Myth: being acquitted in a U.S. court means you won't be punished for the crime

[Universe Prince]

posted by Radley Balko over at Reason Hit & Run:

Most people are still under the quaint assumption that you can't be punished for a crime for which you've been acquitted. Not true.  In cases where a defendant is convicted of some of the charges against him but acquitted of others, the state can pursue a sentence that includes punishment for the acquitted charges. Yes.  You read that correctly.  A recent decision from a U.S. district court in Virginia is unusually candid in pointing out the absurdity of the practice, which is apparently pretty common:                               After an eleven-day trial, a jury acquitted defendant Michael Ibanga of all of the drug distribution charges against him and one of the two money laundering charges against him in the Indictment. The single count of which defendant Ibanga was convicted typically would result in a Guidelines custody range of 51 to 63 months. However, the United States demanded that the Court sentence defendant Ibanga based on the alleged drug dealing for which he was acquitted. This increased the Guidelines custody range to 151 to 188 months, a difference of about ten years. … What could instill more confusion and disrespect than finding out that you will be sentenced to an extra ten years in prison for the alleged crimes of which you were acquitted? The law would have gone from something venerable and respected to a farce and a sham. From the public’s perspective, most people would be shocked to find out that even United States citizens can be (and routinely are) punished for crimes of which they were acquitted. The opinion itself is refreshingly abrupt and scathing, and seems to have come from the pen of a pretty fed-up judge.  It includes a history of the right to a jury trial, and quotes from Dickens. As Cato's Tim Lynch explains, extra jail time for acquitted charges both encourages prosecutors to over-charge defendants, and encourages defendants to accept plea bargains -- knowing that at trial they could well be sentenced for crimes they didn't commit. If you're wondering if all of this is a violation of the Sixth Amendment, well, if the Sixth Amendment means anything at all, it most certainly is.   But we're talking mostly about drug crimes, here -- where the Bill of Rights doesn't apply.

And a little more of my faith in the American justice system to be about justice is chipped away. More and more the system seems to be not about protecting the rights of people, but about making sure people get punished. Kinda like how law enforcement seems to be not about protecting the rights of people but about catching law breakers. But then, to be fair, we have to go back to the legislatures who are making up the laws not to protect the rights of people but to crack down on crime, to get tough on criminals, et cetera. But hey, if that is what the people want, I guess they don't care about having their rights protected.

Sixth Amendment? Constitution? Who really gives a damn anymore? Rights? What rights? The bastard probably had it comin'. Why should anyone care about the rights of criminals. They're not human beings, after all. They're criminals.

(For those watching at home, that last part was all sarcasm. If you try this at home, remember to wear safety goggles.)

[Amianthus]

Most people are still under the quaint assumption that you can't be punished for a crime for which you've been acquitted.

I was disabused of that notion when OJ was acquited of crimes, yet faced huge civil fines for those crimes.

I said at that time that it was a bad direction. The practice has continued and grown well, lovingly cared for by both major political parties.

[Universe Prince]

At least with Simpson they tried to claim it wasn't double jeopardy because the charges in the civil case were not the same charges as in the criminal case.

But I know what you mean, Amianthus. It seems we are moving, or have moved, from "innocent until proven guilty" to "not guilty until accused".

[_JS]

Not that I agree with what took place in the story above, but are there not cases where something similar is justified? I'm thinking specifically about the Federal Government using the violation of one's civil rights as a crime to overturn biased and intimidated all white juries that would not convict individuals for committing crimes against blacks or those who defended the rights of blacks in the segregated South.

Philidelphia, Mississippi or the Birmingham bomber are excellent examples where some have claimed that the Federal Government violated the principle of double jeopardy. Yet, in an instance where a jury is clearly either in passive support of the crime committed or intimidated - should that verdict be counted?

[domer]

This case seems directly contrary to Apprendi, Blakely and their progeny. It has to do, most obviously, with the standard of proof and locus of decision (judge or jury) for sentence enhancers. The topic gets tricky because the rules just mentioned apply to sentences not authorized by the statute providing the basis for the conviction itself. The classic example (Apprendi) is a hate-crime enhancer based on the additional fact of racial animus. Now, if the alleged drug dealer was convicted of a crime statutorily carrying a range, say, of 36 months to 120 months, then technically the Apprendi line of cases doesn't address the problem. This leaves the thornier and as yet unresolved question of allocating a standard of proof (usually reasonable doubt or a preponderance of the evidence) to the issue of length-of-term within a previously-set range of punishment. That, I surmise, is where the crux lies in this case.

[domer]

Double jeopardy, famously, doesn't apply among different, sovereign jurisdictions.

[_JS]

Double jeopardy, famously, doesn't apply among different, sovereign jurisdictions.

Good point. Still, there is little denying that in those cases the Federal Government was basically overturning what it saw as incorrect decisions made by juries at the state level.

[domer]

True. More properly, however, in the U.S. Attorney's discretion, the values represented by, say, the civil rights laws were not fulfilled by alternate means (that is, state prosecution), so direct federal action was necessary.