Iraq is a problem that truly collapses upon itself. All depends, ultimately, on an indigenous political epiphany that we have less and less control over, if we ever any appreciable control at all. The given wisdom of how to fight an insurgency or guerilla war -- win hearts and minds, thereby draining popular support in its many facets, which all add up to disabling the antagonists to continue -- seems at this juncture to be dead in the water. Is there a wind that can provide the needed energy?
Iraq collapses upon itself for two reasons: the labyrinthine politics, conflicts and hatred, which have been in place since time immemorial, it seems, confound any effort at reconciliation. Further, the US presence, while not letting the situation get any "worse," may actually provoke political instability as a foreign occupier imposes its vision of Iraq's future on a tormented and hateful nation, which we can assume yearns, at least, for a peace that is theirs, if at all in the foreseeable future.
These are fundamental questions, the answers to which, yet untried to the proper degree, seem to point to a regional conference, and -- to spark understanding and healing -- a reciprocal "culture initiative" by the West and the Muslim world to dispel fears, establish common ground and build a framework for discussion and action to relieve conflicts. This is a long range plan, both idealistic and hopeful but certainly not devoid of a firm rational basis.
Whatever else we do to set policy for our role in Iraq in the coming weeks, these two suggestions should be integral.
Beyond that, what do we do? Train and withdraw? Recommit with a larger force and fight to the bloody end? Recognizing that events may already be progressing at a rate beyond our ability to control, we have to ask, as to the first question, isn't this a "stay the course" prescription, which famously hasn't worked to date? Indeed, is there any reasonable expectation that trained Iraqi forces, once we leave, would be up to repelling the onslaught?
The larger force to WIN is John McCain's baby, and, perhaps for that reason, given the amount of respect he seems to command, must be taken seriously. In contemplating this option, one is immediately presented with the problem alluded to above: the American presence may actually exacerbate the situation in significant ways. Even if that problem can be negotiated, there remains the willingness of the American electorate to see more of their own be killed and maimed for a cause even now poorly defined in terms of an acceptable outcome. Win? By pressing to "win," we may actually antagonize the larger Muslim world -- irrevocably? -- thereby exponentially complicating our true struggle with violent, terroristic Muslim radicals, whom we should be trying to isolate rather than drive into their arms the "Arab street."
There is the signal danger, in a situation like this, that too many cooks may spoil the pot. The Iraq Study Group has received such criticism. Then there is the proven danger that a myopic leader wedded to his own ideas can create a disaster.
So, what do we do?
