We Want Answers on Iraq, then We Want Policy

[domer]

It can't be emphasized enough, given the dynamics now in place due to the occupation of Iraq, that we must think before we act. We need the best information and intelligence possible, and the most exacting, open analysis and discussion. As I see it, two interrelated issues should draw prime attention. First, winning. I don't particularly even like that term. It harkens to more simple pursuits, like sports, where triumph is defined as the purpose. The more complex a situation becomes, the less powerful this incentive. Not a death-struggle with credibly-threatening enemy, as in WWII, "winning" recedes in importance to solving the problem at hand. That problem (establishing a stable and peaceful world by eliminating the violent, radical Islamic extremists as an influential ideological and operative force in the world) does not necessarily entail America's saving face (although its failure to do so could very well affect the dynamics of an eventual peace). Rather, IF it will advance the cause of peace, America should be willing to accept a "loss" in that particular battle of the war on terror. The measure of our successful disengagement will depend not on whether Iraq is a democracy, a federation or a caliphate (maybe), but whether it is peaceful and stable. Part of that picture HAS TO CONSIDER whether any part of Iraq will become a safe-haven for al Qaeda-style terrorists. This is a prime concern.

Another main concern is, second, preserving life and health in Iraq. To some extent this can be conceived as being independent of the win-loss problem. That is, regardless of other concerns, given our role of precipitating (creating) the bloodshed in Iraq, would our evacuation lead to more loss of life and misery than our staying in some form for a more gradual, eventual redeployment?

[sirs]

actually your question(s) should lean more towards
- We want different answers than the ones we've already gotten and have determined we don't like
- We want a different policy than the current one of standing down as the Iraqis stand-up

So, let's get those answered, shall we

[domer]

Leaving aside the question of a bloodbath in the wake of our withdrawal and our responsibility for it, one thing I can soundly recommend is an immediate treaty with the Iraqi government allowing us to maintain a "striker force" in Iraq itself, or assuring its deployment from elsewhere, to fight, after consultation but in our discretion alone, "terrorist nodes," including training camps, weapons labs and anything similar of a hostile usage.

[sirs]

Leaving aside the question of a bloodbath in the wake of our withdrawal and our responsibility for it, one thing I can soundly recommend is an immediate treaty with the Iraqi government allowing us to maintain a "striker force" in Iraq itself, or assuring its deployment from elsewhere, to fight, after consultation but in our discretion alone, "terrorist nodes," including training camps, weapons labs and anything similar of a hostile usage.

What is the timing of this "Striker Force" Domer?  Before or after Iraq is ready to handle their own security?  If it's done after the Iraqis have proclaimed they can handle things themselves, is that not intervening where they said no?  Is that still standing up, even after the Iraqis' have stood up?

And here's the biggest problem with any "redeployment" regardless of leaving a "striker force", IF the Iraqis are not ready to handle their own security.  What forces you do leave there, regardless of the firepower you leave them with, will have no immediate back-up.  Redeployment takes assets AWAY from the theatre of battle.  Yea, you can say folks can be sent back in, in a moment's notice.  Problem is the battle will be over long before that "moment" occurs.  I realize how fast we can move forces, especially with airlifting.  But any redeployment not only gives a thumbs-up to the enemy as having driven us out, but more so, puts whatever folks we still have present, at MUCH greater risk.

My recommendation for any "striker force" is to maintain precisely what General Casey says he needs.  If he requires more troops, then he should get more troops.  If he says he only needs a striker force of a few hundred, or a couple of thousand, then I recommend a few hundred or a couple of thousand.

[BT]

If i were Bush i would send in 30-40 thousand more troops and pacify the most violent regions. Historically everytime we increase troop strength n Iraq US and Iraqi casualties decreased. The insurgents believe that if they kill a handful more troops we will lose the will to fight. They may be half right. Nethertheless we need to send a strong message that that is not the case.

If Congress has a problem with that they can withdraw authorization through the War Powers Act.

[Plane]

If i were Bush i would send in 30-40 thousand more troops and pacify the most violent regions. Historically everytime we increase troop strength n Iraq US and Iraqi casualties decreased. The insurgents believe that if they kill a handful more troops we will lose the will to fight. They may be half right. Nethertheless we need to send a strong message that that is not the case.

If Congress has a problem with that they can withdraw authorization through the War Powers Act.

This doesn't seem unlikely to me, especialy if we can continue to improve the strength of Iraqs own defenses.

I don't think that any avilible choice includes a garuntee of success .

How much really are people like you and I involved in the "we" that makes this sort of decision?

[BT]

How much really are people like you and I involved in the "we" that makes this sort of decision?

People like you and I are not involved in the "we"unless we choose to make our voices heard through our Representative, Senators and even the President.

A written letter seems to work better than electronic correspondence, i have been told. Letters to the editors of your local papers can also help make your opinion known.

[Plane]

Letters come mostly from the dissatisfied.

[BT]

Letters come mostly from the dissatisfied.

I suppose correspondence advocating a change from the status quo, could be interpreted as dissatisfaction.

[domer]

Assessing the opposition: who is in league with whom, and how can we expect them to behave in the wake of a withdrawal? As I understand it, al Qaeda-style terrorists comprise a small percentage of the Iraqi outlaws, and they are the ones WE should be most concerned about, if not exclusively concerned about. They are our sworn enemies, with a track record. Their ability to use an Iraq-after-withdrawal as a safe-haven, a launching-pad, a training-camp center, a weapons-lab refuge and the like should be our main (only?) concern. Yet, will that horror develop in the wake of a withdrawal? The other components of the Iraqi opposition fall into three general categories: the Sunni (Ba'athist) insurgents; the sectarian militia, and those concerned with nonpolitical criminal activities.

None of these latter three groups, however, have any particular gripe with the US, but only with its occupation of Iraq. Well, the criminals don't even care about that, particularly. The Sunnis want a share of oil revenue and either an autonomous, federated region or a meaningful voice in running the country. Their interest in killing Americans extends only as far as the occupation lasts, I suggest, for the reason that the Americans ousted their government and enable its replacement  to function with policies disadvantageous to their group. On the other hand, the sectarians, a more mysterious set of groupings as far as motivations go, seem to draw strength from resistance to the government and its Shi'ite loyalties (the Sunni sectarians), a frank religious motivation to establish an Islamic state (some Shi'ite sectarians), and a pan-Shi'ite drive fueled by Iran and aimed at either unity with it or a close, close alliance (other Shi'ite sectarians; the latter two groups overlap). From these latter two groups, the danger to America is more diffuse than it is with al-Qaeda: a general animosity to the "Great Satan," but not yet a jihad.

The question is how much will these latter groups (excluding al-Qaeda) tolerate a "terroist base" within the country. I assume that with the dissolution of the occupation, Sunni-insurgent ire towards America will wane significantly, with not pose a problem for us. I also assume that Shi'ite sectarianism will be subsumed under our policy towards Iran, and will not present a significant problem independent of it. So, how can true anti-American terrorists be expected to fare in Iraq post-occupation?

The other elephant in the room is how all these groups will behave in the wake of a withdrawal. Can we expect a bloodbath, an outright civil war, a contagious chaos? How many lives will be negatively impacted? Can we even prevent these nightmares by remaining in-country in force? And, importantly, how much would we be morally responsible for a worst-case outcome, if we left, due to our role in toppling the vicious, oppressive regime that held all these forces in check?

[sirs]

The other elephant in the room is how all these groups will behave in the wake of a withdrawal. Can we expect a bloodbath, an outright civil war, a contagious chaos?

In 1 word, YES

[domer]

I will defer to the unfolding discussion any "definitive answer" to that, but the question remains as to whether we should be caught up in the tumult, whether we can avert this worst case scenario anyhow, and, of course, how long is too long to stay? We are not committed in perpetuity. Even if we bear moral responsibility for the potential unleashing of all these destructive forces, doesn't there come a time when our responsibility is so attenuated -- both by changing circumstances on the ground AND, somewhat ironically, the pent up dynamics that were in place long before we entered? It can be said that a catalyst is not necessarily a cause.

[sirs]

I will defer to the unfolding discussion any "definitive answer" to that, but the question remains as to whether we should be caught up in the tumult, whether we can avert this worst case scenario anyhow, and, of course, how long is too long to stay? We are not committed in perpetuity.

We are (or should) be committed by morality.  The coalition took out their Government (for absolutely justified reasons, as it relates to America's long term security, in my never so humble opinion), and has an absolute obligation to the Iraqi people, who was a 3rd party bystander in this action, to help reinstate a functioning government for them.  So far, so good.  They have a new Government, they have a new ratified Constitution, & they have a new elected leader.  Done so faster than our own country could ever dream

Bush can be called alot of things, some of them even justified.  It's my belief that he does see the big picture, he does see our country's security, decades down the road as more secure now that Saddam is out of power (1st mission accomplished), and with what we're trying to do in Iraq (current 2nd mission).  A stable Democratic Iraq, in the heart of the all the Islamic Fundamentalism that surrounds it, truely has the potential of snuffing out a cancerous growth, that of Militant Islam, at least in that region.  That's ONLY if we succeed. 

It will NOT succeed if we pull out before Iraq is prepared to handle their own security.  No timetable outside of the one we've already imposed...Once Iraq can handle their own security, we can then pull out.  At that point we can negotiate if the Iraqis would wish us to stay as some sort of "striker force" within their boundries.  However if they say no, then we leave completely.  But NOT until the 2nd mission is accomplished

[Plane]

Could we retreat and marshall our forces for a forcefull return?


We could make it clear that we are only going a short distance and would return with great force in the case of a coup or a civil war.


Would being absent but near mollify the proud Iriqui who cannot bear to be occupied?

Would the threat of our return be credable enough to encourage peace?

[domer]

Good questions, Plane ... and there are many others.