircraft.
Despite the increase in SAM firings, their direct effectiveness declined. In 1965 it took almost 18 SAMs to down each American aircraft, a figure that rose to 35 in 1966, to 57 in 1967, and to 107 in 1968. A number of factors contributed to this decline.
The airmen quickly learned that the SA-2 could be outmaneuvered. The Soviets designed the SA-2 to destroy highflying, non-maneuvering, strategic bombers; but until 1972 it engaged primarily low-flying, very maneuverable, tactical fighters. ............................................................................"
<http://warandgame.blogspot.com/2008/04/vietnam-sam.html>
